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Abstract  
The title of this thesis is Freedom of Association and Trade Union Rights in 
Europe, Comparative Analysis of the ECJ and ECtHR Case Law. There are 
several issues that the thesis will try to shed light on. Firstly, it will identify what 
level of freedom of association as a trade union right is deemed acceptable at the 
international and European levels. At the international level the ILO and ESC 
standards will be looked at, while at the regional level I will research the case law 
of the two European Courts – CJEU and ECtHR. Secondly, the standards of the 
CJEU and ECtHR will be compared to each other. This way, we will know which 
of the two protects trade union rights better and where there might be flaws. 
Thirdly, after comparing the CJEU and ECtHR standards with each other, they 
will be compared to the international standards of the ILO and ESC. This way I 
will check how the regional standards are in concert with the international 
standards that are respected worldwide. Finally, the prospects of EU accession to 
the ECHR will be looked at. Here I will investigate whether the accession might 
affect the protection of trade union freedoms in Europe, and if so, in what way. 
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Chapter I – Introduction  
The title of this thesis is Freedom of Association and Trade Union Rights in 
Europe, Comparative Analysis of the ECJ and ECtHR Case Law. There are 
several issues that the thesis will try to shed light on. Firstly, it will identify what 
level of freedom of association as a trade union right is deemed acceptable at the 
international and European levels. At the international level the ILO and ESC 
standards will be looked at, while at the regional level I will research the case law 
of the two European Courts – CJEU and ECtHR. Secondly, the standards of the 
CJEU and ECtHR will be compared to each other. This way, we will know which 
of the two protects trade union rights better and where there might be flaws. 
Thirdly, after comparing the CJEU and ECtHR standards with each other, they 
will be compared to the international standards of the ILO and ESC. This way I 
will check how the regional standards are in concert with the international 
standards that are respected worldwide. Finally, the prospects of EU accession to 
the ECHR will be looked at. Here I will investigate whether the accession might 
affect the protection of trade union freedoms in Europe, and if so, in what way. 
Now, in a few paragraphs, I will explain how the idea of this thesis emerged and 
why this research might be interesting for future developments in the field of 
trade union freedoms in Europe. Everything started with the famous case law of 
ECJ on Viking and Laval in 2007. The Court sent several important messages 
with these cases: it recognizes the protection of human rights and particularly 
trade union freedoms as important aspects of EU law, which stem from the 
constitutional traditions of the member states and therefore constitute the general 
principles of EU law. However, the Court made clear that these rights must be 
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reconciled with the fundamental freedoms of the EU, which are the basic 
fundament of the Union. According to the Court, while human rights can trump 
fundamental freedoms in certain cases, the other way round is also possible, 
which is what happened in the Viking and Laval and later in the Rüffert and 
Luxembourg cases. The position of the Court on this issue has not changed since 
then; economic freedoms are a priority in the Union, which, after all, were the 
main reason behind its creation.  
These cases are also alarming, since they do not only subordinate human rights to 
fundamental freedoms, but at the same time lower standards of protection for 
posted workers. The Posted Workers Directive, which was always understood to 
offer the minimum standards for states to comply with, was interpreted so 
narrowly by the Court that it can be easily argued that it now circumscribes the 
maximum level of protection for posted workers, and that states cannot introduce 
higher standards of protection even if they wish to do so. This position of the 
Court created more stability and certainty for companies posting workers, but it 
significantly lowered the standards of protection of these workers and put states 
willing to offer better protection for posted workers in a very difficult situation.  
This position of the Court is justified by the creation of a single market economy 
without borders, as a result of which the creation of wealth will be intensified and 
better living conditions will be guaranteed for everybody in the future. But this is 
in future. In the Viking Opinion Advocate General Maduro acknowledges that the 
creation of the common market might have negative consequences for workers in 
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Europe. He thinks that society in general should commit itself to supporting such 
workers economically in this difficult period of transition.1  
As a response, another regional Court in Europe – ECtHR – started to further 
promote trade union rights protection within its jurisdiction. Soon after the ECJ 
judgments the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) delivered two 
judgments (Demir and Baykara (2008) and Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen (2009)) on 
Article 11 ECHR. In these judgments the European Court overturned its previous 
case law on freedom of association, in which it had stated that the right to 
collective bargaining, the right to conclude collective agreement and the right to 
strike are means that the state may or may not choose to acknowledge for the 
protection of trade union freedoms (National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium 
1975; Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v Sweden 1976; Schmidt and Dahlström v 
Sweden 1976; Gustafsson v Sweden 1996). Instead, in the cases of Demir and 
Baykara and Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen the ECHR embraced a right to collective 
bargaining, a right to conclude a collective agreement and a right to strike as 
essential elements of the freedom of association protected under Article 11 of the 
European Convention.  
The Demir and Enerji cases can be considered as a step forward in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Even though the Court was not very explicit about 
recognizing the right to strike as an inherent element of the freedom of 
association, it still has improved its attitude towards this right by citing the 
international standards of the ILO and ESC where the right to strike enjoys the 
                                                          
1 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking 
Line ABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007], Opinion of AG Maduro; Para. 57-59.  
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highest level of protection and is considered a very important tool for the trade 
unions to protect the interests of their members.  
Certainly, these decisions fuelled the trade union rights protection in Europe with 
new energy. But they also served another, no less important purpose: they 
repudiated one of the main arguments of the ECJ mentioned in the Viking and 
Laval cases. In these cases, parties in support of trade unions claimed that a right 
to strike is a fundamental right and the freedom of movement provisions of EU 
should not oppress this right. One of the arguments used by the ECJ and 
Advocates General against this claim was that the ECHR does recognize it, but 
only as one of the means, necessary for the protection of trade union freedoms, 
that may or may not be used by states to achieve the protection of the freedom of 
association as a trade union freedom. The ECJ cited the previous cases of the 
ECtHR (before Demir and Enerji) where the Court was of the opinion that the 
right to strike is important but not necessarily the only means for the protection of 
trade union freedoms. In the case of Enerji, this was not mentioned again. 
Instead, the ILO and ESC standards were cited.  
The ECtHR did not stop at that. In the RMT judgment issued in 2014 the Court, 
for the first time, recognized secondary strikes as strikes protected under Article 
11 of the Convention. Even though the Court did not take full notice of the 
international standards and approved a total ban on this right by the UK, it still 
can be said that for the sake of future developments in the field this can be 
considered a progressive step.  
One important thing about the ECtHR case law is that the Court actively started 
to refer to the standards of the ILO and ESC. In the cases of Demir and Enerji the 
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Court offered these standards without providing any interpretation of them. It 
means that the Court trusts the ILO and ESC on their interpretations and does not 
challenge them in any sense. Therefore, the ILO and ESC standards are also 
important to consider.  
Despite the shift in the case law of the ECtHR, the position of the CJEU on the 
matter did not change. The CJEU still did not overturn its proportionality test on 
which it based its conclusions in the cases in 2007-2008. Trade union freedoms 
still need to be reconciled with economic freedoms. It is true, however, that 
unlike the CJEU, the ECHR does not have to deal with the economic freedoms of 
the EU. One might well argue that the situation of the ECtHR is much easier: it is 
a human rights court, without any other concerns.  
In 2009 the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. It added a totally new dimension to 
the relationship between social rights and economic freedoms in Europe. The 
Treaty has a special focus on social Europe. According to article 2 (3) TEU the 
Union shall establish a social market economy “aiming at full employment and 
social progress”.  
The Lisbon Treaty brought two major novelties: the prospect of accession of the 
EU to the ECHR and the binding effect of the EU Charter on Fundamental 
Rights. Article 6 (2) TEU provides the legal basis for the accession of the Union 
to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, at the same time securing that the Union’s competencies shall not be 
affected.  
The preparation for the accession started immediately after the Lisbon Treaty. 
Both European Courts were actively involved in the long process of negotiations 
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as a result of which the Accession Agreement was concluded in 2013. The 
agreement was sent to the CJEU for approval. Surprisingly, the CJEU did not 
approve it, on the grounds that it violated the autonomy of the EU and EU law. 
This was a result that not many commentators were expecting. The process of 
accession was seriously hindered, but I still believe that accession is an 
unavoidable outcome. The accession is provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon, it 
reflects the interests of all the parties (member states) who negotiated the Treaty 
among themselves. This is enough reason to believe that the accession is still 
going to happen. After accession the CJEU will have an explicit obligation to 
take a notice of ECtHR standards on human rights protection, including trade 
union freedoms. As a result, the CJEU might be formed as a more human rights-
oriented court.  
Another novelty of the Lisbon Treaty is the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 2000, which has acquired legally binding force. According to article 6(1) 
of the Lisbon Treaty the Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set 
out in the Charter and gives them the “same legal value as the Treaties”. The 
Charter contains a comprehensive list of all sorts of human rights, including 
social and economic ones.  
There is a detectable trend that after the Lisbon Treaty the ECJ started to make 
reference to the Charter as a main source of human rights in the EU legal order.2 
The question is how the CJEU interprets the rights mentioned in the Charter. As 
the discussion below shows, this is a problematic question. One thing that can be 
mentioned here is that the Charter, even though stating that the rights mentioned 
                                                          
2 Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, third edition, Oxford EU Law Library, 2012, p. 
100. 
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in it have the same scope as the rights in the ECHR, also implies that the specific 
characteristics of the EU have to be respected. In other words, the CJEU has 
freedom to interpret the rights from the Charter differently, justifying it by 
preserving the specificities of the EU and EU law. After accession, the CJEU will 
be more motivated to interpret rights according to ECHR standards in order to 
avoid embarrassing situations, when the ECtHR establishes a violation of human 
rights standards by the EU organs.  
As is clear from this brief description, the standard of trade union protection is 
not easy to establish in Europe. On the one hand there are two European Courts 
with different agendas. On the other hand there are existing standards established 
by the respective international organizations. Moreover, there are member states 
that of course are subordinated to the decisions of the institutions they are part of, 
but at the same time, are the ones (especially in the case of the EU) who create 
these organizations and define their agendas.  
The uncertainties caused by these developments might confuse those member 
states that are members of both European organizations – the EU and the CoE – 
and therefore are subject to the jurisdiction of the both European Courts, acting 
within the framework of both these organizations. Therefore, it is very important 
to find what level of protection of trade union freedoms in Europe is considered 
acceptable.  
1.1 Research Questions and Methodological Aspects  
The divergent attitude of the two European Courts in relation to social rights 
combined with the fact that they operate in the same region and that, therefore, 
the same countries are subject to their jurisdiction makes it important to research 
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these issues. Therefore, the two main research questions of this thesis are the 
following: 1. What is the lower acceptable level for freedom of association in 
Europe? 2. How can it be changed after the EU accession to the ECtHR?  
In answering these questions I will focus on two major aspects: firstly, I will 
analyze the jurisprudence of the European Courts and study what is the current 
situation in terms of recognition of freedom of association as a trade union right. 
By comparing the judgments of the Courts I will establish which aspects of the 
freedom of association are already recognized and applied in practice and which 
are not. Secondly, I will study the accession issue of the EU to the Convention 
and analyze the changes that social Europe might face in case of such an 
accession.  
The methodology that I use in the thesis is mostly comparative. First, I compare 
the recent case law of the European Courts with their old judgments and this way 
will show the shift (in certain cases progressive) the Courts have made in their 
jurisprudence. In the second stage, the jurisprudence of the European Courts will 
be compared. The results of this comparison will be compared to the standards of 
the ILO and ESC, in order to see how the European Courts comply with the 
established international standards.  
The thesis will consist of eight major chapters. The first chapter is the 
introduction. The following two chapters (II and III) will explain the notion of 
freedom of association as a trade union right from an international and an ILO 
perspective. The next two chapters (IV and V) will discuss the current 
developments in Europe and especially the case law of the ECJ and the ECHR. 
Chapter VI will make a comparison between ECJ and ECtHR case law. Chapter 
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VII will deal exclusively with the issue of EU accession to the European 
Convention. And finally, the last chapter, VIII, will summarize the findings of the 
thesis.  
Chapter II – Freedom of Association from an 
International Perspective  
2.1 The International Bill of Human Rights 
The period after the Second World War is considered to be the period in which 
modern international human rights law starts to emerge. The atrocities committed 
during the war made clear to the international community that there was a need to 
establish strong institutional mechanisms in order to guarantee legal protection of 
human rights, and in this way to achieve world peace and security.3 It became 
evident that national governments could not guarantee the safety and liberty of 
their people; in fact, some of them even became the machinery for killing. 
Therefore a broad worldwide consensus was achieved to place the individual 
human being under the protection of the international community.4  
At the San Francisco Conference in 1945 there was a request from some Latin 
American countries to include in the Charter of the United Nations a full code of 
human rights. The code was not included; however, the basic principles were set.5 
In the preamble of the UN Charter the member states take obligation “to save 
                                                          
3 International Human Rights Law: Six Decades after the UDHR and Beyond, M.A. Baderin and 
M. Ssenyonjo (Eds.) Ashgate Publishing Co., 2010, p. 6 
4 Introduction, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 6 December 1966, 
Audiovisual Library of International Law, by Christian Tomuschat, available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/iccpr/iccpr.html  
5 Ibid.   
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succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind”.6 In the same preamble the member states 
also determine themselves “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women 
and of nations large and small” (Para 2). We also read in the Charter that one of 
the purposes of the UN, among others, is to “achieve international cooperation … 
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” (Article 
1.3). Furthermore, the Charter states to promote “universal respect for and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion” (Article 55.1). In order to achieve these 
goals the Charter obligates all member states to “take joint and separate action in 
co-operation with the Organization” (Article 56).  
The UN Charter, despite not listing the specific contents of human rights and 
freedoms, created an important basis for the further development of international 
human rights law. On the basis of the Charter an Economic and Social Council 
was created. The Council was asked to “make recommendations for the purpose 
of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all” (Article 62.2, UN Charter).7  
During the first session the Economic and Social Council established a Nuclear 
Commission on Human Rights in order to propose terms of reference, size and 
                                                          
6 UN Charter, Preamble, Para. 1 
7 Supra note 3.  
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membership of the new Human Rights Commission.8 The Human Rights 
Commission in turn established a drafting committee and the work on the 
International Bill of Human Rights was started.9  
The first general Draft Outline of International Bill of Human Rights was 
prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations and was presented to the 
Drafting Committee of the Commission on Human Rights.10 The Commission on 
Human Rights decided to divide the work on the International Bill of Human 
Rights and to set up three working groups: one group to work on the International 
Convention on Human Rights, a second group on the Declaration of Human 
Rights, and the last one on implementation issues.11 During the working process 
the drafting committee considered the comments and suggestions of 
governments12 and other international and national bodies. In the end, because of 
a lack of time, the Commission decided to deliver only a declaration to the 
General Assembly.13 After some deliberations it was decided to name the 
                                                          
8 Nuclear Commission on Human Rights, 29 April-21 May 1946, Hunter Collage, New York, The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an Historical Record of the Drafting Process, available 
at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/udhr/meetings_1946_nuclear.shtml  
9 Drafting Committee on an International Bill of Human Rights, 1st Session, 9-25 June, 1947, 
Lake Success, New York, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an Historical Record of 
the Drafting Process, available at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/udhr/meetings_1947_1st_draftcom.shtml  
10 Ibid.   
11 Commission on Human Rights, 2nd Session, 2-17 December, 1947, Geneva, The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, an Historical Record of the Drafting Process, available at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/udhr/meetings_1947_2nd_chr.shtml  
12 The United Kingdom representative on Human Rights Commission, Lord Dukeston submitted 
to the Commission the Draft of the International Bill of Human Rights in the form of legal 
instrument. It is notable that the draft did not mention trade unions, however, Article 16 of the 
Draft stated the protection of freedom of association where the term “association” is understood 
“as the widest possible term and is intended to include the creation of entities having juridical 
personality”, Commission on Human Rights, Drafting Committee, E/CN.4/AC.1/4, 5 June 1947 
13 Peter Danchin, Drafting History, Third Session of the Human Rights Commission, Columbia 
University, available at: 
http://ccnmtl.columbia.edu/projects/mmt/udhr/udhr_general/drafting_history_8.html  
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Declaration ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, and it was adopted on 10 
December 1948 by the General Assembly with 48 members in favour and 8 
abstaining.14 It was the first international document containing internationally 
agreed human rights drafted by the Commission on Human Rights.  
However, it was understood that in order to effectively shape the lives of people 
there was a need to translate the substance of the Declaration into the hard legal 
form of an international treaty.15 Therefore, on the same day in which the 
Declaration was adopted, the General Assembly requested the Commission on 
Human Rights to continue its work and to prepare a draft for a human rights 
covenant and measures of implementation.16  
In 1949 the Commission examined the draft of eighteen articles on civil and 
political rights. After the General Assembly declared that “the enjoyment of civic 
and political freedoms and of economic, social and cultural rights are 
interconnected and interdependent” (Section E, Resolution 421(V), 4 Dec, 1950), 
the Commission drafted 14 more articles on economic, social and cultural rights 
in 1951. The Commission also drafted 10 articles on measures of implementation 
according to which state member parties to the covenant were obliged to submit 
periodic reports. After a long debate during the sixth session in 1951/1952, the 
General Assembly requested the Commission to draft two separate covenants, 
one on civil and political rights and the other on economic, social and cultural 
                                                          
14 General Assembly, 3rd Session, Paris, Plenary, 21 September to 2 December, 1948; The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights – An Historical record of the Drafting Process, available 
at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/udhr/meetings_1948_3rd_ga_plenary.shtml  
15 Supra note 4.   
16 Towards the International Covenants, Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of 
Human Rights, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf  
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rights. The Commission completed the drafting process in 1954; however, it was 
not until 1966 that the two Covenants – the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights – were adopted by the General Assembly. Along with these Covenants the 
First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
was also adopted. In 1989 the General Assembly adopted the Second Optional 
Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.17 The two Covenants 
together with the First Optional Protocol have entered into force in 1976. The 
Second Optional Protocol entered into force in 1991.18  
On 10 December 2008 the General Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. After 
receiving ten ratifications from member states the Protocol entered into force on 5 
May 2013.19  
The long-lasting process of adoption of the International Bill of Human Rights 
has finished. As of October 2015 it consists of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, together with its Optional Protocol and the International Covenant on 
Political and Civil Rights together with its two Optional Protocols.20  
                                                          
17 Ibid. Second Optional Protocol.   
18 Ibid. Entry into Force of the Covenants and the Optional Protocols.  
19 The ten states that ratified the Protocol are the following: Ecuador, Mongolia, Spain, El 
Salvador, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Slovakia, Portugal, 
Uruguay; UN, Chapter IV, Human Rights, 3.a. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York, 10 December 2008, available at: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-
a&chapter=4&lang=en  
20 Supra note 16.  
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2.1.1 Trade Union Rights in the UDHR  
The text of the first draft outline of the International Bill of Human Rights 
prepared by the UN Secretariat did not mention “trade union” at all. The only 
reference was made to freedom of association in Article 20 which was structured 
in the following way: “there shall be freedom to form associations for purposes 
not inconsistent with this Bill of Rights”.21  
After considering the comments and suggestions of governments and other 
international and national bodies the Drafting Committee submitted the redrafted 
texts of the Declaration and Covenant to the third session of the Commission on 
Human Rights. For the First time the text of the draft Declaration mentioned trade 
unions in relation to freedom of association. Article 19 was formulated as 
follows: “everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to 
participate in local, national, international and trade union associations for the 
promotion, defence and protection of purposes and interests not inconsistent with 
this declaration”. At that stage, Article 23 did not mention the right to form and 
join trade unions; however, France suggested adding the following sentence to 
Article 23: “he shall be free to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests”. United States also suggested mentioning the right “to join trade unions 
of his own choice”.22 In the report of the third session of the Commission on 
Human Rights submitted to the Seventh Session of the Economic and Social 
Council the Paragraph 4 of Article 21 was construed in the following way: 
“everyone is free to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests”. 
                                                          
21 Draft Outline of International Bill of Rights E/CN.4A/C.1/3, prepared by the Division of 
Human Rights of the UN Secretariat and presented to the Drafting Committee of Commission on 
Human Rights, 4 June 1947.  
22 Draft International Declaration on Human Rights, Report of the Drafting Committee to the 
Commission on Human Rights E/CN.4/95, Commission on Human Rights, Drafting Committee, 
Second Session, 21 May 1948. 
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Finally, it was decided to structure Paragraph 4 Article 23 of the UDHR as 
follows: “everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests”.  
2.1.2 Trade Union Rights in the ICESCR  
The right to form and join trade unions is guaranteed by Article 8 of the ICESCR. 
Paragraph 1(a) of the Article reads as follows: 
1. The state parties of the present Covenant undertake to ensure:  
a) the right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of 
his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, for 
the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. No 
restriction may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those 
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security or public order or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.  
Article 8 Paragraph 1 also guarantees the right of trade unions “to establish 
national federations or confederations” (Para 1.b), “to form and join international 
trade-union organizations” (Para 1.b) and “to function freely subject to no 
limitations other than those prescribed by law and which are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Para 1.c). In order to ensure 
effective implementation of these rights in practice, Article 8, Para 1.d protects 
the right to strike “provided that it is exercised in conformity with the laws of the 
particular country”.  
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The Article offers a restriction clause. Paragraph 2 permits member states to 
restrict the exercise of these rights for the members of the armed forces, police or 
administration of the state.  
Finally, Paragraph 3 refers to the International Labor Organization Convention of 
1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize. 
According to the Paragraph, the state parties to that Convention shall not be 
authorized “to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or apply the law 
in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that 
Convention”.23  
2.1.2.1 The Travaux Preparatoires  
During the drafting process of the Covenant there was debate about the need to 
include an article on trade unions. Those against the inclusion argued that the 
freedom of association was already mentioned in the UDHR (Article 20) and in 
the draft Covenant and that it was “unduly repetitious” to include the article on 
trade unions in the Covenant. It was also argued that mentioning only trade 
unions would put other forms of association (such as co-operative societies), 
which might equally be important, in a discriminatory position.24 
On the other hand, the supporters of the trade union article stressed the fact that 
trade unions were a “necessary instrument for implementing economic, social and 
cultural rights”. They argued that the implementation of economic, social and 
                                                          
23 The main idea for the inclusion of such a provision in the article was to avoid any conflict 
between the Covenant and the Convention. Interestingly, it should be noted that no similar 
provision was adopted in relation to Articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, which also guarantee labour 
rights. 
24 Mathew C. R. Craven, 7, The Right to Form and Join Trade Union, The International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, A perspective on its Development, Clarendon Press 
Oxford, 1995, p. 249-250.  
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cultural rights mostly depends on trade unions and therefore there is a need to 
include a separate article on trade union rights to guarantee better protection for 
these rights; and that merely mentioning the freedom of association could not 
guarantee that the intended purpose would be achieved.25  
The early draft of the article on trade union rights was limited to only one 
Paragraph containing only the right to form and join trade unions. Later, because 
of pressure from Latin American and socialist states, it was decided to expand the 
article.  
During the discussion on states’ obligations to “ensure” the rights enumerated in 
Article 8.1 it was agreed that progressive implementation26 could not be invoked 
in relation to trade union rights, while there was no need of any expenditure on 
behalf of a state; the only action required from states was self-restraint and non-
interference. The representative of the UK supported this approach. According to 
him, the rights enumerated in Article 8 should be subject to definite and 
immediate obligations and not progressive in character since the article requires 
the states “to undertake to ensure” the rights.27  
The representatives of some states indicated that the obligation to ensure was not 
solely negative. Referral was made to the obligation to promote trade unionism 
among workers, which required positive action from the state.28 However, this 
                                                          
25 Ibid. p. 250 
26 Under Article 2.1 of the ICESCR the rights mentioned in the Covenants are generally subject to 
progressive implementation, unlike the rights mentioned in the ICCPR. Trade union rights are 
mentioned in both Covenants. Therefore, for the purpose to avoid the situation when the same 
rights are interpreted by the ICCPR as immediately implemented and by the ICESCR as 
progressively implemented, it was decided that some rights from the ICESCR (including trade 
union rights) should be implemented in an immediate manner. Ibid. p. 261  
27 Ibid. p. 251 
28 Ibid.  
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can hardly be invoked as a reason for non-immediate application. According to 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 8 “would seem 
to be capable of immediate application by judicial and other organs in many 
national legal systems” and “any suggestion that the provisions indicated are 
inherently non-self-executing would seem to be difficult to sustain”.29  
The right to strike was one of the most debated issues during the adoption of 
Article 8. However, the majority of states thought that the right was essential for 
the protection of economic and social interests and that it was not possible to 
guarantee trade union rights without the right to strike. Furthermore, it was noted 
that the right to strike can be found in the legislations of many member states, and 
that this was “a social reality that had to be recognized”.30 Finally, an agreement 
was reached: the right to strike was included in the article together with a 
limitation clause that made this right subject to “the laws of the particular 
country”.31,32  
Paragraph 2 of the article, which allows restrictions on the exercise of these rights 
by the members of the armed forces, police and state administration, also was 
subject to debate. Some states made referrals to ILO practice and argued that the 
ILO does not allow restrictions with respect to all public officials, but only for the 
                                                          
29 Par. 5, The nature of state parties obligations (Art 2, Par 1), 12/14/1990, CESCR General 
Comment 3  
30 Supra note 24, p. 257 
31 Ibid.  
32 It is notable to mention that in its annual report Human Rights Committee expressed concern in 
relation to Estonia about the restrictions on the right to strike. The Committee noted that the draft 
Public Service Act restricts the right of number of public servants to strike. The Committee states 
that “state party should ensure in its legislation that only the most limited number of public 
servants is denied the right to strike”, A/65/40 (Vol. 1) Report of the ninety-seventh session (12-
30 October 2009), ninety-eighth session (8-26 March 2010), ninety-ninth session (12-30 July 
2010), the Human Rights Committee.  
29 
 
armed forces and police, and only to the extent determined by law. However, it 
was assumed by the majority states that the ILO would play a significant role in 
the interpretation of the Covenant and that restrictions should be regarded as 
legitimate only insofar as they complied with the ILO standards. Therefore, the 
provision was accepted.33,34  
The article does not mention a right to collective bargaining. However, during the 
debate on the right to strike it became apparent that Paragraph 1 (c), which 
guarantees the right of trade unions to function freely, includes the right to 
collective bargaining.35  
In the end, one group of states did not welcome the elaborated version of the 
article and the other group of states was disappointed because of the restrictions 
on the rights. However, it can be said that the overall agreement was achieved 
and the article reflects the interests of the member states.36  
2.1.3 Trade Union Rights in the ICCPR  
The right to form and join trade unions is guaranteed under Article 22 of the 
ICCPR. Paragraph 1 of the Article is structured in the following way: 
                                                          
33 Supra note 24, p. 259-260 
34 In the annual report issued in 2012, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
raises the issue of public servants in relation to Germany. The Committee is concerned by the fact 
that public servants are prohibited to strike. The Committee makes referral to article 8.2 of the 
ICESCR and the ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organize and reminds the state that “public officials who do not provide essential services are 
entitled to their right to strike”, Para 94, E/2012/22, E/C. 12/2011/3, Report on the forty-sixth and 
forty-seventh sessions (2-20 May, 2011, 14 Nov-2 Dec, 2011), the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. 
35 Supra note 24, p. 256 
36 Ibid. p. 250 - 251 
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1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, 
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests. 
Paragraph 2 of the article contains a restriction clause: restrictions are applicable 
if they are prescribed by law, are necessary in a democratic society, are in the 
interest of national security, public safety, or the public order (ordre public), and 
are for the protection of public health or morals37 or the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. In relation to the armed forces and police it is stated that 
this article shall not prevent the imposition of “lawful restrictions” on their right 
to freedom of association.  
Paragraph 3 repeats Paragraph 3 of the ICESCR Article 8 and refers to the ILO. It 
states that this article shall not prejudge the rights guaranteed by the ILO 1948 
Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize.  
2.1.3.1 The Travaux Preparatoires  
During the 5th, 6th and 8th sessions of the Commission on Human Rights it was 
generally agreed to include the right to association in the Covenant.38 However, 
divergent opinions were observed about the necessity of specifically mentioning 
the right to form and join trade unions. The major argument coming from those 
against inclusion was that trade union rights were already mentioned in the draft 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and their inclusion in the 
ICCPR would make them subject to two different sets of limitations: the general 
                                                          
37 It is interesting to note that “public health and morals” are not mentioned in the restriction 
clause of Article 8, ICESCR. 
38 Marc J. Bossuyt, The right of association, Discussions, Commission on Human Rights, 5th 
Session (1949), 6th Session (1950), 8th Session (1952), Article 22, Guide to the “Travaux 
Preparatoires” of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1987 Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, p. 424. 
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limitations clause in Article 4 of the ICESCR39 and the limitations mentioned in 
Article 22 itself, Paragraph 2. In the end it was decided to mention trade unions in 
the article. The decisive argument was that not mentioning trade unions would 
lead to the erroneous interpretation that trade union rights are not civil and 
political rights, but only economic and social rights.40 The specific mention can 
also be explained by the fact that historically trade unions are persecuted. 
Advocating and protecting the rights of workers often has not been in the best 
interests of governments and big businesses.41 
A general limitation clause was set in relation to the trade union rights exercised 
by the armed forces and police. It is notable that ICESCR also mentions state 
administration or public officials together with the armed forces and police, while 
in the ICCPR article we only have mention of the armed forces and police. There 
is no mention of other members of the state administration or public officials.42  
Not all state representatives supported the idea of making referral to the ILO 
Convention No. 87 on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organize in Paragraph 3. The argument was that even without the cross-
reference, well-known principles of international law would still prevent any 
conflict between these two treaties; and that it was not appropriate to have cross-
reference in a general legal instrument. The counter-argument stressed the 
progress ILO had achieved in safeguarding trade union rights in international law 
                                                          
39 According to article 4 the State parties may subject rights “only to such limitations as are 
determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of this right and solely 
for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society”. 
40 Supra note 38, p. 426. 
41 Sarah Joseph, Jenny Schultz and Melissa Castan, Trade Union Rights, 19 Freedom of Assembly 
and Association – Articles 21 and 22, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Cases, Materials and Commentary, 2004, Oxford University Press, Second Edition, p. 577. 
42 Supra note 38, p. 430-431.  
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and noted that without the cross-reference this progress could be interpreted as 
overlooked by the UN.43  
2.1.3.2 The Jurisprudence under Article 22 ICCPR  
Under Optional Protocol I ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee is authorized to 
receive individual communications regarding any alleged violations of the rights 
mentioned in the ICCPR. The number of communications regarding trade union 
rights is small.  
One of the few communications to the Human Rights Committee was presented 
against Belarus, by a citizens of Belarus. The facts of the case are the following: 
the Supreme Court of Belarus dissolved the non-governmental public association 
human rights centre “Viasna”. “Viasna” was registered by the Ministry of Justice 
of Belarus.  
The Human Rights Committee considered that the state party was in violation of 
Article 22, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR. According to the Committee, the mere fact 
that the association was allowed to register did not guarantee the protection of 
trade union rights envisaged in Article 22. In the Committee’s view, it is 
important that associations are able to carry out their statutory activities freely 
after registration. The Committee refers to the grounds that justify restrictions on 
trade union rights and explains under which circumstances the curtailment of 
trade union rights can be justified. The Committee starts with declaring that the 
existence and operation of the associations is a “cornerstone of the democratic 
society”. This also covers those associations whose peacefully promoted ideas are 
not favourably received by the government or the majority of the population. The 
                                                          
43 Supra note 38, p. 435-436.  
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Committee then continues and offers a test for the state parties to follow. 
According to the test, after the dissolution of an association the state party should 
demonstrate that this was a necessary measure in order to avert a real danger to 
national security or the democratic order. The Committee emphasizes that the 
danger must not be hypothetical but real and that it is the state’s responsibility to 
demonstrate that less intrusive measures would have been insufficient.44  
Another case interesting for our topic was issued by the Committee in regard to 
the right to strike. In the communication J. B. et al v Canada (118/82) the 
Committee examined the question of admissibility. The Committee considered 
the communication incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant and 
therefore declared it inadmissible. The question before the Committee was 
whether right to strike is guaranteed under Article 22. The authors of the 
communication argued that the prohibition to strike for public employees 
introduced by the Alberta Public Service Employee Relations Act 1977 was in 
breach of Article 22 of the ICCPR. They asserted that even though the right to 
strike was not expressis verbis mentioned in the Article 22, it was implied. In 
support of their argument the authors referred to the ILO Convention No. 87 and 
emphasized the importance the ILO organs give to the right to strike. Namely, 
they argued that in the interpretation of Article 22 the Committee should also take 
into account ILO Convention No. 87 and the fact that even though it is not 
mentioned in express terms, the right to strike derives from Article 3 of the ILO 
Convention. Taking this into account, the authors further argued that Paragraph 3 
                                                          
44 Aleksander Belyatsky et al. v. Belarus, Communication No.1296/2004, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/90/D/1296/2004, 7 August 2007, paragraphs 7.1; 7.2; 7.3; 7.4.  
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of Article 22 of the ICCPR would be breached if the Committee were to disregard 
ILO practice.45  
The Human Rights Committee decided that the right to strike is not implied in 
Article 22. The Committee stated that it has no qualms about accepting the 
interpretation of the ILO organs as correct and just, but that each international 
treaty has a life of its own and must be interpreted by the body entrusted with the 
monitoring of this instrument. The Committee examined the Travaux 
Preparatoires for the ICCPR and found no mention of the right to strike. The 
Committee made a comparison between the trade union rights mentioned in the 
ICCPR and the same rights mentioned in the ICESCR. It was noted that unlike 
Article 22 of the ICCPR, Article 8 of the ICESCR mentions the right to strike 
separately. This gave the Committee reason to believe that the right to strike is 
not an implicit component of the right to form and join trade unions. According to 
the Committee, the reason the right to strike is not included within the scope of 
Article 22 is that this right already enjoys protection under the ICESCR.46  
A minority in the Committee did not agree with the majority decision and 
presented a separate opinion. According to the minority the question before the 
Committee was “whether article 22 alone or in conjunction with other provisions 
of the Covenant necessarily excludes, in the relevant circumstances, an 
entitlement to strike”.47 According to the minority, exercising the right to freedom 
                                                          
45 J. B. et al. v. Canada (118/1982), ICCPR, A/41/40 (18 July 1986) 151, Para: 5.1. 
46 Ibid. Para. 6.3; 6.4. 
47 In the admissibility proceedings the majority of the Human Rights Committee particularly 
determined the scope of protection for trade unions, rather than focusing on the scope of 
protection for associations per se. The issues regarding the specific protection of trade unions 
under Article 22 should have been considered on the merits stage of proceedings. The minority on 
the Committee on the other hand focused on the scope of Article 22 protecting all associations in 
general, Supra note 41, p. 580-581. 
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of association requires certain actions to be allowed, and these actions cannot be 
listed a priori. Referral was also made to the Travaux Preparatoires, which, 
according to the minority, did not clearly determine the right to strike issue. The 
minority also mentioned the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association decision, 
where the ILO Committee found the Alberta Act not in conformity with 
Convention No. 87, Article 10, for the reason that a general prohibition of the 
right to strike “constituted a considerable restriction on the opportunities open to 
trade unions to further and defend the interests of their members.” According to 
the minority, while Article 22 calls for the protection of trade union members’ 
interests, it also allows the right to strike.48  
2.2 Conclusion 
Prominent representative of the classical liberal school Alexis de Tocqueville, 
speaks about the particular role of the right to freedom of association in 
democratic society. In his famous writing Democracy in America he states that 
“the most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself, is that 
of combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in 
common with them”. Tocqueville believes that freedom of association is almost 
as inalienable in its nature as the right to personal liberty and that the foundation 
of the society will be impaired if freedom of association is attacked by the 
legislator. According to Tocqueville , democratically structured societies are 
mostly in need of the associations. In aristocratic nations the body of the nobles 
and the wealthy constitute a natural association and they can check the abuses of 
power. In democratic states where such natural associations do not exist the 
individuals have to make them. Otherwise, the most galling tyranny is inevitable 
                                                          
48 Individual Opinion Submitted by Mrs. Higgins and Messrs. Lallah, Mavrommatis, Opsahl and 
Wako concerning the admissibility of communication No. l18/1982, J.B. et al. v. Canada.  
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and “great people may be oppressed with impunity by a small faction or by a 
single individual” (Alexsis de Tocqueville, Chapter 12, Political Associations in the 
United States in Democracy in America 1831).  
In modern jurisprudence the right to freedom of association is often seen as a 
vehicle for the exercise of many other civil, political, social, economic and 
cultural rights. In Resolution 15/21 of The Rights to Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly and of Association, the Human Rights Council, guided by the Charter 
of the UN and the International Bill of Human Rights, endorsed freedom of 
association and freedom of assembly and recognized them as “essential 
components of democracy”. These two rights taken together provide individuals 
with opportunities to “express their political opinions, engage in literary and 
artistic pursuits and other cultural, economic and social activities, form and join 
trade unions and cooperatives, and elect leaders to represent their interests and 
hold them accountable”.49  
The importance of freedom of association as a trade union right is fairly well 
noted at the UN level. To facilitate better promotion and protection of these rights 
the Human Rights Council decided to appoint the Special Rapporteur on the 
rights of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. In his first report the 
Special Rapporteur defines the right to freedom of association and states that it 
covers “any group of individuals or any legal entities brought together in order to 
collectively act, express, promote, pursue or defend a field of common interests”. 
The Rapporteur makes reference to the ICCPR and ICESCR stating that the right 
to form and join trade unions is an inherent part of the freedom of association. In 
                                                          
49 Preamble, the Resolution 15/21 on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of 
Association, adopted by the Human Rights Council, 6 October, 2010. 
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the report specific emphases are made on the importance of the freedom of any 
associations to be formed and joined, to function freely, to determine their own 
status, structure and activities, to enjoy the right to privacy and to be able to 
access domestic and foreign funding.50  
Trade unions play an important role in the development of liberal democracies.51 
Therefore, ensuring effective enforcement of trade union rights at an international 
level is of utmost importance.  
Chapter III –Freedom of Association from an ILO 
Perspective  
3.1 Historical Review  
The Treaty of Versailles that was enacted in 1919 entails the establishment of the 
two international organizations: the League of Nations and the International 
Labor Organization. Later developments and WWII made it clear to everyone 
that the League of Nations did not meet the high expectations placed on it, and 
the organization was replaced by the United Nations. The International Labor 
Organization, however, still operates, aiming to establish adequate labour 
standards in the world. 
The Treaty of Versailles declares that peace can only be established if social 
justice is provided and that unjust conditions of labour imperil the “great peace 
and harmony of the world” (Part XIII, Section I). The Preamble of the ILO 
Constitution offers the same wording regarding social justice. In both of the texts 
                                                          
50 Maina Kiai, Best Practices Related to the Right of Freedom of Association, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, 
A/HRC/20/27, 21 May, 2012.  
51 Stuart White, Chapter 12, Trade Unionism in Liberal State in Freedom of Association, edited 
by Amy Gutmann, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1998, pp. 339. 
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the recognition of the principle of freedom of association, together with other 
labour conditions, is listed as an important precondition for the achievement of 
social justice and, in turn, world peace.  
Since 1919 the ILO has composed a number of documents on freedom of 
association and gathered a great expertise in the filed. This may be one key 
reason why the ICCPR and ICESCR articles on trade union rights make explicit 
reference to the ILO instruments. Therefore, in order for the reader better to 
understand the international standards established by the International Bill of 
Human Rights, it is of utmost importance to analyse ILO standards first.  
3.2 The ILO Declarations on Freedom of Association  
The ILO declarations are used by the International Labour Conference to 
proclaim certain formal and authoritative statements and reaffirm the importance 
of the principles and values of the organization. The Declarations are not subject 
to ratification. Nevertheless, they have a wide application and have acquired 
symbolic and political value.52  
The first Declaration adopted in 1944 and incorporated into the ILO Constitution 
in 1946 was The Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the 
International Labor Organization (the Declaration of Philadelphia).53 It lists four 
fundamental principles on which the organization is based and which should 
inspire the policy of member states. One of these principles is that, ”freedom of 
expression and of association are essential to sustained progress”.  
                                                          
52 ILO Declarations, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/leg/declarations.htm  
53 Lee Swanston, Adoption of Standards by the International Labor Organization: Lessons and 
Limitations, Standard-Setting: Lessons Learned, International Council on Human Rights Policy 
and International Commission of Jurists Workshop, 13-14 February, 2005, p.4.  
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In 1990s, when globalization and technological change led to uneven economic 
growth and well-being,54 the ILO decided to restate its long-standing 
commitment, and in 1998 it adopted the new Declaration of Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work. Together with the three other fundamental 
principles – namely, the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory 
labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the elimination of 
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, the Declaration 
recognizes freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining as fundamental principles and puts an obligation on states 
“to respect, to promote and to realize” them in good faith, in accordance with the 
ILO Constitution. This obligation to respect, promote and realize concerns not 
only those states that have ratified the fundamental conventions, but also those 
that have not yet done so. The mere fact of membership in the ILO is enough to 
acquire this obligation.55 The Declaration does not create new obligations for 
states; rather, it reaffirms the obligation of the ILO to respect the principles 
concerning fundamental rights.56  
Increased unemployment and insufficient social protection once again became a 
major concern in the beginning of the 21st century. The new challenges that the 
world of work faced inspired the ILO to strengthen its capacity to promote its 
Decent Work Agenda and to adopt the Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization in 2008. The Declaration emphasizes the important role of the 
                                                          
54 Background, ILO Declaration for Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ILO, available 
at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/background/lang--en/index.htm 
55 Article 2, ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1998.  
56 Hilary Kellerson, The ILO Declaration of 1998 on fundamental principles and rights: A 
challenge for the future, International Labour Review, Special Issue: Labour Rights, Human 
Rights, Vol. 137 (1998), No. 2, p. 224. 
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Declaration of Philadelphia and the principles mentioned therein. It restates the 
four strategic objectives of the Decent Work Agenda. These objectives are: 
promotion of employment by creating a sustainable institutional and economic 
environment; development and enhancement of sustainable measures of social 
protection adaptable to national circumstances; promotion of social dialogue and 
tripartism; and finally, respect, promotion and realization of the fundamental 
principles and rights at work. In relation to the fourth objective the Declaration 
clearly states that ”freedom of association and the effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining are particularly important to enable the attainment 
of the four strategic objectives”.  
3.3 The ILO Conventions on Freedom of Association  
The three Declarations of the ILO referred to above state the main principles and 
values of the Organization and emphasize the important role of freedom of 
association for the attainment of these principles. However, to really understand 
the essence of freedom of association as a trade union right one has to look at two 
ILO conventions: Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection 
of the Right to Organize and Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and 
Collective Bargaining, which together constitute basic instruments governing 
freedom of association. These two Conventions are usually discussed together 
and they constitute part of the eight Conventions of the ILO that are recognized 
as fundamental.  
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3.3.1 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 
(Convention No. 87) 
In 1945 the International Labor Organization decided to become a specialized 
agency of the UN in accordance with Articles 57 and 63 of the UN Charter. 
According to the agreement between the ILO and the UN, the ILO was 
recognized as a specialized agency “responsible for taking such action as may be 
appropriate under its basic instrument for the accomplishment of the purposes set 
forth therein”.  
Shortly afterwards, a debate was held on the question whether protection of trade 
union rights and especially freedom of association should be safeguarded by the 
ILO or by a UN organ called ECOSOC. The American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) supported the ILO while the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTR) 
was in favour of ECOSOC. Finally, it was decided by the ECOSOC itself to refer 
the subject of trade union rights to the ILO. The ILO, in turn, was advised to 
adopt a convention about the subject and together with the UN pursue work on 
the machinery to control the protection of trade union rights and freedom of 
association. This is how the Convention on Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organize No. 87 came into being.57  
As discussed above, the Preamble of the ILO Constitution and later the 
Declaration of Philadelphia already mentioned the principle of freedom of 
association. The Convention No. 87 translated this principle into specific rights 
                                                          
57 Harold Dunning, The Origins of Convention No. 87 on freedom of association and the right to 
organize, International Labour Review, Special Issue: Labour Rights, Human Rights, Vol. 137 
(1998), No. 2, p. 159-162. 
42 
 
that are capable of being enacted in national laws and that are applicable in 
practice.58  
The Convention sets the rights of workers and employers to establish and join 
organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization. Workers’ 
and employers’ organizations must be able to organize freely without undue 
interference from authorities, including the right not to be dissolved or suspended 
by administrative authorities. Workers and employer organizations shall also 
have the right to establish and join federations and confederations, which may 
affiliate with international organizations of workers and employers.  
More specifically, Article 2 of Convention No. 87 guarantees the rights of 
workers and employers to establish and join organizations of their own choosing 
and without distinction whatsoever. There is no previous authorization required 
for the establishment of the organization.  
In other words, the right to organize should be guaranteed without distinction or 
discrimination of any kind as to occupation, sex, skin colour, race, creed, 
nationality or political opinion. Any national law that prohibits the right to 
organize for the any workers (public servants, managerial staff, domestic staff or 
agricultural workers), other than those in the armed forces and the police 
(mentioned in Article 9 of the same Convention), is incompatible with the 
Convention.59  
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Workers and employers do not need previous authorization to establish an 
organization, except for the formalities provided by states necessary for the 
normal functioning of an organization. However, these formalities must not 
impair the rights guaranteed by the Convention and they should not be too 
complex or too lengthy. It is of a vital importance that such formalities be 
prescribed by law.60  
Any discretionary power of national authorities to refuse the registration of a 
labour organization is considered to be incompatible with this Convention. The 
ILO supervisory bodies emphasized repeatedly that refusal to register workers’ 
and employers’ organizations is very similar to the case in which previous 
authorization is required, and therefore is not acceptable.61 In case a violation 
happens, workers and employers must have the opportunity to appeal against any 
administrative decision to an independent and impartial body.62 However, it was 
recently noted by the Committee of Experts that the mere fact that the right to 
appeal to the court exists is not an adequate safeguard, and that competent judges 
should be able to review the grounds for refusal of registration and check whether 
it is contrary to the freedom of association principles.63  
Workers and employers shall have the right to establish and join organizations of 
their own choosing. This implies a possibility to form an independent 
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organization in a climate of full security. It includes the right of workers and 
employers to freely determine the structure of the organization and membership 
of the trade unions, to freely choose the establishment of one or more 
organizations in any one enterprise, to choose their occupation or branch of 
activity and to establish federations and confederations. Excessive restrictions 
imposed by law, such as a minimum number of members, a system of trade union 
unity or trade union monopoly, are not in conformity with Article 2 of the 
Convention.64 It is also prohibited to establish a limited list of occupations with a 
view to recognizing the right to associate.65  
In general, the requirement of minimum membership is a set standard in many 
countries and it is not a priori contrary to the Convention. However,”the number 
should be fixed in a reasonable manner”, in order to avoid the complications for 
the establishment of the organization.66  
Article 2 requires that a diversity of organizations should be possible, if workers 
wish. This does not, however, mean that diversity is an absolute necessity. The 
supervisory bodies of the ILO observed that there is a fundamental difference 
between cases where unification is required by law and where the workers unite 
voluntarily, independently of any laws. In the latter case there is always a chance 
that workers establish a different organization in case they wish to do so.67  
National laws should be neutral towards trade unions. Favouring one of them 
might affect the choice of workers, who might seek to join trade unions that have 
                                                          
64 Supra note, p. 38, 48. 
65 Supra note 60, Para. 217, 313, 315.  
66 Supra note 63, p. 33. 
67 Supra note 61, p. 182. 
45 
 
governmental support and therefore might serve them better. Therefore such 
favouritism is not compatible with the provisions of the Convention No. 87.68 The 
notion of “most representative trade union” exists in many national jurisdictions. 
The concept is not in itself contrary to the Convention; however, there should be 
pre-established criteria that establish such organization. Moreover, the other, less 
represented organizations should not be deprived of the essential means to defend 
their members.69  
Article 2 only guarantees a positive right to join a labour organization, but it does 
not say anything about a negative right not to join. According to the ILO 
supervisory bodies it is up to the states to decide whether to introduce such a 
negative right in their legislation or not.70  
Article 3 of the Convention introduces collective rights for the employers’ and 
workers’ organizations. It guarantees the right of workers’ and employers’ 
organizations to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their 
representatives in full freedom, to organize their administration and formulate 
their programme, thus protecting exercise of the socio-economic functions of the 
organizations. The article reaffirms the general autonomy of these organizations 
and states that there shall be no interference from public authorities.  
This article aims to avoid legislative provisions which regulate in detail the 
internal functioning of the workers’ and employers’ organizations. Governments 
are only allowed to establish the overall framework within which the members 
will have wide autonomy to administer their organizations according to their will. 
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Furthermore, if this right is violated organizations must have a possibility to 
appeal to an independent and impartial judicial body.71 In other words, the mere 
existence of a law about trade unions does not constitute a violation of trade 
union rights, since the state might want to ensure that the constitutions and rules 
of the organization are in conformity with national legislation. However, this law 
might not be such as to impede the right of freedom of association of trade 
unions.72 The members of the organization should be able to develop the rules of 
their organization according to their will.73  
In order for the autonomy of the organizations to be guaranteed, questions such as 
trade union elections, eligibility criteria, re-election and dismissal of leaders 
should be regulated by the organizations themselves in their respective 
constitutions.74 In case supervision of the process is still necessary, it should be 
exercised by a judicial authority.75 The organizations shall also be able to 
organize their administration without interference from the government. This 
includes the right to decide on the rules which should govern the administration 
of their organization. They must also be free to resolve disputes between each 
other by themselves, without governmental interference.76 
Workers and employers not only have the right to establish organizations freely, 
but these organizations also have a right to pursue lawful activities for the 
defence of occupational interests of their members. Any interference from the 
government which restricts the right of organizations to pursue such activities is 
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considered a violation of the freedom of association. For the free functioning of 
the organizations it is important that the assets and property that belong to these 
organizations are duly protected. The supervisory bodies of the ILO are very 
strict on this issue. A restriction of this principle should only be allowed if the 
interests of the members or the democratic processes in the organization are at 
stake.77  
One of the last issues that Article 3 covers is the freedom of organizations to 
organize their activities freely and to formulate their programs with a view to 
defend the occupational interests of their members. While respecting the law of 
the land, the members of the organizations should be free to hold meetings, to 
have access to places of work, communicate with the management and organize 
protest action.78 The workers’ and employers’ organizations are allowed to 
participate in political activities and publicly express their opinions on the 
government’s economic or social policy.79 According to the Committee of 
Experts the national legislation should be flexible and should try to establish a 
balance between the legitimate interests of the organizations to express their 
opinions on the social and economic policies that affect their members on the one 
hand, and the separation of political activities and trade union activities on the 
other hand.80  
Article 4 of the Convention states that workers’ and employers’ organizations 
shall not be dissolved or suspended by any administrative authority. The 
suspension and dissolution of an organization constitutes an extreme form of 
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interference of public authorities in the activities of an organization and puts an 
end to the exercise of trade union activities. However, arbitrary interference by 
authorities must be distinguished from interference that is allowed by law and 
that aims to avoid the existence of organizations undermining the internal or 
external security of the state.81 In this case a dissolution or suspension of the 
organization should be executed by the judicial authorities, providing all the legal 
guarantees to the organization concerned. It is of utmost importance that the 
judges are able to deal with the substance of the case.82 In any case, such extreme 
actions as suspension and dissolution of workers’ and employers’ organizations 
can only be taken as a last resort, after exhausting all possibilities that would have 
less serious effects.83  
Article 5 of the Convention guarantees the right of workers’ and employers’ 
organizations to establish and join federations and confederations. These 
federations and confederations have a right to affiliate with international 
organizations of workers and employers.  
The rights guaranteed by Article 5 help organizations to better protect the 
interests of their members. It is up to the workers’ organizations only to decide 
whether there is a need to join federations and confederations and it is up to 
federations and confederations only to decide whether or not to accept the 
affiliation of trade unions.84 Any restriction that prohibits the federations and 
confederations to go on strike or bargain collectively violates Article 5. In case of 
an affiliation there should be no need for authorization from any authorities. 
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National affiliates and international organizations should be able to collaborate 
freely, including national affiliates receiving financial assistance and subsidies, 
exchanging trade union publications and sending representatives to meetings.85  
The rights guaranteed to workers’ and employers’ organizations are equally 
applicable to federations and confederations of workers’ and employers’ 
organizations. As Article 6 of the convention states, the provisions of Articles 2, 
3 and 4 also apply to federations and confederations. 
Finally, Article 10 of the convention defines the term “organization” and states 
that any organization that furthers and defends the interests of workers and/or 
employers is referred to as “organization” in the convention. In other words, the 
distinguishing character of the organizations mentioned in the convention is that 
they defend and promote the rights of workers and of employers.86  
3.1.1 The Right to Strike  
The right to strike is often used as one of the essential means for workers’ and 
employers’ organizations for the promotion and protection of the interests of their 
members. Nevertheless, there is no separate document on the right to strike 
adopted by the ILO; it is not mentioned in the core conventions on freedom of 
association (No. 87) and right to organize (No. 98). The ILO Constitution and the 
Declaration of Philadelphia are also silent about the issue. It is, however, 
mentioned in the Resolution of 1970 Concerning Trade Union Rights and their 
Relation to Civil Liberties, which calls for full and universal respect of trade 
union rights, with particular attention to the right to strike (Article 15). 
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Despite the fact that there is no specific mention of the right to strike in the core 
ILO Conventions and Declarations, the ILO supervisory bodies have reaffirmed 
many times that the right to strike derives from Convention No. 87 on Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize. They never accepted the 
criticism that preparatory work for the Convention does not support the inclusion 
of the right to strike. The Committee of Experts reiterated that the mere absence 
of a concrete provision regarding a right to strike in the Convention is not 
dispositive, as “the terms of the Convention must be interpreted in the light of its 
object and purpose”. According to the Committee even though preparatory work 
is an important interpretative source for the convention, it is not the only one. The 
Committee makes a referral to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Articles 31 and 32) and states that when it comes to the right to strike a 
“subsequent practice” of the ILO Organs is considered an important source for 
the interpretation of the convention.  
Both ILO Committees have recognized the right strike for decades. The 
Committee on Freedom of Association first asserted right to strike as an 
important principle in 1952.87  
Also, the Committee of Experts states that strike action is an “intrinsic corollary 
of the right to organize” protected by the Convention No. 87. According to the 
Committee, this is a collective right exercised by group of people who decide to 
make demands by not working and therefore it is an activity of the workers’ 
organization protected under Article 3.88  
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The right to strike is a fundamental right enjoyed by the workers’ and employers’ 
organizations (trade unions, federations and confederations). It can be used as a 
legitimate weapon for the protection of the interests of members of trade unions 
and employers’ organizations. The demands that can be pursued through strike 
action can be the following: occupational, trade union-related and political. In the 
case of the first two categories of demands no questions arise: the Committee on 
Freedom of Association has ruled them to be legitimate. As for the third category, 
political strikes, the Committee has made clear that strikes of a purely political 
nature are not protected under the principle of the freedom of association.89 
Strikes are legitimate only when they have economic and social objectives and 
not purely political ones.90  
In the case of sympathy strikes the Committee of Experts is of the opinion that a 
general prohibition on participating in sympathy strikes is itself not compatible 
with the freedom of association principle and workers should not be allowed to 
participate in such a strike. However, there should be no questions about the 
lawfulness of the initial strike.91 
In many countries there are certain conditions and requirements that should be 
met before strike action is allowed. The Committee on Freedom of Association 
have declared some of such conditions lawful, providing that these pre-conditions 
are reasonable in practice and do not put substantial limitations on the means of 
action open to trade unions. The following conditions have been considered as 
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acceptable by the supervisory bodies of the ILO: the obligation to give prior 
notice; the obligation to have recourse to conciliation, mediation and voluntary 
arbitration procedures, providing that the proceedings are adequate and speedy 
and the parties concerned are able to participate at every stage; the obligation to 
observe certain quorum; the obligation to take strike decisions in a secret ballot; 
the adoption of measures to comply with safety requirements and for the 
prevention of accidents; the establishment of minimum service in particular 
cases; the freedom to work for non-strikers. According to the Committee on 
Freedom of Association a declaration of the illegality of a strike should lie with 
an independent body that has the trust of all the parties involved in the dispute. 
Governments should not be involved in this, especially in cases where the 
government is itself a party.92  
The protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in relation to strikes is a 
very important component of the right to strike. It is contrary to the freedom of 
association principle to dismiss or heavily penalize persons for their participation 
in strike action. 93  
While cases of trade union discrimination should be examined on a case by case 
basis, the general rule is that those who think they have been discriminated 
against because of their trade union activities should have access to means of 
redress. These means should be expeditious, inexpensive and fully impartial. 
Furthermore, the guarantees against trade union discrimination should be 
provided by the legislation which should contain express provisions for appeals 
and establish sufficiently dissuasive sanctions in order to ensure the practical 
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application of Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective 
Bargaining, Article 1 of which states that “workers shall enjoy adequate 
protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their 
employment”.94  
In general the restriction on the right to strike can only be justified if the strike 
ceases to be peaceful. However, there are roughly three situations where a 
restriction on the right is acceptable under other conditions. In the first case, the 
restriction can be justified in relation to those public servants “exercising 
authority in the name of the state”. According to the ILO supervisory bodies, 
important is not the mere fact that the law on public service mentions employee 
as public servant, but the nature of functions that the public servant carries out; 
he/she should be exercising authority “in the name of the state”.95 
The second group of workers for which the right to strike can be restricted or 
prohibited are those working in essential services. According to the Committee of 
Experts “essential services are only those the interruption of which would 
endanger the life, personal safety, or health of the whole or part of the 
population”.96,97 
Finally, the restriction on the right to strike is justified in situations of acute 
national emergency or national and local crisis. Such situations can for instance 
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be a coup d’état or a serious conflict, insurrection and natural disaster, where the 
normal conditions for the functioning of the society are not present.98  
3.3.2 The Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention 
(No. 98) 
The right to collective bargaining is a fundamental right. It is a key instrument for 
supporting non-discrimination and equality in the workplace. Because of its great 
importance it was mentioned in the Declaration of Philadelphia as one of the aims 
to be achieved.  
Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining is one of 
the eight core ILO Conventions. Because it covers similar issues, Convention No. 
98 is often mentioned together with Convention No. 87 on Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize.  
Convention No. 98 has three main objectives: it protects against acts of anti-union 
discrimination; it also protects against acts of interference in the internal affairs of 
workers’ and employers’ organizations; and lastly, it promotes collective 
bargaining. The principal elements of the Convention are that any parties to 
collective bargaining should be independent and the bargaining process should be 
free and voluntary; the involvement of public authorities in the process of the 
bipartite negotiations between employees and employers must be reduced to a 
minimum; and the primacy in the negotiation process should be given to the 
representatives of the employers and workers.99  
According to Article 1 of the Convention workers shall enjoy adequate protection 
against acts of anti-union discrimination. These are acts that aim to create such 
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working conditions that an employee is dissuaded from joining trade unions or 
encouraged to relinquish trade union membership; acts aiming to cause dismissal 
by reason of union membership or because of participation in union activities 
outside working hours or with the consent of the employer within working hours.  
Anti-union dismissal must be treated differently from other types of dismissals 
since they might be tantamount to a denial of the rights mentioned in the 
Convention No. 87 and may eventually jeopardize the very existence of the trade 
unions. Workers shall enjoy protection against measures of anti-union 
discrimination at the time of taking up employment, in the course of their 
employment and during the termination of their employment. In order for the 
provisions of this article to be effectively applicable in practice it is desirable that 
some machinery for preventive protection exists in the country, such as prior 
authorization of the labour inspectorate or judicial authorities in case of a 
worker’s dismissal. Placing the onus on the employer to prove that a dismissal is 
not connected to any trade union activities of the worker is another way to ensure 
effective protection of workers from anti-union discrimination.100  
All acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of employment shall be forbidden 
by law and penalized in practice. Legislative provisions prohibiting acts of anti-
union discrimination must be broad enough to cover all the possible types of such 
discrimination such as refusal to hire, dismissal, transfer, demotion, or refusal to 
train.101 The legislation should further provide effective means for the dismissed 
worker to get compensation and to be reinstated. It should be noted that even 
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though the Convention offers protection for all workers, the protection is 
particularly important for trade union activists because they are usually the ones 
who encounter difficulties.102 
Article 2 of the Convention states that workers’ and employers’ organizations 
shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts of interference by each other. The 
second Paragraph of the same article clarifies that these acts of interference might 
be designed to promote the establishment of workers' organizations under the 
domination of employers or employers’ organizations; or to support workers’ 
organizations by financial or other means, with the object of placing such 
organizations under the control of employers or employers’ organizations. 
Governments are not only required to exercise great restraint in relation to 
intervention in the internal affairs of trade unions, but moreover, in case there is 
such a need governments have an obligation to take specific action, for instance, 
through the legislative means, to ensure that guarantees provided by this article 
are effective in practice.103 According to the Committee of Experts “adequate 
protection” means that rapid appeal procedures and sufficiently decisive sanctions 
against acts of interference must be established.104  
Article 3 of the Convention speaks about the establishment of machinery 
appropriate to national conditions in order to safeguard the right to organize. This 
article covers protection of workers against acts of anti-union discrimination as 
well as protection of organizations against acts of interference.105 In case of anti-
union discrimination, independent, expeditious and in-depth investigation is 
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required. For this to be achieved, a strong labour inspectorate and an independent 
and effective judicial system in the country are needed.106  
According to Article 4 of the Convention measures appropriate to national 
conditions must be taken in order to encourage and promote machinery for 
voluntary negotiations between workers’ and employers’ organizations with a 
view to regulate terms and conditions of employment by means of collective 
agreements. This article consists of two essential elements: one is action by the 
public authorities to promote collective bargaining and the other is the voluntary 
nature of the negotiations which implies autonomy of the parties.  
The Committee of Experts states that governments are free to establish machinery 
that will support a voluntary bargaining process. Such machinery can be a 
conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration.107 It is prohibited to necessitate 
that a collective agreement be approved before it can enter into force, or to cancel 
it on the ground that it runs against the economic policy of the government. 
Governments, however, can endeavour to convince parties to voluntarily pay 
heed to major economic and social policy considerations of the country. Public 
authorities can intervene if the collective bargaining takes place in the public or 
semi-public sector, but even in this case they should leave enough space for 
bargaining.108  
It is important to note that Convention No. 98 does not regulate such situations 
where the interests of the negotiating parties are in conflict with the interests of 
the country. These are situations where, in extremely serious economic crises, 
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governments resort to restrictive policies on wages and incomes. This might be 
necessary for combating inflation, for achieving a balance of payments or for 
combatting unemployment. These sorts of policies often directly affect collective 
agreements, which become subject to modification or even annulment. In 
situations like this, the position of the ILO supervisory bodies is that changes to 
the content of collective agreements that are already concluded are not 
acceptable. However, governments can intervene in future negotiations, providing 
that the situation is urgent, that the measures are applied only exceptionally and 
to the extent that is necessary. Also the restrictions should not exceed a 
reasonable period and there should be certain guarantees in order to protect the 
standard of living of the workers concerned, who are likely to be most affected. 
All this must be preceded by consultations with the workers’ and employers’ 
organizations.109  
Preliminary work for the adoption of Convention No. 98 stresses the importance 
of the capability of independent organizations to freely conclude collective 
agreements.110 In case no agreement is concluded, it is strictly forbidden to 
impose compulsory arbitration. The situations where states are allowed to impose 
compulsory arbitration are the following: a. In case of essential services in a strict 
sense of this term; b. In case of public servants engaged in the administration of 
the state; c. In a case where negotiations last for a long period of time and the 
deadlock is not going to be overcome without the interference of the authorities; 
d. In case of acute national crisis.111  
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The purpose of collective bargaining is to regulate the relations between 
employer and employee and to set the terms and conditions of employment. Such 
terms and conditions of employment can also be established by law, but they 
should not prevail over collective agreements, unless they offer more favourable 
conditions for workers. This logic is also applied to the private contracts – they 
prevail over collective agreements only if they offer more favourable provisions. 
The principle of good faith is decisive in the process of collective bargaining. The 
organizations representing the parties must engage in genuine and constructive 
negotiations and mutually respect the commitments entered into the 
negotiation.112 
3.4 Conclusion 
Conventions No. 87 and 98 (like most of the other international labour standards) 
include flexibility clauses. Both conventions give the state the freedom to decide 
on the extent to which the provisions are applicable to the armed forces and 
police. Furthermore, the soft language such as “where necessary” used in Articles 
3 and 4 of Convention No. 98 gives the states greater leeway of giving effect to 
the content of the instrument.113 The idea behind the introduction of flexibility 
clauses is that different countries have different cultural and historical 
backgrounds, legal systems, and levels of economic development, and therefore 
standards must be flexible enough to be translated into national law and 
practice.114  
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The right to collective bargaining is linked to the right to freedom of association, 
which is a major prerequisite for collective bargaining and social dialogue. 
Together they constitute enabling rights that make it possible to promote and 
realize decent conditions at work. The exercise of these rights requires a 
conducive and enabling environment, the main elements of which are a strong 
legislative framework, institutions to facilitate collective bargaining, efficient 
labour administrations and strong workers’ and employers’ organizations. 
Governments have a major responsibility in providing for such an 
environment.115  
In general, the main idea behind the freedom of association is that workers and 
employers are equally represented in the negotiation process, that they enjoy 
equal rights which are protected and respected and that only in case of mutual 
respect social justice is achievable. At the same time, ILO takes into 
consideration the necessary measures that states have to refer to sometimes in 
order to save the economy, and allows for some restrictions to the freedom of 
association, providing that these restrictions are reasonable, last no more than is 
necessary and are agreed with the workers’ and employers’ organizations.  
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Chapter IV – Freedom of Association in the European 
Union 
4.1. History of the Creation of the European Union and its Social 
Policy  
The founding fathers of the European Union most probably did not foresee that 
the Union would be structured and shaped the way it is now; however, the idea of 
a peaceful, united and prosperous Europe that they envisaged has proved to be 
achievable.  
In his speech in Zürich in 1946, one of the founding fathers of the European 
Union, Winston Churchill, proposed to create a sort of “United States of Europe”. 
His French colleagues Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet believed that in order to 
avoid military confrontations on the territory of Europe and to lead to further 
economic integration it was necessary to integrate strategically important sectors 
of the economy by removing them from national control. These ideas were 
further elaborated in the document called the ‘Schuman Plan’, presented in May 
1950.116  
The Schuman Plan was followed by the Paris Treaty that established the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The organization 
comprised of six European states: France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux 
countries – Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The idea behind the 
creation of such an Organization was to create interdependence in coal and steel 
                                                          
116 August Reinisch, Essentials of EU law, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 
3-4.  
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production and thus to make military confrontation materially impossible; one 
state could no longer mobilize its armed forces without others knowing.117  
Until the year 2009, a number of treaties were enacted in the European Union. 
Each of them played its role in the formation of the EU. The Treaties of Rome set 
up the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM) in 1957.118  
These Treaties aimed at deepening general economic cooperation within Europe 
by establishing a common market of goods, workers, services and capital. The 
novelties brought by the EEC Treaty were manifold, but the main aim was the 
establishment of a common market. For this purpose it abolished all customs 
duties and charges, having an equivalent effect on the movement of goods among 
member states and established a common external tariff. The four freedoms of 
movement of goods, workers, services and capital were included in the extended 
interpretation of the common market, and it was prohibited to put restrictions 
upon them.119 While concerned mainly with the economic aims, the Rome Treaty 
provided little about the social policy of the Union. It contained the Title on 
Social Policy; however, the provisions of the Title were “largely exhortatory and 
conferred little by way of direct rights on citizens”.120  
The Single European Act 1986 was mainly concerned with the realization of the 
four freedoms – free movement of goods, workers, services and capital. However, 
                                                          
117 EU Treaties, available at: http://europa.eu/eu-law/treaties/index_en.htm, last visited: 22 Jul. 13.  
118 Edit. Sonia Morano-Foadi and Johanna Diekmann, European Union Law 2011-2012, 
Routledge, 2011, p. 3-4. 
119 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davis, Giorgio Monti, European Union Law, Cases and Materials, 
Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 12-13.  
120 Catherine Barnard, EU Employment Law, Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 4.  
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some positive changes were also introduced in the field of social policy of the 
Union. The qualified majority voting was extended in relation to measures 
adopted in the field of health and safety of workers, the area regulated under 
Article 118a EEC (now Article 153 TFEU). Article 118a EEC acquired a role 
even greater than initially anticipated – at a time when a number of the member 
states of the Union were pursuing a deregulatory agenda of the labour law, 
Article 118a created a legal basis for the successful adoption of important 
Directives on Working Time (Council Dir. 93/104/EC (OJ [1993] L307/18)), 
Pregnant Workers (Council Dir. 92/85/EEC (OJ [1992] L348/1)) and Young 
Workers (Council Dir. 94/33/EC (OJ [1994] L216/12)). In other words, Article 
118a supported the construction of a larger social Europe.121,122  
The Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 brought some important changes to the 
social policy of the Union. The original plan to amend the EEC Treaty and 
expand the EU’s social competence had failed because of fierce resistance of the 
UK.123 A solution was found and a separate Protocol (the Social Policy Protocol 
(SPP)) and a separate agreement (Social Policy Agreement (SPA)), referred to 
jointly as the ‘Social Chapter’, were introduced. The SPA further increased the 
competence of the Union in the social field and increased the area in which 
measures could be taken by qualified majority vote. Note should be made of 
Article 2 (6) of the SPA, which clearly states that the provisions of the Article do 
                                                          
121 Ibid. p. 10-11.  
122 Speaking about social policy of the Union it is important to mention the Community Social 
Charter enacted soon after the SEA in 1989. The Charter itself was not incorporated in Union law 
and therefore did not obtain a binding legal force, however, it was supported through the Social 
Charter Action Program which in turn relied on the EEC Treaty and led to the enactment of 
important pieces of social legislation including the Posted Workers Directive (Council Dir. 
96/71/EC (OJ [1997] L18/1), which I will refer to later in this chapter.  
123 However, later, when the Labor government came to the power in 1997, the UK made a 
decision to sign up for the Social Chapter in 1997, Supra note 120, p. 20.  
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not apply to “the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose 
lock-outs”.124  
The next Treaties aimed at improving the functioning of the European institutions 
were the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 and the Treaty of Nice 2001. The aim of 
these Treaties was to make sure that EU institutions would function well after the 
EU enlargement. Therefore, the main focus was on institutional reforms.125 
However, some other important changes also took place. With the Treaty of 
Amsterdam the Schengen Agreement was integrated into the legal framework of 
the TEU, and QMV was significantly extended, covering new fields.126  
The next Treaty that brought significant changes to the social policy of the Union 
was Amsterdam Treaty 1997. As I mentioned in Footnote 123, the UK changed 
its decision and opted back into the Social Charter. Therefore, it was decided on 
Amsterdam IGC to amend the chapter on social policy by incorporating Article 
117-121 EEC and the SPA into the EC Treaty in a new section entitled “The 
Union and the Citizen”. Also, a new Title on Employment was added to the EC 
Treaty. Under Article 2 EC the Union acquired a new task to ensure a high level 
of employment. According to some commentators, the inclusion of the 
Employment Title in the Treaty was a recognition of the fact that the economic 
policies of the Union and the social policies of the states are largely 
interdependent and that social policy was no longer only a matter of domestic 
concern.127  
                                                          
124 Supra note 119, p. 15-17.  
125 Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, The ABC of European Union Law, European Union, 2010, p. 12. 
126 Supra note 119, p. 28-29. 
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At the preparation stage of the Treaty of Nice there were two major issues on the 
agenda: the adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
and the institutional reform of the organization. The Charter was adopted, 
containing civil, political, economic and social rights; however, agreement on the 
legal status of the Charter was not reached.128  
Slowly but steadily Europe was moving to a more integrated, constitutional 
union. In 2001 the Heads of State adopted a Declaration on the Future of the 
European Union which opened a way to a Constitution for Europe. The 
Constitutional Convention was created which produced a Draft Treaty for a 
Constitution for Europe. The status of the EU Fundamental Rights Charter was 
one of the issues. However, the Constitutional Treaty was openly rejected by 
French and Dutch voters in national referenda.129  
The idea of common constitution had failed, but the EU leaders were convinced 
that reform of EU was still needed. Therefore, in 2007 the member states agreed 
on the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force in 2009. The Lisbon Treaty 
incorporated many aspects of the 2004 Draft Constitution, however, it abandoned 
the “constitutional concept”. The provisions about the primacy of EU law were 
removed from the main body of the Treaty together with the detailed text of the 
EU Charter of the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Instead a Declaration was 
annexed to the Treaty setting out the primacy of EU law and requiring the Union 
to respect the rights, freedoms and principles enumerated in the Charter.130 Under 
Article 6 (1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) the Charter acquires the 
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same legal value as the Treaties;131 Paragraph 2 of the same Article further details 
the accession of the Union to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights (ECHR). Importantly, according to Article 6 (3) the rights 
guaranteed by the ECHR result from the constitutional traditions of the member 
states and therefore constitute the general principles of EU law. The reference to 
the ECHR is also made in the Declarations that are annexed to the Lisbon Treaty. 
The Declaration on Article 6 (2) of the Treaty on European Union provides 
further details about the accession of the Union to the ECHR. It states that despite 
the accession, the specific features of EU law should be preserved. The text of the 
Declaration also affirms the regular dialogue between the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the EU and makes a prediction that the 
dialogue is reinforced after the Union actually accedes to the European 
Convention (an issue that will be dealt later in this thesis). 
Important changes were brought by the Lisbon Treaty with regard to the concept 
of Supremacy of the Community law. This concept was the foundation of the 
Community from the very beginning. It means that some powers are transferred 
from the national states to the jurisdiction of the Community. However, nothing 
specific was mentioned about the concept in the EC Treaties. The ECJ took a 
leading role and in its case law developed a concept of supremacy of the EC 
law.132 The very first such case was Van Gend en Loos where the ECJ stated that 
the Treaties had a direct effect. At the same time the Court took the opportunity 
                                                          
131 In terms of social and economic rights it is important to note that together with Poland the 
United Kingdom agreed to enact The Protocol (No 30) On the Application of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and the United Kingdom, annexed to the 
Treaties, where both state parties stated that the Charter IV does not create justiciable rights 
within their jurisdiction, unless, the same rights are provided by their national legislation.  
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to declare the supremacy of EC law over the national law, stating that “the 
Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of 
which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited 
fields”.133 134 
In the field of social policy the main contribution of the Lisbon Treaty was to 
grant the Charter of Fundamental Rights legal force. The Treaty also gave social 
policy a more prominent role, as Article 2 TEU identifies pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and 
men as common values of the Union. Furthermore, Article 3 (3) TEU articulates 
the aims of the Union, stating that it shall establish an internal market and build 
“a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and 
social progress”. According to certain commentators, the mention of the social 
and economic provisions in the same article is not a coincidence and it 
emphasizes a link which was first identified in the Amsterdam Treaty.135  
                                                          
133 Case 26-62 NV Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963].  
134 Speaking about the supremacy of the EU law it is notable to mention the developments of the 
case law of the member states constitutional courts and notably the German Constitutional Court. 
In case of Manfred Brunner and Others v The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57 the 
Federal Constitutional Court seriously questioning the democratic credentials of the Union, 
expressed concern over the fact that the organizational structure of the Union was not democratic 
enough. For this reason the Court was sceptical about the transmission of the national powers to 
the Union. This decision was issued right after the entrance into force of the Maastricht Treaty 
which established the political Union with more competences than the EC enjoyed; the pathos of 
the German Constitutional Court was the same in the case of 2BvE 2/08 Gauweiler v Treaty of 
Lisbon, 30 June, 2009 where the Court is sceptical about granting the excessive powers to the 
Union on the bases that it does not guarantee the democratic process available on national level. 
135 Supra note 120, p. 27.  
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4.2 The four Fundamental Freedoms in the EU  
Part Three of the TFEU enumerates the major principles and rules that provide 
for the establishment of the internal, common market of the EU. Article 26 (2) 
(Ex 14 TEC) TFEU defines the internal market as “an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty”.  
Article 28 (ex 23 TEC) TFEU speaks about the free movement of goods. The 
Union in this article is referred to as a customs union which covers all trade in 
goods and which excludes customs duties on import and export and any charges 
“having equivalent effect”. Article 45 (ex 39 TEC) TFEU provides for the 
freedom of movement of workers with the Union without any discrimination 
based on nationality between workers of the Member States in relation to 
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work. These rights are 
however subject to limitations on the grounds of public policy, public security 
and public health. Article 56 (ex 49 TEC) TFEU prohibits restrictions on the 
freedom of Union citizens to provide services within the Union, whether they are 
established in the same country where they provide services or not. Also, Article 
63 (ex 56 TEC) TFEU guarantees that there are no restrictions on the movement 
of capital among Union member states.  
The right of establishment is often mentioned in relation to these four freedoms. 
According to article 49 (ex 43 TEC) TFEU the citizens of one member state shall 
be able without any restrictions to set up agencies, branches or subsidiaries in 
another member state. This right to establishment also includes the right to self-
employment and establishment of legal persons which can be qualified as 
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companies and firms under civil or commercial law and which are governed by 
public or private law.  
The idea behind the four freedoms of the Union is to ensure that demand and 
supply of goods, workers and services coincide, on the whole territory of the EU, 
and this way wealth creation is maximized. This is achieved through two 
techniques. Firstly, EU law prohibits those national discriminatory laws that 
hinder cross-border trade or render access to the national market difficult. This 
technique is broadly known as negative integration. Secondly, the EU overcomes 
national diversity laws by enacting the Directives that harmonize the national 
laws. This can be called positive integration.136,137  
The ECJ contributed to the creation of a single market. Through the Article 258 
TFEU and by using the direct effect doctrine the Court interpreted the Treaties in 
support of a single market (Cassis de Dijon, 1979).138  
4.3 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights  
The final recognition of human rights as general principles of Community/Union 
law was reached. Yet, there was no one legal document of mandatory character 
within the Community that clearly enumerated the fundamental rights widely 
recognized by the Community and the ECJ.  
In 1996 the ECJ was asked to decide if the Community as a whole had 
competence to accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Court gave the opinion that “as 
                                                          
136 Nigel Foster, EU Law Directions, Oxford University Press, 2nd Edition, 2009, p. 249.  
137 Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EU Law, Text, Cases, And Material, Fifth Edition, Oxford 
University Press, p. 582. 
138 Ibid. p. 583.  
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Community law now stands, the Community has no competence to accede to the 
European Convention”.139 In other words, it was necessary to amend the 
Community Treaties in order to accede to the Convention. This was a 
complicated procedure as it required the unanimity of member states. While 
accession to the ECHR did not seem plausible at the time, the idea emerged that 
the EU write a Charter of Fundamental Rights of its own.140  
In the Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council an agreement 
was reached that for the further development of the European Union there was a 
need to consolidate those fundamental rights applicable at the Union level in a 
single Charter, and thus to make them more evident and visible to the Union’s 
citizens. The Council repeated the view of the Court and stated that “protection of 
fundamental rights is a founding principle of the Union and an indispensable 
prerequisite for her legitimacy”.141  
The Charter was not incorporated into the Treaties as there was no unanimity 
about its legal force. However, the Charter was incorporated into the Draft 
Constitution 2004, which failed. In the process of deliberations over the Lisbon 
Treaty it was decided in 2007 not to include the Charter in the Treaties any more. 
Instead, it was slightly amended and Article 6 (1) TEU was formulated in the 
following way, “the Charter … shall have the same legal values as Treaties”.142  
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140 David Anderson and Cian C Murphy, The Charter of Fundamental Rights in Ed. Andrea 
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The content of the Charter is all-inclusive. As is stated in its Preamble, the 
Charter contains “rights, freedoms and principles”. The Charter consists of seven 
Titles, the first six of which enumerate the rights and freedoms and principles (I – 
Dignity; II – Freedoms; III – Equality; IV – Solidarity; V – Citizens’ Rights; VI - 
Justice). The last Title (VII - General Provisions Governing the Interpretation and 
Application of the Charter) contains the horizontal provisions according to which 
the Charter must be interpreted.143  
Remarkably, Article 6(1) of the TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter make 
referral to the “explanations” – the guidance notes that do not have a status of 
law, but to which the European Court and the member states should pay “due 
regard” while interpreting the Charter’s rights, freedoms and principles. The 
“explanations” set out the sources of the provisions mentioned in the first six 
Titles of the Charter. From the sources mentioned in the “explanations” (EC and 
EU Treaties; the European Social Charter; the Community Charter on the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers etc.), one of the most cited in relation to 
Titles II and VI is the ECHR.144 
Article 51 of the Charter clarifies to whom the Charter applies. According to this 
article the Charter’s provisions are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union “with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity”. As 
for the member states, the provisions of the Charter are only addressed to them 
“when they are implementing Union Law”. This formulation with regard to the 
states is often a subject of discussion and deliberations.  
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4.3.2 Trade Union Rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights  
For the purposes of this thesis two Articles of the EU Charter are of particular 
interest: Article 12 on Freedom of Assembly and Association and Article 28 on 
the Right of Collective Bargaining and Collective Action. The former is from 
Title II on Freedoms and the latter from Title IV on Solidarity.  
4.3.2.1 Article 12 – Freedom of Assembly and of Association  
According to article 12.1 of the Charter: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic 
matters, which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade 
unions for the protection of his or her interests. 
The most important information that we can read in Article 12 from the 
Explanations145 prepared under the authority of the Presidium of the Convention 
drafting the Charter is that “the meaning of the provisions of paragraph 1 of this 
Article 12 is the same as that of the ECHR”. However, it is stated in the 
Explanations that the scope of the application of the article is wider as it applies 
at all levels including the European level and the national one. The Explanations 
also make clear that in accordance with article 52(3) of the Charter only those 
limitations considered legitimate by virtue of article 11(2) of the ECHR can be 
applicable to article 12(1) of the Charter.  
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interpretation intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter”, Ibid.  
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Other than the ECHR the Explanations also mention Article 11 of the 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 1989146 as a 
basis for Article 12(1). Article 11 of the Charter 1989 guarantees the freedom of 
employers and workers of the European Community to constitute profession 
organizations or trade unions “of their choice”, “for the defence of their economic 
and social interests”. According to the same article employers and workers should 
be free to join or not join such organizations and not to suffer any personal or 
occupational damage thereby.  
While speaking about the field of application of Article 12(1), it is important to 
have a look at Article 153 (ex 137) TFEU, which enumerates the competencies of 
the EU in the field of social policy. Paragraph 5 of the article explicitly excludes 
the right of association from the competencies of the Union. At first sight this 
kind of formal exclusion severely limits the practical relevance of Article 12 for 
the matter of material EU law and its implementation by member states. 
However, according to some commentators (e.g. Filip Dorssemont) this 
impression can be mitigated: firstly, because there are limits to exclusion; an 
understanding of the right of association cannot be generic and needs to be 
situated in a social policy context. Exclusion should not extend to civic, political, 
commercial or economic matters. However, this is not advantageous for the 
workers and employers whose rights are violated; they cannot refer to the other 
Policy Titles in the TFEU. Secondly, exclusion does not preclude or invalidate 
                                                          
146 The Charter was shortly referred above. As mentioned in Footnote 129, the Charter did not 
acquire the legally binding force because of the fierce resistance from UK (which eventually 
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of the social policy of the Community and Union. Further information regarding the Charter can 
be found on the following link: 
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legislative interventions that can be indirectly related to the trade union issues. 
Exclusion of pay, for instance, does not prevent the prohibition of unequal 
treatment in the field of pay. Thirdly, despite the exclusion, conflict between the 
right to organize and fundamental economic freedoms of the EU was still an issue 
for discussion in the cases of Viking and Laval. Freedom of association was taken 
into account by the Court of Justice as it is recognized in the Charter. And 
fourthly, irrespective of the exclusion of freedom of association Article 12 
continues to be relevant because of the freedom of assembly.147  
4.3.2.2 Article 28 – Right to Collective Bargaining and Action  
The next article of the Charter that deserves our attention is Article 28: 
Workers and employers, or their respective organizations, have, in 
accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to 
negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels 
and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend 
their interests, including strike action. 
The term “appropriate levels” is defined in the Explanations as “levels laid down 
by Union law or by national laws and practices, which might include the 
European level when Union legislation so provides.” The Explanations further 
provide that limits on the exercise of collective action are an issue of national 
law.148  
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As we can see, the article consists of two rights: the right to bargain collectively 
for the purposes of concluding collective agreements and the right to collective 
action, including the right to strike for the protection of the interests of workers 
and employers. Below I discuss these two separately. 
4.3.2.2.1 Right to Bargain Collectively  
The right to bargain collectively was not recognized as a separate right at first. In 
the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in the Albany case it was stated that the 
mere fact that the right to bargain collectively is included in Article 6 of the 
European Social Charter 1961 of the Council of Europe does not mean that the 
right is generally recognized as a fundamental right. According to the Advocate 
General, the rights set out in the Charter represent policy goals and are not 
necessarily enforceable rights; the state parties to it are free to select which of the 
rights specified they undertake to protect. In support of his argument the 
Advocate General referred to ILO Convention No. 98 and ECHR case law. 
According to him, Article 4 of the ILO Convention is “carefully drafted” and it 
imposes an obligation on the contracting states “to encourage and promote” 
collective bargaining, rather than grant any rights. He also cited the ECHR case 
law (National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium, 1975; Swedish Engine Drivers’ 
Union v Sweden, 1976; Schmidt and Dahlström v Sweden, 1976; Gustafsson v 
Sweden, 1996) in support of his position, stating that according to the ECHR 
“trade union freedom is only one form or a special aspect of freedom of 
association and that article 11 does not guarantee any particular treatment of trade 
unions”. 149 The Advocate General pays much attention to the case of Gustafsson 
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where the European Court stated that the Convention safeguards freedom to 
protect the occupational interests of trade union members by trade union action 
although “the state has a choice as to the means to be used” and that considering 
the wide degree of divergence between the domestic systems “the Contracting 
States should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in their choice of the means to 
be employed”.150 The conclusion of the Advocate General was that the 
community legal order protects freedom of association. The right to form and join 
trade unions is at the heart of that freedom. The right to take collective action is 
also “indispensable for the enjoyment of freedom of association”. However, 
collective bargaining is not recognized as a specific right.151  
Recently, though, the position of the ECJ in relation to collective bargaining has 
changed. In the case of Commission v Germany, the Court expressly stated the 
right to collective bargaining is a recognized right under Article 6 of the 
European Social Charter 1961 (Council of Europe) and also under Article 2 of the 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers’ 1989 (EU 
level). The Court also mentioned Article 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and reaffirmed that under Article 6 TEU it enjoys the same legal value as 
the EU Treaties.152  
While recognizing the right to bargain collectively the Court in the Commission v 
Germany case also stated that although fundamental, the right is not absolute and 
can be limited. In support of the statement the Court referred to the famous Viking 
                                                          
150 Interestingly, in the Opinion on the Albany case the Advocate General also mentions the 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Martens, Joined by Judge Matscher in relation to Gustafsson case 
where the judges argued that the right to collective bargaining is an inherent part of the right to 
freedom of association guaranteed under Article 11 of the ECHR.  
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and Laval judgments. According to the Court, the right to bargain collectively 
must be reconciled with the requirements stemming from the fundamental 
freedoms protected under TFEU and should be in accordance with the principle 
of proportionality used in the Viking and Laval cases; an issue that will be 
discussed in more detail later in this thesis.153  
The general definition of collective bargaining is that it encompasses all kinds of 
bipartite or tripartite discussions that directly affect workers’ groups. However, 
the more specific definition of collective bargaining is that it is a negotiation 
process between an individual employer or his/her representative on the one hand 
and a workers’ group or their representatives (trade unions) on the other hand. 
The agreement they reach is usually compulsory. The content of the agreement 
can be agreed between the negotiating parties but it usually includes 1) normative 
clauses; and 2) contractual or obligatory clauses. Normative clauses are usually 
those that refer to the terms and conditions of work (working conditions, wages, 
fringe benefits, job classifications, working hours, time off, training, job security, 
non-contribution benefits schemes) that must be observed in individual contracts; 
the contractual and obligatory clauses spell out the rights and duties of the 
parties.154  
The benefits of collective bargaining are spelled out in the Albany case already 
mentioned above. As was stated by the Advocate General: “It is widely accepted 
that collective agreements between management and labour prevent costly labour 
conflicts, reduce transaction costs through a collective and rule-based negotiation 
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process and promote predictability and transparency”; the emphasis was also on 
the high probability of a “balanced outcome” of negotiations as a result of 
bargaining power on both sides.155  
In this respect it is interesting to note a judgment delivered by the EU Civil 
Service Tribunal in 2011. In this case the Court directly referred to Article 28 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 11 of the ECHR and stated 
that these articles do not entail an obligation to establish a procedure of collective 
bargaining nor any obligation to confer to the mentioned unions the power of co-
decision for the improvement of the employee’s working conditions.156  
4.3.2.2.2 Right to Collective Action  
The second part of Article 28 concerns the right to collective action, which also 
includes the right to strike. Collective action can have different forms: firstly, it 
can be either primary (action taken by employees against their employer with 
whom they are in dispute) or secondary (action taken by the employees against 
their employers with whom they are not in dispute, but on whom they aim to put 
pressure); and secondly, the forms of action itself may vary: work bans; going 
slow; working to rule; stopping work meetings; picketing; lockouts and strikes.157  
It is important to establish whether the right to collective action, and most 
importantly the right to strike, are collective rights only or can also be taken up 
by individuals. It is argued by some commentators that while the ILO has allowed 
imposing prohibitions on so-called “wildcat strikes” it does consider a right to 
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strike as a collective right and therefore reserves it for the trade unions.158 
However, in case of the Charter, it is less clear. Article 28 makes a distinction 
between “workers” and “organizations” and also makes reference to different 
practices in the member states. It shows that the practices of member states are 
not always the same; for instance, France and Sweden recognize an individual 
right to strike as well.159 Tonia Novitz thinks that the tendency to regard civil and 
political rights as individual, and social rights as collective (the division initially 
supported by the ICCPR and ICESCR) is already old-fashioned. The fact that 
ICESCR has now introduced an individual mechanism of complaints suggests 
that the right to collective action can be regarded as both, a right of individual 
worker to exercise it at his/her own discretion and a right of workers’ 
organizations to exercise it collectively.160  
As stated in Article 28, the rights mentioned therein are subject to national laws 
and practices (which vary from one state to another) and Union law (which 
regulates industrial action by the ECJ case law (Viking, Laval, Rüffert and 
Luxembourg); detailed analyses of which follows later in this thesis). Notably, 
Article 52 (1) TFEU sets limits to limitations. According to the Article any 
limitation must “be provided by law”, “respect the essence of those rights and 
freedoms”, should be “necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general 
interest recognized by the Union”, or “need to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others”.  
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According to Filip Dorssemont these restrictions can be formulated as internal 
restrictions without any substantive limit. In other words, it means that Union law 
and national law define to what extent the freedom of collective bargaining and 
the right to take collective action are recognized under the Charter.161 On the 
other hand, Article 12 on the freedom of association does not provide for such a 
restriction.  
While interpreting the Charter provisions, proper regard should also be made to 
the ECHR. As Article 52(3) of the Charter puts it, the meaning and scope of the 
rights which correspond to the rights guaranteed by the ECHR “shall be the same 
as those laid down by the said Convention”. The Presidium clarified this 
provision further by stating that “the legislator, in laying down the limitations to 
those rights, must comply with the same standards as are fixed by the detailed 
limitation arrangements laid down in the ECHR, which are thus made applicable 
for the rights covered by this paragraph, without thereby adversely affecting the 
autonomy of Union Law and of that of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union”. From this, one may conclude that the EU Charter and the ECHR are 
broadly linked with each other.  
Speaking of the general principles of the EU and the Charter, it is interesting to 
mention an observation made by Steve Peers: prior to the coming into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the Court of Justice hardly ever referred to the Charter, and then 
only as “a subsidiary measure reaffirming the right which formed part of the 
general principles of EU law”. It was not clear whether the Charter had any role 
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other than this. After the Charter acquired legally binding force, it came to 
substitute the “general principles” in the Court’s case law.162  
4.4 ECJ Jurisprudence on Fundamental Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms  
4.4.1 Human Rights in the EU developed by the ECJ  
The creation of a single market initially was the core idea of the European 
Community. Human rights were considered to fall within the sphere of national 
law. Therefore there was no mention of human rights protection in the original 
Treaties of the Community.163  
However, at some point the European Court of Justice came to the idea that for 
the further development of the Community law it was necessary to develop a 
Community approach towards human rights and that it was no longer possible to 
disregard it. Through its case law the ECJ acknowledged human rights as part of 
the Community legal order. In one of its early decisions the ECJ stated that “the 
provision at issue contains nothing capable of prejudicing the fundamental human 
rights enshrined in the general principles of Community Law and protected by the 
Court”.164 In another case, decided soon after, the ECJ emphasized the 
importance of fundamental rights as an “integral part of law protected by the 
Court of Justice” and held that “the protection of fundamental rights, whilst 
inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, must be 
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ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the 
Community”165. Thus, the Court gradually moved to the perception that human 
rights are part of the Community legal order as a general principle of Community 
law.  
In the ECJ judgment on Nold the Court stated that those international treaties to 
which the Community member states were party shall be a source of inspiration 
for fundamental rights within the Community. According to the Court rights 
derived from international treaties and agreements might “be subject to certain 
limits justified by the overall objectives pursued by the Community”, however 
only “on condition that the substance of these rights is left untouched”.166 In later 
case law the Court started to refer to the ECtHR and took the position that 
Community law has to be interpreted in reference to the ECHR.167  
The ECJ played a greater role in establishing standards of freedom of association. 
The first high profile case of this kind was Bosman, in which the Court 
recognized freedom of association as a general principle of EU law. The case was 
about the freedom of a football player to move around the Union as a worker. The 
internal rules of the federation to which his club was affiliated did not allow him 
to do this. The player alleged a violation of his freedom to movement as a worker, 
while the Federation pointed to its freedom of association that included the right 
to elaborate internal rules. The Court made referral to Article 11 ECHR, the 
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constitutional traditions common to the member states, the Preamble of the Single 
European Act and Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union, and stated that 
the principle of freedom of association is protected in the Community legal order. 
However, the Court did not consider the internal rules of the sporting associations 
necessary for the enjoyment of the freedom of association.168 According to some 
commentators, the fact that the Court recognized the freedom of association does 
mean that it saw the link between this freedom and the autonomy of the 
associations in laying down rules. What the Court avoided to do though was a 
balancing exercise. The Court did not examine whether free movement of 
workers could justify restrictions on the internal autonomy of professional 
organizations and whether this restriction was proportionate.169  
The next case of the ECJ that deserves our attention and which can be considered 
a continuation of the Bosman case is the famous case of Albany. While in Bosman 
the ECJ recognized the freedom of association as a general principle of EC law, 
in Albany Advocate General Jacobs went further and considered a more specific 
“right to form and join trade unions” (the formulation given in article 12(1) of the 
Charter) to be a general principle of EC Law. The AG based his conclusion on 
the famous cases Bosman and Maurissen and stated that “the Community legal 
order protects the right to form and join trade unions and employers’ associations 
which is at the heart of freedom of association”.170 In the same Paragraph 139 the 
AG also states that together with the right to form and join trade unions, the right 
to collective action is recognized with respect to freedom of association. The AG, 
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however, stated that it was not yet certain if the right to bargain collectively is a 
fundamental right.  
An interesting case in relation to the freedom of association in the context of 
industrial relations is the case of Werhof. The judgment in this case is criticized 
by commentators, as the Court established that freedom of association also entails 
a negative right of employers not to organize and ruled that such a right was at 
stake because employers were being forced to apply the employment conditions 
stated in a collective agreement and signed by an employers’ organization to 
which they were not affiliated.171 Despite this negative approach of the Court 
there still is something positive to be seen in this judgment: the Court once again 
reaffirms that the freedom of association is one of the fundamental rights that is 
protected in the Community legal order, and saying this, makes reference to 
Article 11 of the ECHR.172  
After the ECJ developed its case law in favour of human rights, the moment had 
come to mention human rights also in the Community Treaties. The first such 
Treaty that explicitly mentioned human rights was the Maastricht Treaty, Article 
6 (1) of which declared that “the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of 
law”. In the second paragraph of the same Article 6 the Union takes obligation to 
“respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms … as they result from 
the constitutional traditions common to the member states, as general principles 
of Community law”.  
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Later, with the amendments of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice, 
Article 7 TEU set a procedure for determining instances of breaches of 
fundamental rights principles declared in Article 6. According to this procedure, 
the member state breaching these principles shall face certain sanctions, including 
the suspension of voting rights.173  
It is clear that EU institutions pay due regard to human rights, including social 
rights. However, it is interesting to observe what happens when fundamental 
rights and fundamental freedoms collide and when EU institutions and 
specifically the ECJ have to rule on the relationship between them. Such 
collisions of fundamental rights (the right to industrial action) and fundamental 
freedoms (freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services) is the main 
topic of my research. Below, I will analyze how the ECJ deals with such cases.  
4.4.2 The Viking Case 
The first case of the ECJ that inspired discussion on the collision of fundamental 
rights, namely social rights and fundamental freedoms of the EU, was 
International Transport Workers Federation v Viking Line ABP, issued by the 
Court in 2007. A short summary of the case: Viking is a large ferry company 
operating under the Finnish flag. The Rosella is one of the vessels Viking 
operates, and it plies the route between Tallinn (Estonia) and Helsinki (Finland). 
The crew of the Rosella are members of the Finnish Union of Seamen (FSU), 
which, in turn, is affiliated with the International Federation of Transport 
Workers’ Union (ITF). The ITF is a large trade union federation grouping 
together 600 unions from 140 different states.  
                                                          
173 Supra note 163, p. 145-146. 
86 
 
While the Rosella sailed under the Finnish flag, Viking was obliged to pay the 
crew wages according to Finnish standards. The Rosella ran at a loss because of 
direct competition from Estonian vessels running on the same route and paying 
the crew Estonian wages, which were much lower than the Finnish. Therefore, in 
October 2003 the Viking administration has decided to reflag the Rosella and 
register it in either Estonia or Norway in order to be able to enter into a new 
collective agreement with the trade union in one of those states. This led to 
litigation.  
The FSU opposed the plan of Viking and sought support from the ITF, which in 
turn sent a circular to its affiliates asking them to refrain from negotiations with 
Viking.174 FSU gave notice of the strike and requested Viking to increase the 
manning with the eight people and to give up the plans of reflagging the Rosella. 
Viking agreed on the increase of manning, but not on the reflagging. FSU made 
clear that it would only accept the reflagging if the working conditions were not 
changed and if Viking continues to abide by the Finnish law. Viking made it clear 
that the reflagging would not involve any redundancies. However, no agreement 
was reached, and because of the fear of strike action Viking was forced to accept 
trade union demands and abandoned its plans to reflag. The judicial proceeding 
initiated by Viking at the Finnish Court during the process of conciliation was 
also discontinued.  
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This happened in the year 2003 when Estonia was not yet a member of the 
European Union. In May 2004 the situation changed: Estonia acquired EU 
membership. Viking brought an action before the High Court of Justice of 
England and Wales, Queens Bench Division (Commercial Court) alleging a 
violation of rights under Community law and requesting the withdrawal of the 
ITF circular which was still in force. The Court granted the form of order sought 
by Viking on the basis that the actions orchestrated by the FSU and ITF caused 
unjustified restrictions on the freedom of movement of workers, freedom of 
establishment and freedom to provide services guaranteed to Viking under 
Articles 39, 43, 49 EC.  
The FSU and the ITF appealed, arguing that the right of trade unions to take 
collective action for preserving jobs of workers is a fundamental right recognized 
under the EC Treaty itself, where Article 136 (now Article 151 TFEU) makes a 
reference to the 1961 European Social Charter and 1989 Community Charter of 
the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and sets the following objectives for 
the member states “the promotion of employment, improved living and working 
conditions, so as to make possible their harmonization while the improvement is 
being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between management and 
labor, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high 
employment and the combating of exclusion”. While the case was about the 
interpretation of EU law, the Court of Appeal of the UK decided to stay the 
proceedings and refer the questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.175 
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Ten questions were referred to the ECJ, which Advocate General Maduro 
grouped into three major questions. The first issue was about the analogy with the 
Albany case decided by the ECJ, and the question asked was whether collective 
action organized by the FSU and the ITF falls outside the scope of Article 43 EC 
(now Article 49 TFEU) on the right of establishment by virtue of Community 
social policy. The second issue was about the horizontal direct effect, and the 
question was whether Article 43 EC confers rights on individuals that can be used 
against trade unions in respect of collective action. The final issue was about 
restrictions and their justification. More specifically, the question was whether 
the collective action taken by the trade unions constituted a restriction on freedom 
of movement in the EU and if so, whether this is justified. In other words, 
whether such activities of the trade unions allow to strike a fair balance between 
the freedom of establishment and provision of services on the one hand, and a 
fundamental social right to take a collective action on the other.176  
Regarding the first question the opinion of the ECJ was that the actions of the 
trade unions were not excluded from the scope of Article 43 EC. About the 
horizontal direct effect the Court was of the opinion that Article 43 EC confers 
rights on private undertakings that can be relied on against trade unions. And 
finally, the Court decided that the actions of the trade unions in the present case 
constituted a restriction on the freedom of establishment; however, this restriction 
might be justified if there is an “overriding reason of public interest, such as the 
protection of workers”, but only if the “restriction is suitable for ensuring the 
attainment of the legitimate objective pursued and does not go beyond what is 
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necessary to achieve that objective”. The final conclusion whether the actions of 
the FSU and ITF were justified or not, the ECJ left to the national court.  
4.4.2.1 Discussing the Judgment  
While discussing the first issue on the applicability of the Community law the 
Court rejected the argument that while according to Article 137(5) EC (now 
153(5) TFEU) the right of association and the right to strike are explicitly 
excluded from the competences of the EC, these issues should fall outside the 
scope of Article 43 EC. The Court stated that even if an issue falls out of EC 
competence, member states are still free to introduce conditions governing the 
existence and exercise of the rights under discussion; but even in this case, States 
still have to comply with EC law.177  
The next argument in relation to the first issue of applicability of Community law 
was that the right to strike constitutes a fundamental right and therefore should 
fall outside the scope of Article 43 EC. Notably, the ECJ explicitly recognized the 
right to strike as a fundamental right, but stated that the exercise of this right 
nonetheless may be subject to certain restrictions. The Court cited its previous 
case law of Schmidberger178 and Omega179 and noted that even though the 
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protection of fundamental rights can justify restrictions on fundamental freedoms 
(the freedom of establishment and provision of services), this does not mean that 
fundamental rights are outside the scope of EC law, and in this particular case 
outside the scope of Article 43 EC.180  
The final argument regarding the first issue provided by trade unions was that the 
reasoning in Albany181 should be applied by analogy. In Albany the ECJ found 
that certain restrictions to competition are inherent in collective agreements 
between workers’ and employers’ organizations; nevertheless, the Court stated 
that the social policy objectives pursed by such agreements can seriously be 
undermined if subjected to the rules on competition under Article 85(1) EC (now, 
Article 101(1) TFEU). The Court refused to extend the Albany reasoning to the 
present case, stating that the Treaty rules about competition are different from the 
Treaty provisions on freedom of movement and the fact that agreement or activity 
is excluded from the competition rules does not mean that it is also excluded from 
the free movement provisions, as these two sets of provisions are applicable in 
different circumstances.182  
Having ruled that Community law does apply to the circumstances of the case, 
the next question the Court dealt with was whether the Treaty provisions on free 
movement created a horizontal obligation for private actors; whether Treaty 
provisions confer rights on private individuals that can be invoked against the 
trade unions. The conclusion of the Court was that Article 43 EC is certainly 
capable of conferring rights on private undertakings which may be relied on 
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against trade unions. To the argument that trade unions are not public entities, and 
since the Treaty creates obligations only for member states Article 43 EC should 
not create any obligations for trade unions, the Court replied that for the 
realization of the freedom of provision of services it does not matter if the 
obstacles result from acts by public entities or by associations and organizations 
not governed by public law. Here the Court relied on previous case law (Case C-
265/95 Commission v France [1997] ECR I-6959; Schmidberger; Walrave and 
Koch).183  
Advocate General Maduro developed a very interesting approach regarding direct 
horizontal applicability in the Viking case. He asked a question: can the action of 
the private entities (in other words, those entities that are not public) actually 
cause a disruption to the realization of the provision of services? He made a 
comparison between the competition rules and the fundamental freedom of free 
movement, and stated that while competition rules usually have horizontal effects 
and the freedom of free movement vertical effects, the freedom of free movement 
can also have direct horizontal effects, but only in cases where market access is 
denied.184 In other words, according to the Advocate General the Treaty can be 
relied on only against those private actions that are “capable of effectively 
restricting others from exercising their right to freedom of movement”.185 The 
Advocate General further explains that the fact that private actors are now subject 
to the Treaty rules on freedom of movement does not necessarily mean that they 
are now held to exactly the same standards as state authorities; instead, “the Court 
may apply different levels of scrutiny, depending on the source and seriousness of 
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the impediment to the exercise of the right to freedom of movement, and on the 
force and validity of competing claims of private autonomy”.186  
This approach of Advocate General Maduro was criticized by Catherine Barnard, 
who thinks that this is a provocative approach that opens up a host of problems. 
Legal certainty now is replaced by flexibility. According to her, the facts of the 
case allowed the Advocate General simply to say that “taken together the actions 
of the FSU and the ITF are capable of effectively restricting the exercise of the 
right to freedom of establishment of an undertaking such as Viking”.187,188  
Furthermore, Catherine Barnard considers the Viking judgment problematic for 
two major reasons. Firstly, it puts trade unions in the same position as states, with 
the same responsibilities. She thinks this is not fair to trade unions, because, 
unlike states, trade unions are mainly concerned with the protection of the 
interests of their members and do not have to balance the interests of those losing 
their jobs with the interests of society as a whole having cheaper services. For 
Barnard it is problematic that trade unions are now subject to the same 
obligations as states, while at the same time they cannot invoke any of the 
defences in Article 46 EC (now, Article 52 TFEU), for instance public policy, 
because these were drafted with states in mind.189  
A more detailed analysis of the horizontal direct effect of the Treaty provisions is 
offered by Alan Dashwood. He starts by differentiating between the approaches 
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taken by the Advocate General Maduro and the ECJ in the case of Viking and also 
Laval. According to Dashwood the Advocate General attempted to formulate a 
general theory of the horizontal direct effect of the free movement provisions in 
the Treaty and applied it to Viking; while the ECJ decided the cases of Viking and 
Laval by analogy by making reference to established case law.190  
Dashwood states that free movement provisions certainly do apply directly in 
some cases, but the problem is to know which these cases are. No answer to this 
question is provided by the Advocate General, so it must be decided on a case-by-
case basis. The case-by-case approach criticized by Barnard, who did not support 
the idea that legal certainty is now replaced by flexibility, is also problematic for 
Dashwood. It is difficult to strike a balance between the need of subjecting 
certain private actors to the Treaty provisions on freedom of movement and the 
need to respect the private autonomy of these private actors as protected under 
domestic law. Similar to Barnard, Dashwood is also of the idea that it is not 
appropriate to hold individual actors to the same strict standards as national 
authorities, which usually enjoy a margin of discretion in the steps that should be 
taken to prevent obstacles to free movement resulting from the conduct of private 
actors.191  
Having answered the first and the second questions the Court then went to 
consider whether the industrial action breached the Treaty and if so, whether this 
was justified. The Court started with the statement that freedom of establishment 
is one of the fundamental principles of the Community, the purpose of which is to 
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ensure that foreign nationals and companies are treated in the host member state 
the same way as nationals of that state, and that the fact that a national or 
company is originally from a particular member state should not prevent them 
from settling or being established in another member state. The Court then refers 
to the definition of the freedom of establishment, which according to its previous 
case law involves “the actual pursuit of economic activity through a fixed 
establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period”. The Court 
concluded that the registration of a vessel actually falls within this definition, as a 
vessel serves as a vehicle for the pursuit of economic activity.192  
As a result, the Court reached the conclusion that both actions of the FSU and the 
ITF constituted restrictions on the freedom of establishment. In relation to the 
FSU the Court stated that the collective action envisaged by the FSU had had the 
effect of making Viking’s exercise of its right to freedom of establishment less 
attractive or even pointless, as the action of the FSU prevented Viking from 
enjoying the same treatment in the host member state as other economic operators 
established in that state.193 In regard to the ITF the Court stated that the policy of 
the ITF which aims at combating the use of flags of convenience “must be 
considered to be at least liable to restrict Viking’s exercise of its right of freedom 
of establishment”.194  
Having established that the actions of the trade unions constituted a restriction on 
the freedom of establishment, the next question the Court dealt with was whether 
or not this restriction was justified. Advocate General Maduro started by pointing 
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out the benefits of the rules of establishment for the economic welfare of all 
member states within the Union. At the same time he stressed the importance of 
the social rights of workers and endorsed these by recognizing the right of 
workers to associate and act collectively in order to make their voices heard. The 
Advocate General also noted the negative consequences that are inherent in the 
creation of a common market, in exchange for which the society must commit 
itself to the general improvement of the living conditions of workers who 
personally experience the difficulties caused in the process of common market 
creation.195  
After carefully balancing the interests of the common market and the workers’ 
rights the Advocate General moved on to establishing whether the industrial 
action undertaken by the ITF and proposed by the FSU went too far. Here the 
Advocate General distinguished between two types of industrial action: collective 
action in the interests of the jobs and the working conditions of the current crew, 
which was the situation of the FSU, and collective action to improve the terms of 
employment of seafarers throughout the community, which concerned the ITF.  
Regarding the first type of collective action the Advocate General was of the 
opinion that this is compatible with EC law, provided that intra-community 
relocations are not treated less favourably than relocations within national 
borders. However, relocations shall not be initiated purely for the reason to 
prevent an undertaking to provide services in the member state where it had 
previously been established. In other words, the FSU action could be justified if 
Viking had planned to relocate from Finland. But while Viking had planned to 
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relocate from Finland to Estonia (within the EC Community) the action by FSU is 
not appropriate, because “blocking or threating to block, through collective 
action, an undertaking established in one Member State from lawfully providing 
services in another Member State … entirely negates the rationale of the common 
market”.196  
Regarding the second type of industrial action the Advocate General recognized 
the need for the coordinated collective actions from the trade unions in order to 
protect workers’ rights. However, he distinguished between situations where 
trade unions have a choice in deciding on their own whether to participate in 
collective industrial action and where trade unions are compelled to participate in 
such an action. The later one might constitute an abuse, he noted, and thus 
contravene Article 43 EC because it enables any national union to seek the 
support of other trade unions in order to block the relocation of a company from 
one member state to another if its own preferred standards are not respected.197  
The ECJ offered a more careful observation. The Court had not justified the 
restriction on the freedom of establishment, nevertheless, its ruling gave the 
national court strong leverage on making a final decision on whether the 
collective action was really about the protection of workers. The Court reiterated 
the position of the Advocate General that the protection of the jobs and conditions 
of employment of trade union members can fall within the objective of protecting 
workers, and therefore can justify the restriction on freedom of movement 
clauses; noting, however, that “such a view would no longer be tenable if it were 
established that the jobs or conditions of employment were not jeopardized or 
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under serious threat”. The Court referred to Viking’s undertaking not to terminate 
the employment with any person as a result of reflagging, at the same time stating 
that while the exact legal scope of the undertaking is not clear it is the national 
court that determines “whether the jobs or conditions of employment of that trade 
union’s members who are liable to be affected by the reflagging of the Rosella 
were jeopardized or under serious threat”.198  
The Court offered a proportionality test for the national court to apply: if the 
national court reaches the conclusion that jobs were “jeopardized or under serious 
threat” and the collective action by FSU was necessary to protect these jobs, the 
national court further has to ascertain whether the FSU action “was suitable for 
ensuring the objective pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain 
that objective”.199  
Interestingly, the Court makes referral to European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) case law (National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, no. 4464/70, 
ECHR, 1975; Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v. United 
Kingdom, ECHR, 2002), stressing the importance of the right to strike and the 
right to collective agreement and collective bargaining for the protection of 
workers’ rights as “one of the main ways” in which trade unions can protect their 
members. However, in the next paragraph the Court considers whether the 
collective action in the case of Viking goes beyond what is necessary to achieve 
the objective. Here the Court is of the opinion that for this to be established “it is 
for the national court to examine, in particular, on the one hand, whether, under 
the national rules and collective agreement law applicable to that action, FSU did 
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not have other means at its disposal which were less restrictive of freedom of 
establishment in order to bring to a successful conclusion the collective 
negotiations entered into with Viking, and, on the other, whether that trade union 
had exhausted those means before initiating such action”.200  
According to Catherine Barnard this test of proportionality will cause significant 
problems for trade unions in the future. It suggests that industrial action is the last 
resort and that national courts have to check whether the union has exhausted all 
other avenues under national law, before finding the industrial action 
proportionate.201  
While I share the position of Catherine Barnard that such a proportionality test 
seriously undermines the opportunity for trade unions to protect the interests of 
workers, I want to draw a parallel between Viking and an ECHR case which the 
Court does not mention: the case of Schmidt and Dahlstrom. In this case the issue 
was also the right to strike, and the Court ruled that the “Convention safeguards 
freedom to protect the occupational interests of trade union members by trade 
union action, the conduct and development of which the Contracting States must 
both permit and make possible. Article 11.1, nevertheless leaves each State a free 
choice of the means to be used towards this end”. The ECHR further continued 
that “the grant of a right to strike represents without any doubt one of the most 
important of these means, but there are others. Such a right which is not expressly 
enshrined in Article 11 may be subject under national law to regulation of a kind 
that limits its exercise in certain instances”.202 The reading of this paragraph 
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shows that before the ECJ the ECHR also considered the right to strike as one of 
the means, which might be restricted in certain situations under national law. 
Interesting is how the ECJ responds to the recent developments of the ECHR 
jurisprudence (where the position of the Court has changed in relation to the trade 
union right of freedom of association and it is now interpreted according to the 
ILO standards). This is to be discussed in the following chapter.  
Continuing with the Viking judgment, the Court shared the unfriendly attitude of 
the Advocate General towards the ITF action and stated that the restriction on the 
freedom of establishment caused by the ITF policy – which resulted in ship 
owners being prevented from registering their vessels in a state other than the 
state of which the beneficial owners of those vessels are nationals – cannot be 
justified. The Court nevertheless notes that the objective of the policy is to protect 
seafarers and to improve their terms and conditions of employment; however, 
from the file submitted to the Court it is apparent that according to the Flag of 
Convenience (FOC) policy the ITF is required to initiate strike action against an 
employer when asked by one of its members irrespective of whether that 
employer’s exercise of the right to establishment has a harmful effect on the 
working conditions of workers. It means that the FOC policy is also applicable to 
a situation in which the vessel is re-registered in a state that guarantees the 
workers higher protection than they had enjoyed in the first state. In other words, 
the policy is indiscriminate.203  
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The case of Viking was returned to the Court of Appeal and the parties settled the 
case. Although the terms of settlement remain confidential, it is known that the 
Rosella is now registered in Sweden.204  
4.4.3 The Laval Case 
The second case that covered the issue of the relationship between social rights 
and economic freedoms and that was decided by the ECJ together with Viking 
was Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets, avd. 1, Byggettan, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet. 
The facts of the case are the following: Laval is a Latvian company that has a 
wholly owned subsidiary L&P Baltic Bygg, a company incorporated under 
Swedish law. Baltic won a contract to refurbish and extend a school in Sweden 
(in the Stockholm suburb of Vaxholm). Laval posted 35 Latvian workers to 
Sweden to fulfil the contract. The workers earned 40% less per hour than 
comparable Swedish workers. Therefore, even though Laval was in a collective 
agreement with the Latvian trade unions, the major Swedish construction trade 
union wanted Laval to join the Swedish national agreement. The negotiations 
started in June 2004. Laval was requested to join the collective agreement for the 
building sector signed between the Swedish trade unions and the Swedish 
Building Employers’ Association. The agreement covered a number of issues, 
including the obligation for Laval to pay a special building supplement to an 
insurance company in order to finance group life insurance contracts. 
Importantly, the pay for workers was not defined and was left to be negotiated at 
the local level between the local trade union (Byggettan) and the employer on a 
                                                          
204 Supra note 188, p. 484. 
101 
 
case-by-case basis after the tie-in to the Swedish collective agreement. The 
negotiations were unsuccessful. Laval refused to sign the agreement, for the 
reason that the obligations with regard to wages were not clear. Byggettan (a local 
trade union) requested Byggnads (a major Swedish construction trade union) to 
initiate strike action against Laval by blockading the building site (preventing the 
delivery of goods onto the site, placing pickets and prohibiting Latvian workers 
and vehicles from entering the site). Subsequent mediation was not effective and 
the collective action against Laval intensified; other trade unions in Sweden 
announced sympathy strikes (Elektrikerna joined the action, with the result that 
Swedish undertakings belonging to the organization of electricians’ employers 
were prevented from providing services to Laval). As a result, the town of 
Vaxholm terminated the contract with the Baltic company, which eventually went 
bankrupt. The Latvian workers returned to Latvia.205 
In December 2004 Laval commenced proceedings in the Swedish national court 
(Arbetsdomstolen) against Byggnads, Byggettan and Elektrikerna, asking the 
Court firstly to declare the blockade and sympathy actions illegal and issue an 
order to seize the actions, and secondly, to issue an order to the trade unions to 
pay compensation for the damage. The national court dismissed the application 
for an interim order to bring the collective action to an end.  
However, the national court was interested to know whether Articles 12 EC (now 
article 18 TFEU) and 49 EC (now article 56 TFEU) and the Directive on Posting 
Workers 96/71 preclude trade unions from attempting, by means of strike action, 
                                                          
205 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets, avd. 1, Byggettan, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007]; Para 27-38.  
102 
 
to force a foreign company posting workers to Sweden to apply a Swedish 
collective agreement, and referred the following two questions to the ECJ:  
1. Is it compatible with rules of the EC Treaty on the freedom to provide 
services and the prohibition of any discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality and with the provisions of Directive 96/71/EC … for trade 
unions to attempt, by means of collective action in the form of a blockade 
(“blockad”), to force a foreign provider of services to sign a collective 
agreement in the host country in respect of terms and conditions of 
employment, such as that described in the decision of Arbetsdomstolen of 
29 April 2005 (collective agreement for the building sector), if the 
situation in the host country is such that the legislation to implement 
Directive 96/71 has no express provisions concerning the application of 
terms and conditions of employment in collective agreements?  
2. The [MBL] prohibits a trade union from taking collective action with 
the intention of circumventing a collective agreement concluded by other 
parties. The prohibition applies, however, pursuant to a special provision 
contained in part of the law known as the “Lex Britannia”, only where a 
trade union takes collective action in relation to conditions of work to 
which the [MBL] is directly applicable, which means in practice that the 
prohibition is not applicable to collective action against a foreign 
undertaking which is temporarily active in Sweden and which brings its 
own workforce. Do the rules of the EC Treaty on the freedom to provide 
services and the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality and the provisions of Directive 96/71 preclude application of 
the latter rule – which, together with other parts of the Lex Britannia, 
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mean in practice that Swedish collective agreements become applicable 
and take precedence over foreign collective agreements already concluded 
– to collective action in the form of a blockade taken by Swedish trade 
unions against a foreign temporary provider of services in Sweden?206  
The judgment of the Court was accordingly structured in two paragraphs:  
“1. Article 49 EC and Article 3 of Directive 96/71/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services are to be 
interpreted as precluding a trade union, in a Member State in which the 
terms and conditions of employment covering the matters referred to in 
Article 3(1), first subparagraph, (a) to (g) of that directive are contained in 
legislative provisions, save for minimum rates of pay, from attempting, by 
means of collective action in the form of a blockade (“blockad”) of sites 
such as that at issue in the main proceedings, to force a provider of 
services established in another member state to enter into negotiations 
with it on the rates of pay for posted workers and to sign a collective 
agreement the terms of which lay down, as regards some of those matters, 
more favourable conditions than those resulting from the relevant 
legislative provisions, while other terms relate to matters not referred to in 
Article 3 of the Directive. 2. Where there is a prohibition in a Member 
State against trade unions undertaking collective action with the aim of 
having a collective agreement between other parties set aside or amended, 
Article 49 EC and 50 EC preclude that prohibition from being subject to 
                                                          
206 Ibid. para 39-40.  
104 
 
the condition that such action must relate to terms and conditions of 
employment to which the national law applies directly”.207  
                                                          
207 After the Laval judgment the Swedish government decided to make changes to the existing law 
in order to make it correspondent to the ECJ jurisprudence. Therefore, section 5a of the Foreign 
Posting of Employees Act (Lex Laval) was formulated so that, no form of collective action can be 
taken by trade unions if the employer shows that workers enjoy conditions of employment 
(including wage levels and other essential aspects of work) that are at least as favourable as the 
minimum conditions established in agreements at central level. Section 5b of the same Act was 
structured in the following way, no form of collective action can be taken by trade unions if the 
employer shows that workers enjoy conditions of employment (including wage levels and other 
essential aspects of work) that are at least as favourable as the minimum conditions established in 
agreements at central level or in the user undertaking. Furthermore, Section 41 of the Co-
determination Act provides that collective action taken in violation of section 5a and 5b is 
unlawful and trade unions acting in breach of Foreign Posting of Employees Act shall pay 
compensation for any loss incurred. The changes entered into force in April, 2010.  
Changes concerned also the Foreign Branch Offices Act. Under Section 2 of the Act foreign 
companies which conduct their economic activities in Sweden are not obliged to create a branch 
office with independent management in Sweden if the economic activity is made subject to the 
provisions on free movement of goods and services in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union or the corresponding provisions of the Agreement on the European Economic 
Area (EEA).  
The obvious influence of the Laval put Swedish trade unions in a hard condition. They started to 
fight back and in a couple of year’s times after Laval they have achieved tangible results. On May 
22, 2013 Swedish parliament approved the proposed bill of the government (Prop. 2012/13:71) 
making amendments to the Act on Posting of Workers. According to this amendment foreign 
service providers are requested to register at the Swedish Work Environment Authority and to 
appoint a contact person in Sweden. There is an exemption to this rule, if the work in Sweden 
lasts for maximum of five days (European Labor Law Network, 
http://www.labourlawnetwork.eu/national_labour_law_latest_country_reports/national_legislation
/legislative_developments/prm/109/v__detail/id__3151/category__1/index.html).  
In 2012 Swedish trade unions lodged a complaint against Sweden to the European Committee of 
Social Rights, complaining about the violation of Article 6 on the right to bargain collectively and 
the right to collective action (para 2, 4) and Article 19 on the right of migrant workers and their 
families to protection and assistance (para 4a, b) of the European Social Charter (revised) of 1996. 
The Committee established violation of the Charter on all four aspects. The decision was made 
public on November 20, 2013. In Paragraph 18 the Committee states that “the facilitation of free 
cross-border movement of services and the promotion of the freedom of an employer to provide 
services in the territory of other states … cannot be treated … as having a greater a priori value 
than core labor rights, including the right to collective action to demand further and better 
protection of the economic and social rights and interests of workers” (85/2012 – Swedish Trade 
Union Confederation (LO) and Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO) v. 
Sweden).  
These recent developments show how successfully the Swedish trade unions acted against the 
Laval restrictions. How far can this go and whether trade unions manage to restore the pre-Laval 
status quo remains to be seen.  
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4.4.3.1 Posting Workers Directive  
While the ECJ was asked to interpret Directive 96/71 on Posting of Workers, I 
consider it useful to mention several provisions of the Directive that the Court 
was specifically concerned with. In the Preamble we read that because of the 
internationalization of employment relationships sometimes it becomes harder to 
decide which legislation is applicable in employment relationships (Recital 6). 
Therefore, member states should coordinate in the framework of the Community 
in order to set mandatory rules for minimum protection to be observed by 
employers posting workers to other member states (Recital 13). At the same time, 
it is stressed that these minimum protection rules should not prevent the 
application of terms and conditions of employment more favourable to workers 
(Recital 17). In the same Preamble reference is made to collective action, 
specifying that the Directive is without prejudice to the national law on collective 
action for defending occupational interests (Recital 22). 
As for the scope of the Directive, it is applicable to companies that post workers 
from one member state to another. It is also applicable to situations similar to 
Laval when companies post workers to an establishment or to an undertaking 
owned by a group in the territory of a member state and when there is an 
employment relationship between this undertaking and the worker during the 
period of posting (Article 1).  
Directive 96/71 binds undertakings to respect the terms and conditions of 
employment of the host country provided either by law, regulation or 
administrative provision, or by the collective agreements or arbitration awards 
that are declared universally applicable. The issues that can be covered by these 
documents also include the rate of pay (Article 3.1).  
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Directive 96/71 defines universally applicable collective agreements and 
arbitration awards as “collective agreements or arbitration awards which must be 
observed by all undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or 
industry concerned”. In case member states do not have a system of declaring 
these as universal they may rely on “a. collective agreements or arbitration 
awards which are generally applicable to all similar undertakings in the 
geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned, and/or b. collective 
agreements which have been concluded by the most representative employers’ 
and labor organizations at national level and which are applied throughout 
national territory.” The importance of equality of treatment is stressed in the same 
paragraph, meaning that national undertakings are subject to the same obligations 
with the same effect as the undertakings posting workers (Article 3.8).  
It is also stressed that the application of more favourable terms and conditions of 
employment to posted workers shall not be prevented. It is also specified that 
allowances specific to the posting shall be considered to be part of the minimum 
wage unless paid in reimbursement of expenditure incurred on account of the 
posting (Article 3.7). 
On the basis of equality of treatment and in the case of public policy provisions 
member states are allowed to apply to national and foreign undertakings the terms 
and conditions of employment not mentioned in national laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions. On the same ground member states are also allowed to 
apply terms and conditions of work to the national and international undertakings 
that are mentioned in universally applicable collective agreements and arbitration 
awards but are not specified in Article 3.1 (Article 3.10).  
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4.4.3.2 Swedish legislation  
As to the Swedish legislation, it is important to mention that Sweden does not 
have a system for declaring collective agreements universally applicable, and in 
order to avoid a discriminatory approach Sweden does not require foreign 
undertakings to apply Swedish collective agreements because not all Swedish 
workers are bound by collective agreements. The Directive 96/71 was transposed 
by the Law on the Posting of Workers (lag om utstationering av arbetstagare 
(1999:678)). However, Swedish legislation does not provide for minimum rates 
of pay as mentioned in Article 3.1 of the Directive. As required under Article 4.1 
of the Directive, a liaison office (Arbetsmiljöverket) was established for 
informing interested persons about the existence of the collective agreements and 
providing them with the necessary information.208  
The right to take collective action is guaranteed by the Basic Law of Sweden. The 
Law on Workers’ Participation in Decisions 1976 (Medbestämmandelagen, 
‘MBL’) provides rules concerning the rights of association, negotiation, 
collective agreements, and mediation of collective labour disputes, as well as the 
obligation of social peace. It also contains a provision on the restrictions on 
engaging in collective action. According to Article 41 MBL there is a mandatory 
social truce between the employer and the employee bound by a collective 
agreement and it is prohibited to take collective action with the aim of changing 
the terms and conditions of this agreement. Collective action is allowed when the 
management and labourers are not bound by any collective agreement. Article 42 
of the MBL prohibits any kind of participation in illegal collective action. In the 
case law Article 42 is defined as prohibiting trade unions to take collective action 
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with the purpose of having a collective agreement between other parties set aside 
or amended. In the case of Britania (1989, No 120) it was held that this 
“prohibition extends to collective action taken in Sweden in order to have a 
collective agreement concluded between foreign parties in a workplace abroad set 
aside or amended if such collective action is prohibited by the foreign legislation 
applicable to the signatories to that collective agreement”. The “Lex Britania” 
which entered into force in 1991 reduced the scope of the principle expounded in 
Britania judgment, saying that collective action against a foreign employer is no 
longer prohibited if “the particular situation suggests that the link with that 
member state is too tenuous for the MBL to be deemed to apply directly to the 
terms and conditions of employment in question”.209  
The collective agreement for the building sector that Laval was asked to join was 
an agreement concluded between Byggnads (a trade union which groups together 
workers in the construction sector in Sweden) and Sveriges Byggindustrier (a 
central organization for employers in the construction sector). Other than setting 
terms and conditions of employment the agreement also required the signatory 
undertakings to accept a number of pecuniary obligations, such as a sum equal to 
1.5% of gross wages for the purposes of the pay review this section of the trade 
union carries out. Also undertakings were obliged to pay sums to the insurance 
company, FORA, firstly, 0.8% of total gross wages for the purposes of a “special 
building supplement” (intended to finance group life insurance contracts and the 
research fund for Swedish building undertakings, Galaxen, that had the purpose 
of the adaptation of the work places for persons with reduced mobility) and 
secondly, 5.9% for the purposes of a number of insurance premiums 
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(guaranteeing workers supplementary retirement insurance; payment of health 
benefits; compensation for accidents at work; and financial assistance for 
relatives in the event of the death of a worker).210  
The determination of wages in Sweden takes place on a case-by-case basis, as a 
result of negotiations between the management and individual workers, 
considering the qualification of the worker and also the work to be performed. In 
the construction sector performance-related pay is standard. New pay agreements 
should be concluded in respect of each construction project. However, employers 
and local trade unions may agree on the application of an hourly wage in respect 
of a specific site. There is no system of monthly wages applicable to the workers 
in the construction business. If the local trade union and the employer cannot 
agree on the issue of pay, the central trade union (in the case of Laval this was 
Byggnads) can intervene as a party on the side of employees. If the negotiations 
are still unsuccessful the basic wage is determined according to a fall-back 
clause. This is a negotiation mechanism of the last resort and in 2004 the amount 
suggested by the clause amounted to SEK 109 (approximately 12 EUR) per 
hour.211  
4.4.3.3 Discussing the Judgement  
The questions raised in Laval were structured in the same order as the questions 
in Viking. The first question was about the applicability of EC law to the exercise 
of fundamental social rights. The Danish and Swedish governments submitted to 
the Court two main reasons for the inapplicability of EC law: firstly, according to 
Article 137(5) EC (now Article 153(5) TFEU) freedom of association and the 
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right to strike fall out of the scope of the Community; secondly, the right to strike 
is a fundamental right guaranteed by various international instruments and 
therefore cannot be trumped by freedom of movement provisions. The position of 
the Advocate General about these issues was that a it would be indefensible and 
anachronistic if EU law generally did not apply to the social laws of member 
states, because firstly, in exercising power in the social sphere member states 
must still comply with Community law and secondly, under Title XI, the 
Community itself also retains certain powers, albeit limited, in the social 
sphere.212  
As for the second issue concerning the fundamentality of the right to strike the 
Advocate General was of the opinion that the right to strike is a fundamental right 
and a general principle of Community law.213 However, according to the 
Advocate General this right is not absolute, and certain restrictions can be put on 
it. Here he cited case law of the ECHR in which it is recognized that the right to 
strike can be one of the means by which states might or might not choose to 
guarantee the right to freedom of association for trade unions protected under 
Article 11 ECHR. It is stressed that the right to strike is not upheld by Article 11 
of the ECHR and that it might be subject to national laws and regulations that 
limit its exercise.214  
The Advocate General suggested that with regard to particular situation in Laval 
the exercise of the trade unions’ right of collective action falls within the scope of 
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Community law, namely, provisions on the freedom of providing services.215 The 
Court shared this opinion and stated that Community law is applicable to the 
strike action taken by the trade unions in Laval.216  
The next issue raised in the case was whether EC law applies to trade unions; in 
other words, the issue of direct horizontal effect of the EC provision on freedom 
of movement. The opinion of the Advocate General was that the prohibition of 
discrimination laid down in Article 49 EC (now Article 56 TFEU) applies not 
only to public authorities, but also to rules of a non-public nature which “are 
intended to regulate, collectively, the work of self-employed persons and the 
provision of services”. Relying on previous case law he stated that the abolition 
of obstacles to the free movement of services among member states would be 
compromised if such obstacles were allowed to be created by associations and 
bodies that enjoy legal autonomy and that do not come under public law. He also 
noted that considering the differences in legal systems of the member states 
sometimes working conditions are governed not by provisions of laws and 
regulations, but by acts and agreements concluded by private persons.217 It is 
interesting to note that despite the fact that Advocate General Mengozzi wrote 
about direct horizontal effect, the ECJ did not mention this issue in the judgment. 
The next issue that the Court dealt with was whether the industrial action taken 
by trade unions constituted a restriction on the Treaty provisions on services. 
Here the Court stated that Article 49 EC (now Article 56 TFEU) was breached. 
According to the Court, trade union action designed to force service providers to 
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sign a contract that contains more favourable terms and conditions than the 
Directive 96/71 Article 3(1) “is liable to make it less attractive or more difficult 
for such undertakings to carry out construction work in Sweden and therefore 
constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services within the meaning of 
Article 49 EC”.218  
The justification of such a restriction was the next question the Court dealt with. 
The Court stated that the activities of the Community include not only the 
creation of an internal market without boundaries but also policy concerning the 
social sphere, and that these two activities should be balanced against each other. 
According to the Court the restriction on fundamental freedoms is justified by 
application of the right to take collective action for the protection of the workers 
of the host state against possible social dumping, because it may constitute an 
overriding reason of public interest within the meaning of the case law of the 
Court. In the present case of Laval the Court observes that the blockading action 
by trade unions, aimed at ensuring that posted workers have their terms and 
conditions of employment fixed at a certain level, falls within the objective of 
protecting workers. However, according to the Court, forcing a foreign 
undertaking to sign a collective agreement creates such an obstacle that it cannot 
be justified by this objective. The level of protection guaranteed by Directive 
96/71 is limited to what is provided by Article 3(1), unless the foreign 
undertaking itself voluntarily signs a collective agreement in the host member 
state which provides more favourable terms and conditions of employment. The 
Court then makes referral to public policy provisions under Article 3(10) of the 
Directive, explaining that if there are issues other than those provided under 
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Article 3(1) of the Directive (in the present case these were the pecuniary 
obligations mentioned in the Swedish collective agreement), that the host state 
wants to apply under public policy provisions, it is necessary that the state first 
opt in to Article 3(10), which Sweden in the present case did not do.219 Therefore, 
Laval is only required to observe the nucleus mandatory rules for minimum 
protection in the host member state.220  
The Court separately mentions the imposition of negotiations concerning 
minimum pay by trade unions on the foreign undertaking, and states that in 
general such action is not prohibited by Community law; however, in the 
particular circumstances of the case the collective action cannot be justified in the 
light of the public interest objective that obtains when the host state does not have 
in place any laws or regulations that are sufficiently precise and accessible and 
render it possible for the undertaking to determine the obligations with which it is 
required to comply as regards minimum pay.221  
Based on these assumptions, the Court answered the first question in favour of 
Laval: that Article 49 EC and the 96/71 Directive on the Posting Workers did 
preclude the trade unions in the present case to take industrial action for the 
purposes of forcing the undertaking to sign the Swedish collective agreement and 
agree on minimum rates of pay.222  
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As for the second question on the applicability of the provision of the MBL (the 
system introduced to combat social dumping, pursuant to which a service 
provider does not have to expect any account to be taken of the obligations set 
down in collective agreements signed in the member state where it is established) 
the opinion of the Court is that such a system is discriminatory because it 
legalizes the collective action against the foreign undertaking, subject to the law 
(or collective agreement) of another member state in the same way as such action 
is authorized against national undertakings that are not bound by any collective 
agreement. The Court reiterates that discrimination arises when different rules are 
applied to comparable situations and also when same rule is applied to different 
situations. Therefore, in the present case of Laval, the Court is of the opinion that 
the national rules give rise to a discriminatory situation, because they do not take 
into account whether a foreign undertaking is already bound by a collective 
agreement in the home member state and put them in the same position as 
national undertakings that might not be bound by any collective agreement. This 
kind of discrimination can only be justified on grounds of public policy, public 
security and health, which, according to the Court, are not at issue in the present 
case. Therefore, the discrimination is not justified.223  
Catherine Barnard is very critical of the Court’s reading of the Directive. She 
thinks that the Court read the Directive provisions very strictly. For Barnard, 
Article 3(7) (“Paragraphs 1 to 6 shall not prevent application of terms and 
conditions of employment which are more favourable to workers”) always meant 
that Directive provided a “floor” of rights, while the states (in general presumably 
the host state) could go further by imposing higher standards, subject to the 
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ceiling of Article 49. She criticized the position of the Court that Article 3(7) 
applies to the situation of foreign service providers only if they voluntarily sign a 
collective agreement in the host state which offers superior terms and conditions 
for their employees, a scenario that is very unlikely. Therefore, she thinks that the 
Court came very close to making Article 3(1) not a floor but a ceiling. The strict 
reading of Article 3(1) and Article 3(8) of the Directive is also problematic. 
Matters listed in Article 3(1) must be laid down in laws and regulations or in 
collective agreements or arbitration awards satisfying the conditions laid down in 
Article 3(8). Otherwise, they cannot be applied to posted workers.224  
Mia Rönnmar shares the view of Barnard that after Viking and Laval Directive 
96/71 came to set only the minimum protection of a nucleus of mandatory rules. 
In other words, the Directive is not only a minimum Directive as it is stated in 
Article 3(7) and Recital 17 of the Preamble, but also a maximum Directive, 
“establishing a ceiling for the terms and conditions of employment that a trade 
union or a state may require foreign service providers to apply to employees”.225  
Rönnmar also clarifies that in Laval, the lack of transparency and case-by-case 
negotiation of wages were not acceptable for the ECJ. In connection to this she 
mentions the Swedish discussion on the compatibility of Lex Britania with EC 
Law, which took place before Sweden joined the EU, in 1994. The conclusion of 
that discussion was that “the Lex Britania probably was compatible with EC 
                                                          
224 Supra note 188, p. 475-476. 
225 Mia Rönnmar, Free Movement of Services versus National Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations Systems: Understanding the Laval Case from a Swedish and Nordic Perspective in the 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Volume 10, 2007-2008, Ed. Catherine Barnard, 
Hart Publishing, 2008, P. 523.  
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Law”. Therefore, the conclusion of the ECJ in Laval that the Lex Britania was 
discriminatory and in contravention with Articles 49 and 50 is not surprising.226  
Tonia Novitz focuses on the definition of the term “protection of workers” (which 
according to the ECJ can be used to justify restrictions on the freedom of 
movement provisions of the EU) from the perspective of the Viking and Laval 
cases and also the ILO. The observation she makes is that in contrast to the ILO 
the interpretation offered by the ECJ in these two cases is very restrictive and 
narrow. Inspired by the company’s promise that reflagging would not lead to 
redundancies, in Viking the ECJ states that the actions of the trade union (FSU) 
cannot be considered to be protection of workers, “if it were established that the 
jobs and conditions of employment were not seriously under threat”. Based on the 
same argument that the reflagging did not have harmful effects on a particular 
group of workers, the Court did not consider the ITF “Flags of Convenience” 
policy justified.227  
A similar restrictive interpretation was offered by the Court in Laval. The Court 
recognized that the blockading action fell within the objective of protecting 
workers. However, collective action was not justified because negotiations on pay 
form part of a national context which lacked sufficient precision and accessible 
provisions allowing the undertaking to determine the obligations with which it 
was required to obey with regard to minimum pay.228  
In contrast to the ECJ approach, the interpretation offered by the ILO organs in 
regard to the scope of the legitimate aim of the industrial actions was much 
                                                          
226 Ibid. p. 512, 518, 519.  
227 Supra note 160, p. 557-558. 
228 Ibid. p. 556-557. 
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broader. Novitz observes that according to ILO jurisprudence legitimate 
protection of workers’ interests also includes the pursuit of economic and social 
policy objectives. She cites the Digest of Decisions of the Freedom of 
Association Committee of the ILO, which states that the exercise of the right to 
strike can be used not only for the defence of occupational and economic 
interests, but also for “seeking a solution to economic and social policy questions 
and problems facing the undertakings which are of direct concern to the 
workers”. The same Committee considers that trade unions should be allowed to 
refer to strike action “to support their position in the search to solutions to 
problems posed by major social and economic policy trends which have a direct 
impact on their members and on workers in general, in particular as regards 
employment, social protection and standards of living”.229,230  
The ILO also expressed its concern regarding the Laval judgment and subsequent 
developments. In its 2013 report the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations stated that it is not its task to judge the 
correctness of the ECJ rulings in Viking and Laval, as they set out an 
interpretation of European Union law. Rather, the Committee was to check 
whether the impact of these rulings was such that they impeded the enjoyment of 
the rights guaranteed under Convention No. 87 at a national level. In the case of 
Laval the Committee said to be deeply concerned by the fact that the trade unions 
were held liable (and forced to pay punitive damages (€342,000) to Laval’s 
Latvian trustee in bankruptcy) for a strike action that was lawful under national 
law at the time and for which it could not have been reasonably presumed that the 
                                                          
229 Ibid. p. 558-559. 
230 A more detailed interpretation of the principle of freedom of association according to the ILO 
organs can be found in Chapter III above.  
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action would be found in violation of EU law. The Committee recalled that the 
imposition of sanctions on trade unions for leading a legitimate strike is a grave 
violation of freedom of association principles. Therefore, the Committee 
requested the Swedish government to review this matter with the social partners 
concerned so as to study possible solutions for compensation of the two unions. 
The Committee also criticized the amendments to the Lex laval already 
mentioned here and requested the government to review the changes made in 
2010.231  
If the ECJ had referred to ILO instruments, the Viking and Laval outcomes could 
have been different. In a later case, however, issued by the ECJ in 2009, reference 
to ILO instruments was made. Particularly, while interpreting the Working Time 
Directive 2003/88 the ECJ relied on the ILO Convention No 132 concerning 
Annual Holidays with Pay.232  
Nevertheless, even though the Posting Directive was interpreted as a cap for the 
protection of posted workers’ rights and the legal basis of it was decided to be 
Article 49 EC in the case of Laval, the pre-emptive approach of the Court may 
have little impact outside posting cases, while most of the social policy directives 
have a Treaty basis in the Social Policy Title and cannot be said to be 
interpretations or expressions of Article 49 or any other free movement 
provisions of the EU Treaty.233  
                                                          
231 General Report and Observations concerning particular countries, Report III (Part IA), 
International Labour Conference, 102nd Session, 2013.  
232 Joined Cases C-350/06 and C-520/06 Gerhard Schultz-Hoff v Deutsche Rentenversicherung 
Bund and Stringer and Others v Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2009]; Para. 37-38.  
233 Simon Deakin, Regulatory Competition after Laval in the Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies, Volume 10, 2007-2008, Ed. Catherine Barnard, Hart Publishing, 2008, P. 602. 
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4.4.4 The Rüffert Case  
The next case after Viking and Laval on the relationship between fundamental 
rights and fundamental freedoms was Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen. The 
factual circumstances of the case are the following: after a public invitation to 
tender, the company Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co was awarded a contract 
for structural work in Niedersachsen. The contract included a declaration 
regarding compliance with the collective agreements, specifically mentioning the 
obligation to pay workers on the building site the minimum wage set by 
collective agreements, applicable at the place where the services were performed. 
Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co subcontracted to a Polish firm with the 
provision that it would ensure compliance with wage rates already in force on site 
through collective agreements.234 It was discovered, however, that the Polish firm 
was paying its posted workers 46.57% of the applicable minimum wage for the 
construction sector. The Niedersachsen authorities withdrew the contract and 
demanded payment of contractual penalties from the subcontractor. The company 
took legal action. The appeal regional Court of Hannover (the Oberlandesgericht 
Celle) considered that the resolution of the dispute was dependent on whether the 
application of the Landesvergabegesetz was precluded on the ground of an 
incompatibility with the freedom to provide services laid down in Article 49 EC. 
While the issue of interpretation of Community law was raised, the national court 
stayed the proceedings and referred the following question to the ECJ: “does it 
                                                          
234 According to the Law of Niedersachsen on the award of public contracts (Landesvergabegesetz 
Nds) “contracts for building services shall be awarded only to undertakings which, when lodging 
a tender, undertake in writing to pay their employees, when performing those services, at least the 
remuneration prescribed by the collective agreement at the place where those services are 
performed and at the time prescribed by the collective agreement” (Paragraph 3(1)); this 
obligation on minimum wages applies also to subcontractors if services are assigned to them 
(Paragraph 4(1)).  
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amount to an unjustified restriction on the freedom to provide services under the 
EC Treaty if a public contracting authority is required by statute to award 
contracts for building services only to undertakings which, when lodging a 
tender, undertake in writing to pay their employees, when performing those 
services, at least the remuneration prescribed by the collective agreement in force 
at the place where those services are performed?”.235  
Similar to the Viking and Laval the ECJ favoured single market rules. The Court 
stated that “Directive 96/71, interpreted in the light of article 49 EC, precludes an 
authority of a Member State … from adopting a measure of a legislative nature 
requiring the contracting authority to designate as contractors for public work 
contracts only those undertakings which, when submitting their tenders, agree in 
writing to pay their employees, in return for performance of the services 
concerned, at least the remuneration prescribed by the collective agreement in 
force at the place where those services are performed”.236  
4.4.4.1 Discussing the Judgment  
It is interesting to note that the opinion of Advocate General Bot was 
contradictory to the Court’s judgment. He thought that the Directive 96/71 EC 
should be interpreted as not precluding national legislation 
(Landesvergabegesetz) to award such public contracts, which requires contractors 
and subcontractors to pay workers posted in the framework of the performance of 
a public contract at least the remuneration prescribed by the collective agreement 
in force at the place where those services are performed, even if the collective 
                                                          
235 Case C-346/06 Rechtsanwalt Dr. Dirk Rüffert, in his capacity as liquidator of Objekt und 
Bauregie GmbH & Co. KG v Land Niedersachsen [2008]; Para 10-16.  
236 Ibid. para. 43.  
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agreement to which the legislation in question refers is not declared to be 
universally applicable.237  
For Advocate General Bot the Posting Directive 96/71 offered a nucleus of 
minimum protective rules that are guaranteed to posted workers. Article 3.7 
allowed member states to enhance the social protection of posted workers (Para. 
83). The fact that the collective agreement in the construction industry (TV 
Mindestlohn, which is universally applicable on the whole territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany) offered lower wages than requested by the local collective 
agreement (which is not universally applicable but is mentioned in TV 
Mindestlohn) referred in the law of Niedersachsen on the award of public 
contracts (Landesvergabegesetz) was explained by the Advocate General as a 
member state using the option offered under Article 3.7 (Para 90-95). Therefore, 
a national measure such as the one at issue in the main proceedings, which made 
a local collective agreement mandatory for posted workers as well, was consistent 
with the Directive (Para 95).  
Advocate General Bot thought that any enhanced protection under Article 3.7 of 
the Directive should also be in concert with Article 49 EC, which is interpreted 
by the ECJ as a provision requiring the elimination of any kind of discrimination 
against service providers on the basis of nationality; a provision that requires the 
abolition of any restriction that prohibits, impedes or renders less attractive the 
activities of a foreign service provider (Para 84, 100).  
According to Advocate General Bot there was no doubt that a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services did take place; the question was whether that 
                                                          
237 Case C-346/06 Rechtsanwalt Dr. Dirk Rüffert, in his capacity as liquidator of Objekt und 
Bauregie GmbH & Co. KG v Land Niedersachsen [2008]; Opinion of AG Bot, Para 136. 
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restriction was justified (Para 102). According to the established case law of the 
Court, the protection of workers, which also includes the prevention of unfair 
competition by undertakings paying their workers less than the minimum wage 
(social dumping), can be a justification for a restriction on the freedom to provide 
services (Para 106-108). In the present case the Advocate General asked the 
question whether the rules under the Landesvergabegesetz actually confer a 
genuine benefit on the workers concerned. Taking into account the gross amount 
of wages, he stated that if applied properly under the law of the 
Landesvergabegesetz, the workers would have received significantly higher 
wages. Therefore the law provides protection for posted workers and prevents 
social dumping as it ensures that local and foreign workers on the site are paid 
equally (Para 118-119). The objectives of worker protection and the prevention of 
social dumping could not be achieved with less restrictive means that the 
Landesvergabegesetz (Para 124).  
The Advocate General disagreed with the position of the Commission that there 
is discrimination between posted workers in the construction industry according 
to whether the primary contractor is a public or a private one, as the law 
(Landesvergabegesetz) applies only to public contractors. The Advocate General 
was of the opinion that this argument was not valid, because under Article 49 the 
Landesvergabegesetz was required to comply with non-discrimination on the 
basis of nationality, which it did; it applied equally to national and foreign 
workers in a given workplace (Para 127-131).  
The conclusion of Advocate General Bot was that while the contract performance 
condition relating to the minimum remuneration of workers laid down in the 
disputed provisions of the Landesvergabegesetz complied with the principle of 
123 
 
non-discrimination (on the basis of nationality) and while it also complied with 
the principle of transparency, it had to be considered consistent with Community 
law (Para 134).  
The ECJ did not agree with Advocate General Bot.238 The Court started with a 
question: was the rate of pay laid down by a measure such as in the case of 
Rüffert (when the law of Niedersachsen concerning the public contract sought to 
make a collective agreement providing for the rate of pay binding for 
undertakings such as subcontractor Objekt and Bauregie) fixed in concert with 
one of the procedures described under Directive 96/71 (Articles 3.1 and/or 3.8) 
on posting workers (Para 23)? The answer to this question was negative. Firstly, 
it was negative because the law on public contracts could not be considered as a 
law implementing the Directive. Secondly, while the Germans’ transposition of 
the Posted Workers Directive (AEntG) contained a reference to collective 
agreements that are declared universally applicable, the collective agreement at 
stake (on “Building and Public Works”) had not been declared universal and was 
not capable of being treated as universally applicable within the meaning of the 
second indent of the first subparagraph of Article 3.1 read in conjunction with the 
first subparagraph of Article 3.8 of the Posting Directive (Para 25-26). Thirdly, 
the collective agreement at issue does not fit within the second subparagraph of 
Article 3.8 either, because this subparagraph applies to states without a system for 
declaring collective agreements universal, which is not the case in Germany. In 
addition, the collective agreement in the case does not respond to the 
                                                          
238 It is interesting to observe that the judgments of Viking and Laval are similar to the one in 
Rüffert, in a way that in all three cases the Court gave privilege to fundamental freedoms over 
fundamental social rights. However, they are different in terms of the Courts taking into account 
the opinion of the Advocate Generals. While in Viking and Laval the Court mainly agreed with 
the positions of Maduro and Mengozzi, in Rüffert the Court totally disregarded the opinion of Bot.  
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requirements of general applicability “to all similar undertakings in the 
geographical area and in the profession and industry concerned”, specified under 
the second subparagraph of Article 3(8), while it applies to public contracts only 
and not to private ones, and also is applicable only within the geographical area 
of the agreement (Para 27-29). Therefore, the Court concludes that the minimum 
rate of pay in the case is not fixed in accordance with the Directive requirements 
and cannot be considered to be a term or condition of employment that is more 
favourable to workers under the meaning of Article 3(7) of the Directive (Para 
30-33). 
Interestingly, the Court copies Paragraph 81 of the Laval judgment, which states 
that the level of protection guaranteed to posted workers is limited to that 
provided for in Article 3(1), first subparagraph (a) to (g) of the Posting Directive, 
unless it is provided otherwise by host state laws or collective agreements and 
unless the posting undertaking commits itself to voluntarily sign the collective 
agreement in the host state guaranteeing the posted workers more favourable 
conditions of work (a situation that is described by Catherine Barnard as very 
unlikely) (Para 34).  
The Court stated that this interpretation of the Directive is compatible with 
Article 49 EC and guarantees freedom to provide services. According to the 
Court, restriction on this freedom, cannot be justified by the objective of ensuring 
protection of workers (Para 38). Protection for independence in the organization 
of working life by trade unions was also rejected by the Court (Para 41). The 
argument that the effectiveness of the social security system depends on the level 
of workers’ salaries was also not accepted (Para 42). The conclusion of the Court 
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is that the law of Niedersachsen (Landesvergabegesetz) is incompatible with the 
Posting Directive 96/71, interpreted in the light of Article 49 EC. 
4.4.5 Luxembourg Case  
One more case interesting for our discussion is Commission v Luxembourg. The 
case concerned the transposition of Directive 96/71 by Luxembourg. The 
proceeding against Luxembourg was initiated by the European Commission. 
Luxembourg was accused of acting on a wider interpretation of the Directive than 
was allowed by the Directive and the EU Treaties. The Commission considered 
that the national legislation of Luxembourg that transposed the Directive violated 
the Directive on four points. Firstly, according to the Commission the public 
policy provision under Article 10 was interpreted too broadly by the national 
legislation of Luxembourg,239 including the requirement of a written employment 
contract or a written document established in accordance with Directive 
91/533;240 automatic indexation of remuneration to the cost of living; the 
regulation of part-time work and fixed-term work; and respect for collective 
agreements. Secondly, the Commission was of the opinion that Luxembourg did 
not make a proper transposition of Article 3(1) (a) of Directive 96/71 on the 
notion of minimum rest periods. The government of Luxembourg acknowledged 
this and amended its legislation accordingly. Thirdly, Commission thought that 
the national law provision that asked foreign companies to provide information 
                                                          
239 Reference was made to Declaration No. 10 enacted together with Posting Directive 96/71, 
which defines “public policy” as “provisions covering those mandatory rules from which there 
can be no derogation and which, by their nature and objective, meet the imperative requirements 
of the public interest. These may include, in particular, the prohibition of forced labor or the 
involvement of public authorities in monitoring compliance with legislation on working 
conditions”.  
240 Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 on an employer’s obligation to inform 
employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship.  
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on posted workers created legal uncertainty for foreign undertakings and put 
undertakings at risk of infringing the law, and therefore, that this law constituted 
an unjustified restriction on freedom to provide services. The law was considered 
a prior notification requirement and thus incompatible with Article 49 EC. And 
lastly, the Commission was not satisfied with the requirement of the national law 
of Luxembourg according to which service providers should appoint a 
representative, residing in Luxembourg, to keep the documents necessary for 
labour inspections.241  
The ECJ Court agreed with the Commission on all four points. The Court stated 
that the “Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has failed to fulfil its obligations under 
Article 3(1) of Directive 96/71, read in conjunction with Article 10 thereof and 
Articles 49 EC and 50 EC”.242 
4.4.5.1 Arguments for and against the Judgment  
On the first point Court made several observations: about the requirement of the 
Luxembourg law to have a written employment contract or a written document in 
accordance with Directive 91/533, the Court was of the opinion that since the 
Directive 91/533 applies also to the home state, which means that posted workers 
already enjoy the same protection in the country of origin, the requirement 
becomes redundant (Para 41-44). A similar conclusion was drawn about the 
regulation of part-time work and fixed-term work, which the Court considered to 
be already regulated by the country of origin of the undertaking (Para 60). In 
relation to the requirement of automatic indexation of remuneration to the cost of 
                                                          
241 Case C-319/06 Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
[2008] Opinion of AG Trstenjak, Para 20-32.  
242 Case C-319/06 Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
[2008]; Para 98.  
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living the Court was not convinced by the argument of Luxembourg that this 
measure falls under public policy provisions under Article 10 of the Posting 
Directive (Para 53-55). As for the obligation to consider collective agreements 
under public policy provision, the Court noted that it must be the content and 
provisions of the collective agreements that can be considered as public policy 
and not the collective agreement per se. Also, Article 3(10) applies only to 
collective agreements that are declared universally applicable (Para 65-68). For 
these reasons the Court considered the first complaint of the Commission well 
founded.243  
Regarding the second question the ECJ was brief because Luxembourg 
acknowledged that the transposition of Article 3(1) (a) of Directive 96/71 on 
maximum work periods and minimum rest periods was not complete and made 
subsequent changes to the national legislation. However, since these changes 
were not made on time the Court still considered the second complaint well 
founded.244  
As for the third issue Court was of the opinion that the provisions of the national 
law on the monitoring arrangements of the work of undertakings were not 
sufficiently clear and precise to accord to Article 49 EC. On the one hand, the 
extent of the rights and obligations of foreign companies is not apparent (which 
creates legal uncertainty for companies), and on the other hand, failure to comply 
with those obligations incurs considerable penalties. Therefore, the demands are 
                                                          
243 Ibid. para. 69.  
244 Ibid. para. 72-73. 
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incompatible with Article 49 EC. Therefore, the Court also considered this 
argument well founded.245  
As for the final complaint of the Commission, the Court also found it well 
founded. According to the Court, Luxembourg failed to justify that national 
authorities could not carry out their supervisory tasks unless the foreign company 
had designated a representative in Luxembourg to keep the necessary documents 
for labour inspections. The Court suggested less restrictive measures for the 
freedom to provide services, such as to entrust the documents to one of the posted 
workers in Luxembourg. In any case, this kind of restriction on fundamental 
freedoms of movement is, according to the Court, not necessary when Article 4 of 
Directive 96/71 provides for an organized system of cooperation or exchange of 
information between member states.246  
Unlike Rüffert and more similar to Viking and Laval in this case of Luxembourg 
the opinions of the Advocate General and the Court were in accord with each 
other. The only point that differentiates the Advocate General’s opinion from that 
of the ECJ judgment is the automatic adjustment of remuneration in accordance 
to developments in the cost of living. Here the Commission did not agree with the 
government that making the minimum wage subject to the general adjustment 
mechanism was compatible with Article 3(1) (a) of Directive 96/71. Advocate 
General Trstenjak was of the opinion that even though the wording of the national 
legislation transposing the Directive was different from the language of the 
                                                          
245 Ibid. para. 77-82.  
246 Ibid. para. 85-96. 
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Directive it was “neither ambiguous nor does it allow for an interpretation which 
is contrary to the Community law”.247  
In relation to these four cases it has to be mentioned that the margin of 
appreciation of states in terms of social policies is strictly restricted by the Court 
of Justice. In contrast, the Court itself has a very wide margin of appreciation 
when deciding on issues of social rights and economic freedoms. On the one 
hand, it can make reference to national laws and practices relying on Protocol 30 
(in case of certain states) or Article 52(6) of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights or to the constitutional traditions under Paragraph 4 of the same article. On 
the other hand, the Court can refer to the general principles of EU law and the 
supremacy principle, and declare that national laws and practices are in breach of 
the EU acquis and therefore null and void. The Court can also refer to ECHR 
case law on the basis of the first sentence of Paragraph 3 of Article 52 of the 
Charter. But the Court can also disregard the ECHR by referring to the second 
sentence of the same Paragraph 3 of Article 52.  
4.5 The Monti II Regulation  
In 2010 a new vision on the relationship between economic freedoms and social 
rights was presented by Mario Monti, former commissioner of the EU. The 
Report suggests clarifying the implementation of the Posting of Workers 
Directive 96/71, disseminating information on the rights and obligations of 
workers and companies, strengthening the cooperation between national 
administrations, and better sanctioning of abuses. According to the Report, issues 
as important as the relationship between social rights and economic freedoms 
                                                          
247 Supra note 242, para. 53-54. 
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must not be left to future occasional litigation before the ECJ or national courts; 
rather, political forces should intervene and seek a solution in line with the 
Lisbon Treaty objective of a “social market economy”. The report suggests to 
introduce a provision which guarantees the right to strike, modelled after 
European Council Regulation 2679/98 (the so-called Monti I regulation) and a 
system for informal solutions of labour disputes concerning the application of the 
Posting of Workers Directive 96/71.248  
As a continuation of the Monti Report a Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services (the so called Monti II 
Regulation) was prepared in the beginning of 2012. The proposal reiterates that 
there is an “inherent conflict” between the freedom of establishment and 
provision of services protected by the EU Treaties, and the exercise of the 
fundamental right to take collective action. According to the proposal there is no 
primacy of the one over the other, and this equal status implies that freedoms may 
have to be restricted in the interests of the protection of fundamental rights, while 
in certain cases the same freedoms may justify restrictions on the effective 
exercise of fundamental rights. Further, in case of conflict the exercise of 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms may have to be reconciled in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality “in line with standard practice by 
courts and EU case law”.249  
                                                          
248 A New Strategy for the Single Market at the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society, Report 
to the President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso, by Mario Monti, 9 May 
2010, p. 68-72.  
249 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within 
the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, Explanatory 
Memorandum, Brussels, 21.3.2012. 
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The proposal did not get support. As a result of strong opposition from trade 
unions and employers the Commission started the withdrawal procedure of the 
Monti II regulation in September 2012.250  
Niklas Bruun and Andreas Bucker were among those who criticized the proposal. 
They think that equality between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms is 
not acceptable and that fundamental rights must have priority over fundamental 
freedoms. They further argue that the proposal should no longer adhere to the 
principle of proportionality recognized by the ECJ in the ill famous case law 
(Viking, Laval), but instead make a clear commitment to international law and 
labour standards. In support of their position the authors emphasize that “whereas 
the major objective of economic freedoms is ‘merely’ to realize an internal 
market, fundamental social rights protect citizens’ freedoms”.251  
4.6 Conclusion 
Different scholars and institutions express different views on how the situation 
with regard to social rights protection in EU should be regulated. The Lisbon 
Treaty, which entered into force in 2009, is a solution for some scholars when it 
comes to the clash between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
EU. According to Advocate General Villon “working conditions constitute an 
overriding reason relating to the public interest justifying derogation from the 
freedom to provide services” and therefore should not be interpreted strictly after 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. This assumption is based on the fact that 
Lisbon Treaty speaks about the construction of an internal market by using 
                                                          
250 Sophie Petitjean, Commission withdraws Monti II Proposal, available at 
http://www.europolitics.info/social/commission-withdraws-monti-ii-proposal-art342821-25.html  
251 ETUI Policy Brief, European Economic, Employment and Social Policy, #4/12, Critical 
assessment of the proposed Monti II regulation – more carriage and strength needed to remedy 
the social imbalances by Niklas Bruun and Andreas Bucker, ETUI aisbl, Brussels, April 2012. 
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policies based on a social market economy “aiming at full employment and social 
progress” (Article 3(3) TEU). Also, it is based on the fact that with the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty the European Charter of Fundamental Rights became a 
legally binding law. The Charter, which clearly states the social obligations for 
the Union, provides in Article 31 that “every worker has the right to working 
conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity”.252  
However, not everyone seems to be optimistic regarding the clauses on social 
guarantees in the Lisbon Treaty. Filip Dorssemont argues that the fact that the 
Lisbon Treaty refers to the Charter of Fundamental Rights is not a guarantee that 
the ECJ will change its position and introduce a new balance between 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms in the EU. Instead, Dorssemont 
thinks that such a shift in ECJ case law is more likely to take place in case of EU 
accession to the ECHR. In that case the ECHR, which puts genuine fundamental 
workers’ rights at the heart of the matter, will force EU institutions, including the 
ECJ, to abide by the judgments delivered in Strasbourg. Dorssemont thinks that 
even though the accession procedure is very complicated it is still an unavoidable 
process.253  
Simon Deakin explores the current situation regarding the clash of fundamental 
rights and freedoms from different angle. According to Deakin the Viking and 
Laval cases are a result that followed from the shift of the EU economic 
constitution from an ordoliberal to a neoclassical model. Both models oppose 
                                                          
252 C-515/08 dos Santos Palhota and Others, [2010]; Opinion of Advocate General Villon.  
253 Filip Dorssemont, How the European Court of Human Rights gave us Enerji to cope with 
Laval and Viking, in Before and After Economic Crisis, What Implications for the “European 
Social Model”?, edited by Marie-Ange Moreau, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011, p. 231-
232.  
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direct state intervention in the economy. However, neoclassical thought is more 
extreme and sees markets as essentially self-equilibrating. Neoclassical 
approaches view labour law rules and collective bargaining practices as 
inherently inefficient and therefore in the neoclassical approach the principal role 
of courts is to remove legislative interventions through deregulation. The view 
that labour regulations are inherently restrictive is what underlies the Viking and 
Laval cases. The growing influence of neoclassical thought was a fact that over 
time found expression in the case law of the ECJ. The author also refers to the 
term “social market economy” mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty and considers it an 
echo of the 1950 ordoliberal thought. However, Deakin thinks that this cannot be 
used as a “bulwark against further deregulation” and suggests that there is a need 
to consider alternative law-market relationships.254 The deregulation of the 
market means less intervention of state or other actors capable to cause harm to 
business to act freely. In the Viking quartet this seems to be the main motivator 
for the court; actions of the trade unions hindering the business did not get 
support; the proportionality test established by the court does give business much 
freedom to act. If we consider the previous cases of Schmidberger and Albany the 
position of Deakin seems to have a strong basis.  
In regard to the Viking Quartet the ILO Committee of Experts also expressed its 
view in the British case of BALPA. According to the Committee the doctrine the 
ECJ had elaborated in the Laval and Viking cases is very likely to have a 
significant restrictive effect on the exercise of the right to strike, which is 
                                                          
254 Simon Deakin, The Lisbon Treaty, the Viking and Laval Judgments and the Financial Crisis: 
In Search of New Foundations for Europe’s “Social Market Economy” in The Lisbon Treaty and 
Social Europe, edited by Niklas Bruun, Klaus Lorcher and Isabelle Schoman, Hart Publishing, 
2012, p. 29-31.  
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contrary to ILO Convention 87.255 This position once again signals the need for 
changes.  
In its General Survey 2012 the Committee of Experts comments on the ECJ cases 
on Laval and Viking and expresses its concern over the fact that the right to strike 
can be restricted where its effects may disproportionately impede an employer’s 
freedom of services or freedom of establishment. However, the Committee did 
not react on the request of the ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation) 
which asked to determine if these decisions were compatible with the 
Conventions No. 87 and 98; the Committee recalled that its mandate is limited to 
reviewing the application of Conventions in a given state.256  
The European Trade Union Confederation prepared its response to the Viking 
quartet – a draft amendment to the Lisbon Treaty, called the Protocol on the 
Relation between Economic Freedoms and Fundamental Social Rights in the 
Light of Social Progress. The Protocol states that a highly competitive social 
market economy is not an end in itself, but should be used to serve the welfare of 
all (Article 1). With this aspiration Article 3(1) states that neither economic 
freedoms, nor competition rules shall have priority over fundamental social rights 
and in case of conflict the latter shall take precedence. This approach however 
was criticized in the Monti report, where it was stated that changes to the Treaty 
do not seem realistic in the short term.257 
                                                          
255 Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
ilolex No. 062010GBR087, 2010.  
256 Supra note 63, p. 52.  
257 Supra note 248, p. 70. 
135 
 
The principle of freedom of association as a trade union right has gone a long 
way in the European Community, from being recognised as a general principle of 
EC law in the Bosman case (1995) to the acknowledgement of the right to strike 
as an inherent element of the freedom of association in the Viking case (2007). 
However, more still needs to be done and the formal recognition of freedom of 
association has to be put in practice alongside the fundamental freedoms of the 
EU.  
Chapter V – Freedom of Association in the Council of 
Europe 
5.1 History of the Creation of Council of Europe  
The outrages of the Second World War stimulated the establishment of one more 
international organization – the Council of Europe (hereinafter COE). Unlike the 
European Union which became concerned with human rights at a relatively later 
stage, the COE was seen from the very beginning as an organization created for 
the purposes of human rights protection.  
The COE was founded on 5 May 1949. The aim of the organization is “to achieve 
a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing 
the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their 
economic and social progress” (COE Statute, Article 1.b). It was believed that 
one of the key elements for achieving this aim was “the maintenance and further 
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (COE Statute, Article 
1.b).  
Article 3 of the Statute obliges member states to “accept the principles of rule of 
law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights 
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and fundamental freedoms”. By disregarding the obligations under Article 3 
member states risk to be suspended of the representation right. Members can also 
be removed from membership of the Organization if the Committee of Ministers 
decides to do so (Article 8, COE Statute).  
The COE did not become a European Federation of States, as the European 
Movement had planned it. As Ed Bates puts it, “the Preamble of the Statute may 
have alluded to European Unity; however, a close look at the statute itself 
revealed that the Council was but a forum in which steps toward that end might 
be discussed, if and when the governments of the member States regarded this as 
desirable”.258 Nevertheless, the role of the COE in the development of human 
rights on a regional level is immense. 
Under the umbrella of the COE dozens of human rights instruments were created. 
For the purposes of my research I concentrate only on two of them: the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(hereinafter ECHR) and the European Social Charter 1961 (hereinafter ESC), 
revised in 1996. While the ECHR is mainly concerned with civil and political 
rights, the ESC’s main domain is social and economic rights, as its name 
suggests.  
5.1.1 The European Convention and the European Court 
The first proposal of the European Convention text prepared by the European 
Movement was very different from the one that we know now. One of the reasons 
is that the drafters of the very first text wanted to create a system of collective 
security against tyranny and oppression. They believed that the European 
                                                          
258 Ed Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention of Human Rights: From Its Inception to 
the Creation of the Permanent Court of Human rights, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 51.  
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community already enjoyed democratic values. Therefore, the aim of the 
Convention and the Court was not to create new values but to safeguard already 
existing ones. The Convention, together with the Court as an institution for 
implementation was originally seen as an alarm bell instrument in case something 
were to “go wrong”, the aim of which was to “preserve the human rights status 
quo in Europe and to prevent backsliding into dictatorship”.259  
The rights guaranteed under the original text of the convention were listed only in 
two articles (Articles 1 and 2)260 and were not defined with legal precision. This 
was explained by the fact that more precise definitions of the rights would require 
long discussions and consultations between the European states. It was also 
suggested that it was easier for the Court to adjudicate on the more limited 
questions “as to whether the liberties of the citizens of the country concerned had 
been infringed or diminished, either by passing of a certain new law or by some 
specified act of government”.261  
Nevertheless, the idea of creating a detailed human rights bill was not abandoned. 
It was believed that it was not yet the right time for this, but that that time might 
come later. Therefore, Article 5 of the draft envisaged the conclusion of a 
“Supplementary Agreement” in a due course for defining the rights enumerated in 
Articles 1 and 2.262  
                                                          
259 Ibid. p. 58-59.  
260 Article 1(f) of which was on the freedom of association and assembly.  
261 Doc. INF/5/E/R, pp. 13-15 in Preparatory Work on Article 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 31 March 1977, Cour (77) 9 Bilingue, Council of Europe, p. 2-3.  
262 Doc. INF/5/E/R, pp. 6-8 in Preparatory Work on Article 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 31 March 1977, Cour (77) 9 Bilingue, Council of Europe, p. 1.  
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The first draft of the Convention went through many revisions before achieving 
its final state. It was first submitted to the Consultative Assembly (now, 
Parliamentary Assembly) for further considerations. The Committee on Legal and 
Administrative Questions embraced the idea of a collective pact against 
totalitarianism as it was suggested by the European Movement. It also welcomed 
the idea of a European Bill of Rights as it was envisaged in the Supplementary 
Agreement in the first draft of the Convention.  
Parallel to the Convention text debates were held about the enforcement 
mechanism – the European Court. Despite opposition, it was decided that a 
European Commission and a European Court would be established. Individual 
petitions would go first to the Commission and only after that to the Court in case 
the Commission were to so decide.  
The Draft produced by the Consultative Assembly was sent to the Committee of 
Ministers of the COE for the final approval. The Committee did not immediately 
embrace the idea of an international human rights instrument. In 1950 the 
Committee convened two bodies (a Committee of Legal Experts and a Conference 
of Senior Officials) for discussing the text of the Convention. Fierce debates were 
held on several issues, including the need for a detailed definition of the rights in 
the Convention. Certain state representatives advocated for a more detailed 
construction of the articles. The reason behind this was a distrust of the concept 
of the Court, an institution that was seen as a future interpreting mechanism of 
generally formulated rights. The idea of creation of a Court and the necessity of 
individual petitions263 were hotly debated. These questions were considered 
                                                          
263 As the Irish Minister of External Affairs Sean MacBride correctly noted during the debates, 
without a right of individual petition the Convention is “not worth a paper it was written on”.  
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political as they were seen as a mechanism that would restrict the sovereignty of 
the states.264 
Finally, the participants agreed on the following: the original text of the 
Convention would not include a detailed description of rights; a European 
Commission of Human Rights and a European Court of Human Rights would be 
set up under Article 19 of the Convention; according to Article 44 of the 
Convention only High Contracting Parties and the Commission were allowed to 
bring a case before the Court; individual petitions were permitted “provided that 
the High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged has 
declared that it recognizes the competence of the Commission to receive such 
petitions” (Article 25.1). One Optional Protocol was also prepared by the 
Committee. The Protocol guaranteed three additional rights: the right to property 
(Article 1), the right to education (Article 2) and an obligation of contracting 
states to hold free elections, at reasonable intervals by secret ballot in a free 
environment (Article 3).  
On 4 November 1950, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms was signed by thirteen states265 at the Palazzo Barbarini 
in Rome. The Convention entered into force in 1953. By 1955 the Commission 
had achieved the competence to receive individual petitions and the Court was set 
up in 1959. This way, long and (for some states) embarrassing debates on the 
creation of the Convention together with its enforcement mechanisms had ended. 
                                                          
264 Supra note 266, p. 80-82, 89, 90.  
265 The contracting states were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Saar (incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany 
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Instead, a new era had started – an era of progression and development of the 
Convention.  
The Convention was not a very effective mechanism during its first two decades. 
Only few talked about it in professional circles. Nor did the Commission and the 
Court receive many applications. This situation changed gradually. In the period 
1959–1998 the Court delivered 837 judgments. While in 2012 alone the same 
Court delivered 1093 judgments.266  
Two major changes that the Court has undergone since its establishment were 
brought by the Additional Protocols 11 and 14. Under Protocol 11 adopted in 
1998, the two-tier system of Commission and Court was abolished. Instead, a 
single full-time Court was created. According to the Preamble of the Protocol 
there was an urgent need to restructure the control machinery in order to maintain 
and improve the efficiency of the Convention challenged by the increase in 
numbers of applications and also by the growing membership of the COE. It is 
important to note that before Protocol 11 the decision on the merits of cases could 
be taken either by the Court if the case was referred to it, or by the Committee of 
Ministers (while the Commission was mainly concerned with friendly settlement 
procedures). Protocol 11 removed the Committee of Ministers from its role of 
taking final binding decisions on the merits. The permanent Court was designated 
for this role. However, the Committee of Ministers retained the role of 
supervising the execution of judgments.267  
                                                          
266 The European Court of Human Rights, Overview 1959-2012 ECHR, June, 2013, p. 4.  
267 Soren C. Prebensen, Inter-State Complaints under Treaty Provisions – The Experience under 
the European Convention on Human Rights in International Human Rights Monitoring 
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The increase of the workload of the Court became a reason for the adoption of 
another important protocol: Protocol 14, which entered into force in 2010. Under 
this Protocol new judicial formations were introduced for the simplest cases. This 
meant that, admissibility decisions could also be taken by a single judge (Article 
27). Also, a new admissibility criterion was established under Article 35, which 
allowed the Court to declare the application inadmissible if an applicant did not 
suffer a “significant disadvantage”.  
By 1990 all the member states to the Convention had accepted the jurisdiction of 
the Court and the right of individuals to petition. With the enactment of Protocol 
11, speculations about the recognition of the right of individual petitions and the 
jurisdiction of the Court ended, as both of them became compulsory features of 
the membership of the Convention.268 By this time the transaction of the 
Convention from a collective pact to a European Bill of Human Rights was 
obvious. However, the Convention never ceased to be seen as a guarantor for 
democracy in the region. In the 2004 Declaration of the Committee of Ministers, 
the Convention was referred to as a “constitutional instrument of European public 
order, on which the democratic stability of the Continent depends”.269  
5.1.2 The European Social Charter  
Initially, the ECHR was mainly perceived as an instrument for the protection of 
civil and political rights; social and economic rights were not mentioned in the 
text. At that time this seemed logical, as the main concern of the founding fathers 
of the Convention was to rescue democratic values, which are mainly expressed 
                                                          
268 Supra note 258, p. 22.  
269 Declaration of the Committee of Ministers, ensuring the effectiveness of the implementation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights at national and European levels, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 12 May 2004 at its 114th session.  
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in civil and political rights. Therefore, an idea emerged to prepare a separate 
treaty on social and economic rights – the European Social Charter (ESC).  
The ESC was adopted in 1961 and revised in 1996. Since its adoption it was 
complemented by three Protocols.270 The Charter is considered to be a 
complementary document to the ECHR, which unlike the ECHR is concerned 
with the social and economic rights of the citizens of the respective parties. 
However, some of the rights (such as the prohibition of forced labour, the right to 
a family life and the right to organize) are present in both texts. Most of the rights 
mentioned in the Charter are also present in the EU Charter on Human Rights. 
The revised Charter contains rights that reflect the ILO Conventions.  
The ESC provides a monitoring mechanism to ensure its proper implementation. 
The European Committee of Social Rights consists of 15 independent experts (it 
had started with seven experts; the number was gradually increased) elected by 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The European Committee 
of Social Rights works mainly in two directions: firstly, it examines annual 
reports submitted by states and makes legal assessments of the conformity of the 
national situation to the Charter. As a result, it adopts “Conclusions”. Secondly, it 
examines collective complaints lodged under the 1995 Protocol, decides on their 
admissibility and examines merits. In this respect, it provides “decisions”.  
Unlike ECHR, there is no individual complaint procedure in relation to ESC; it 
only provides the possibility for collective complaints. A collective complaint can 
be lodged against a state party that has accepted this procedure under the 
                                                          
270 Additional Protocol of 1988 extending the social and economic rights of the 1961 Charter 
(CETS No. 128); Amending Protocol of 1991 reforming the supervisory mechanism (CETS No. 
142) and Additional Protocol of 1995 providing for a system of collective complaints (CETS No. 
158).  
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Additional Protocol of 1995, providing for such a system. Article 1 of the 
Protocol gives an exhaustive list of those organizations that are entitled to lodge a 
complaint against a state alleging an unsatisfactory application of the Charter:  
- International (European) organizations of employers and trade unions that 
participate in the work of the Governmental Committee in pursuance of 
Article 27(2) of the Charter;271 
- Other international (European) non-governmental organizations that have 
consultative status with the Council of Europe and have been put on a list 
for this purpose by the Governmental Committee; 
- Representative national organizations of employers and trade unions of 
the state concerned.  
In addition, any state may authorize national non-governmental organizations to 
lodge complaints against it. The only criterion for the selection of such 
organizations is that candidates have to show “particular competence in the 
matters governed by the Charter” (Protocol, Article 2(1)).  
The role of the Committee of Ministers in the activities of the ESC Committee is 
bigger than in the ECHR. Unlike the ECHR, the Committee of Ministers is not 
only concerned with the execution of the decisions of the ESC Committee, but 
also, as already mentioned, selects the members of the ESC Committee. It gives 
the Committee of Ministers better leverage and more control.  
One aspect that the Charter shares with the ECHR is that they both were not 
popular in the beginning. Only in the wake of the 1990s reforms the Charter 
                                                          
271 The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), Business Europe (former Union of 
Industrial and Employer’s Confederations of Europe (UNICE)) and International Organization of 
Employers (IOE).  
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attained a certain degree of effectiveness. Now it is signed by all 47 member 
states of the Council of Europe and ratified by the majority of them.  
5.2 Trade Union Rights in the ECHR  
5.2.1 Article 11  
Trade union rights are protected in the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms under Article 11(1): “Everyone has 
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with 
others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of 
his interests.” 
The second paragraph of the Article explains that the rights in Paragraph 1 are not 
absolute and that their exercise can be restricted, but only when these restrictions 
are “prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder and crime, for 
the protection of health and morals or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others”.  
The text of Article 11 as we have it now in the Convention is a result of long 
discussions and deliberations among the founding fathers. The very first draft of 
Article 11 was presented by Rapporteur Teitgen to the Committee of the 
Consultative Assembly on Legal and Administrative Measures in August 1949. 
The proposal contained the following passages:  
The Convention and the Procedure to be determined later by the 
Committee will guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms listed 
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below to every person residing within the metropolitan territory of a 
Member State: 
[…] Freedom of meeting, as laid down in Article 20 of the Declaration of 
the United Nations. 
Freedom of association, as laid down in Article 20 of the Declaration of 
the United Nations.  
The right to combine in trade unions, as laid down in paragraph 4 of 
Article 23 of the Declaration of the United Nations.272  
The proposed text went through a harsh scrutiny in the Council of Europe. The 
UK government submitted its own proposal to the Committee of Experts on 
Human Rights. Paragraph 1 of the Article combined the right to freedom of 
assembly with the right to association. The second paragraph provided the 
restrictions on the rights mentioned in Paragraph 1. There was no mention of 
trade union rights in the UK proposal; however, it was explained by the 
Committee of Experts that these right were implied in the right to associate. 
Because the topic was considered to have a political character, the Committee of 
Experts avoided to take responsibility for choosing between the two versions, and 
sent the text to the Committee of Ministers, which in turn convened the 
Conference of Senior Officials (government representatives) to make a choice. 
Finally, the UK version of the Article was adopted, with an amendment to 
explicitly mention the right of trade unions to associate. It was explained that 
such a formulation brings the Article into conformity with the UDHR, which 
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mentions a right to form trade unions separately from a general right to associate. 
However, unlike the UDHR, Article 11 did not mention the right not to be 
compelled to belong to the association. This was explained by the difficulties 
caused by “closed-shop” practices in certain countries. On November 3, 1950 the 
Committee of Experts made minor changes to the text of Article 11 and the next 
day the Convention was signed.273  
Article 11 recognizes the right to form and join trade unions as an element of 
freedom of association. Unlike other international instruments in the field (ESC, 
ILO, ICESCR), the Convention does not recognize a right to organize separately, 
but only as part of the freedom of association.274  
The Convention is very brief on trade union freedoms. No specific trade union 
freedoms are expressly guaranteed. Unlike the ESC and ILO Conventions 87 and 
98 (where rights are attributed to the workers and employers) the Convention 
does not reveal the identity of the rights-holder concerned (workers or 
employers), but mentions “everyone” instead.  
The Convention is also brief on the objective of the trade union rights, only 
generally mentioning “protection of interests”. In this regard other international 
instruments are much more specific.275 However, this objective still provides 
scope for teleological interpretation. Even though Article 11 is silent on the 
collective dimension of trade union rights (the article only explicitly mentions an 
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individual’s right to form and join trade unions), it is the opinion of some scholars 
that “protection of interests” would be deprived of substance if it were to be 
stripped of the possibility to engage in trade union action in order to “protect” the 
interests at stake.276  
Even though the Convention is brief on trade union freedoms and does not 
mention specific trade union rights, this is still not much of a problem. As it is 
recognized by the Court the Convention is a “living instrument”, which must be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”.277 This enables the Court not 
only to bypass the Travaux preparatoires but also to adapt and re-state its case 
law.278  
By relying on the concept of a “living instrument” the Court has gradually 
developed corollary rights that, according to the Court, are “essential” for the 
protection of workers’ interests. These essential rights have to be differentiated 
from another category of means, qualified as “important means” for the 
protection of the same interests.279 The difference between these two sets of rights 
is that in the case of essential elements of freedom of associations’ restrictions 
need to be considered less necessary. In other words, the margin of appreciation 
of states with regard to essential means is smaller.280  
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5.2.2 ECHR Case Law on Trade Union Rights 
The first case in which the Court started to recognize inherent elements of the 
right to form and join trade unions for the protection of workers’ interests was 
National union of Belgian Police v. Belgium 1975.281 In this case the national 
union of the Belgian police alleged a violation of Article 11 (together with Article 
14 and 17), because the Belgian government refused to recognize the union as a 
representative organization and stripped it of the right to consultation.  
The Court shared neither the opinion of the majority (that the right to consultation 
comes within the scope of Article 11) nor the minority of the Commission (which 
described the phrase “for the protection of his interests” as redundant). According 
to the Court the “right to be consulted” is not mentioned in Article 11, is not 
incorporated in the national law or practice of every member state and is not 
indispensable for the effective enjoyment of trade union freedom. Therefore, the 
Court was of the opinion that the right to consult is “not an element necessarily 
inherent” in Article 11.282  
The Court was not convinced that Article 6.1 ESC 1961, according to which 
states are bound to promote joint consultations, creates a real right to 
consultations. Furthermore, Article 20 of the Charter permits a contracting state 
not to accept an undertaking in Article 6.1. According to the Court, the inclusion 
of the right to consult into the Article 11 would automatically amount to 
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association.  
282 National union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, application no. 4464/70, §38, ECHR, 1975. 
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admitting that the Charter took a retrograde step in this domain by making this 
right optional.283  
The opinion of the Court was that the phrase “for the protection of his interests” 
mentioned in Article 11 is not redundant, but shows the purpose of the 
Convention to “safeguard freedom to protect the occupational interests of trade 
union members by trade union action, the conduct and development of which the 
Contracting States must both permit and make possible”. It follows that members 
of a trade union should enjoy a “right to be heard” in order to protect their 
interests. States are free to choose the means to achieve this end. According to the 
Court, “while consultation is one of these means, there are others”.284  
A similar approach was used by the European Court in the case of Swedish 
Engine Drivers’ Union v Sweden 1976. Here an independent trade union 
unionizing 20-25% of the employees of the Swedish State Railways claimed a 
right to enter into a collective agreement. According to the trade union the 
government agency (the Swedish National Collective Bargaining Office) 
concluded collective agreement on terms of employment and conditions of work 
only with the Railwaymen’s Section of the State Employees’ Union (comprising 
75-80% of the employees). This led to stagnation and a drop in trade union 
membership.285  
The Court stated that Article 11.1 does not secure any particular treatment of 
trade unions or their members by the state. This also includes the alleged 
obligation for a state to conclude a collective agreement with them. This right is 
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not mentioned in the Article 11, does not constitute a practice of contracting 
states and is not indispensable for the effective enjoyment of trade union freedom. 
Therefore, it is not an element necessarily inherent in a right guaranteed in the 
Convention.286  
According to the Court Article 6.2 ESC affirms the voluntary nature of collective 
bargaining and collective agreements. It does not provide for a real right. 
Furthermore, the Court again (similar to National union of Belgian Police) 
emphasized the retrograde step taken by the ESC in allowing states not to accept 
undertakings, mentioned in Article 6.2. Therefore, the Court considered that such 
a right cannot be derived by implication from Article 11.287  
In the next paragraph the Court continued in the same vain as in the National 
union of Belgian Police case and stated that trade unions have the right to be 
heard and that Article 11.1 leaves states a choice to choose the means for 
attaining that purpose. In the opinion of the Court “while the concluding of 
collective agreements is one of these means, there are others”.288  
In the case of Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden 1976 the issue was a right to 
strike. The applicants were complaining that because their trade unions went on 
strike (even though they themselves did not participate) they were denied certain 
retroactive benefits paid to the members of other trade unions and those without 
trade union membership.289  
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The Court in this case took the similar stand as in the cases mentioned above. The 
Court recognized that right to strike constitutes one of the most important means 
for trade unions to protect occupational interests of their members. However, the 
Court is of the opinion that there are also other means and that states are free to 
choose.290 
The right to strike was an issue in one other case, which the Court declared 
inadmissible: Unison v. The United Kingdom 2002. University College London 
Hospitals (UCLH) was in the process of transferring parts of the hospital from the 
public to the private sector. The trade union Unison demanded guarantees that 
transferred workers and also new workers recruited by the transferee would be 
assured the same employment conditions as the beneficiaries of one of the 
transferor’s collective bargaining agreement for more than 30 years. Unison did 
not get such guarantees and gave notice of a strike. UCLH obtained an injunction 
from the national court prohibiting the strike. Interesting here is the fact that 
employer subjected to the strike was considered a “third party” in the conflict. 
The dispute was considered to be one between the union and the transferee. 
According to the British Trade Union Consolidation Act 1992 (TULRCA) unions 
enjoy immunity only if the industrial dispute at hand is between an employee and 
“their employer”.291  
The Unison argued before the Strasbourg Court that the structural prohibition of 
strike action in the national law of the UK impeded it from effectively defending 
the interests of its members. The union challenged the conclusion reached in the 
case of Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden and stated that the right to strike was 
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not just one of the means among others to protect the interests of the workers, but 
rather, a prohibition to strike affected the very core of the right to organize. In 
order to show a close link between a right to organize and a strike the applicant 
pointed to reports and conclusions of the ILO and the ESC. The Court did not 
accept the arguments and repeated its previous case law that strike action is one 
of the relevant means and states have a wide margin of appreciation in choosing 
the means.292  
The novelty of the Unison case that distinguishes it from Schmidt and Dahlström 
is that the Court in Unison considered the prohibition of a strike by the UK as a 
restriction on the applicant’s power to protect the interests of its members. The 
Court explicitly reviewed such restriction against principles governing 
restrictions in Article 11.2. In previous case law such a review had taken place 
only in relation to core or essential aspects of the freedom of association, which 
the right to strike, at the time, was not.293  
One more interesting case for my research is Wilson, National Union of 
Journalists and Others v. The United Kingdom 2002. The applicants in this case 
were offered by the employer personal contracts with salary in return for 
relinquishing trade union recognition and representation. Unlike the previous 
three cases mentioned, the Court in this case decided that there had been a 
violation of Article 11.1 regarding the use of financial incentives to induce 
                                                          
292 Unison v. The United Kingdom, application no. 53574/99, ECHR, 2002.  
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employees to give up on the right of union representation for collective 
bargaining.294  
The Court reaffirmed that the right to collective bargaining might be one of the 
means by which trade unions protect the interests of their members, but it is not 
indispensable for the effective enjoyment of trade union freedoms. Compulsory 
collective bargaining is not acceptable for the Court as it imposes an obligation 
on employer to conduct negotiations with trade unions. The Court continues with 
acknowledgment that it is not yet prepared to hold that a freedom of a trade union 
to make its voice heard extends on imposing an obligation on employer to 
recognize a trade union. Here the Court came up with a new concept; it 
introduced a right for a union “to seek to persuade the employer to listen to what 
it has to say on behalf of its members”.295  
One importance of this judgment lies with the fact that the Court took account of 
the soft law instruments in deciding on violation of Article 11.1. The Court notes 
that the UK law at the relevant time provided for possibility for an employer to 
effectively undermine or frustrate a trade union’s ability to protect its members’ 
interests. Court paid attention to the fact that, these aspects of the UK law were 
criticized by the Social Charter’s Committee of Independent Experts and the 
ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association.296  
                                                          
294 Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v. The United Kingdom, applications nos. 
30668/96, 30671/96, 30678/96, §9-19, ECHR, 2002.  
295 Ibid. §44.  
296 Ibid. §48. 
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5.2.2.1 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey  
Until 2008 the position of the Court with regard to the right to bargain and the 
right to enter into collective agreements (i.e., that these constitute important 
means of “the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests” but not essential elements thereof) expressed in the cases above, 
remained unchanged. In 2008 the Grand Chamber of the Court had to adjudicate 
a case against the Turkish government – Demir and Baykara v. Turkey 2008.297 
The facts of the case were the following: the trade union (Tum Bel Sen), founded 
in 1990 by civil servants, entered into a collective agreement with the Gaziantep 
Municipal Council for a period of two years (1993-1995). Because of a failure of 
fulfilment of certain obligations on account of the Council, the trade union 
brought civil proceedings against it. The case went through several court 
proceedings. According to the Court of Cassation even though certain rights and 
freedoms are mentioned in the Constitution, some of them are not directly 
applicable and require the enactment of further legislation. Without such specific 
legislation these rights (including the freedom to join a trade union and to bargain 
collectively) could not be exercised. In the view of the Court the trade union 
could not rely on the ILO Conventions as they were not yet incorporated into 
domestic law; no implementing legislation had been enacted. The Court noted 
that the legislation at that time when the trade union was founded did not permit 
civil servants to form a trade union and bargain collectively. The union had never 
enjoyed legal personality since its foundation and therefore did not have a 
capacity to take or defend court proceedings. According to the Audit Court the 
                                                          
297 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, application no. 34503/97, Grand Chamber, ECHR, 2008.  
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members of the trade union Tum Bel Sen had to reimburse the additional income 
they received as a result of the defunct collective agreement (Para 26-29). 
The case was referred to the ECHR. In 2006 a Chamber judgment was delivered 
in which the Court established a violation of Article 11 on account of the 
domestic courts’ refusal to recognize the legal personality of the applicants’ trade 
union and the annulment by the national courts of the collective agreement 
between the trade union and its members’ employers. The case was referred to 
the Grand Chamber.  
The preliminary objections of the Turkish government before Grand Chamber 
were twofold. Firstly the government argued that international instruments to 
which the state is not party cannot be considered. In response to this, the 
European Court mentioned a number of examples where it had used international 
instruments (ILO, ESC, ICESCR, and ICCPR) to reach conclusions. The Court 
noted that in searching for common ground among the norms of international law 
it had never distinguished between sources of law according to whether they are 
signed and ratified by member states (Para 78). According to the Court, in 
defining the meaning of terms and notions in the text of the Convention, it “can 
and must take into account elements of international law other than the 
Convention, the interpretation of such elements by competent organs, and the 
practice of European States reflecting their common values”. (Para 85)  
The second preliminary argument that the government raised was that the 
application was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the 
Convention, based on the ground that Article 11 is not applicable to “members … 
of the administration of state”, as is provided by the second paragraph of the 
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Article. The Court did not accept this argument either. According to the Court the 
restriction should be construed strictly and must not impair the very essence of 
the right to organize; and states have to show the legitimacy of any restriction to 
people’s right to organize. In the opinion of the Court, municipal civil servants 
not engaged in the administration of the state cannot in principle be treated as 
“members of the administration” of the state. In support of its position the Court 
referred to the previously mentioned international (ILO, ICESCR, ICCPR) and 
regional instruments (ESC, EU Charter). In conclusion, members of the 
administration of the state cannot be excluded from the scope of Article 11 of the 
Convention. National authorities are only entitled to impose “lawful restrictions” 
on those members. In the present case, however, the opinion of the Court was that 
the government failed to show how the nature of the duties performed by the 
applicants, as municipal civil servants, required them to be regarded as “members 
of administration of the state” subject to such restrictions (Para 96-108). 
In deciding on the right of the municipal civil servants to form trade unions, and 
on the question whether the action of the government in this regard was in 
compliance with Article 11, the Grand Chamber, similarly to the Chamber, was 
not convinced that the absolute prohibition on forming trade unions imposed on 
civil servants by law, as it had applied at the material time, met a pressing social 
need. In the opinion of the Court the mere fact that the legislation at that time did 
not provide a possibility for civil servants to form a trade union was not sufficient 
to warrant as radical a measure as the dissolution of the trade union. The position 
of the Court was supported also by the fact that at the material time Turkey was 
already a contracting party of the international instruments (ILO Convention 87, 
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ICESCR, and ICCPR) that recognize a right of civil servants to form trade unions 
(Para 117-124). 
The Court noted that the combined effects of the restrictive and the formalistic 
interpretation by the Cassation Court (without taking into account developments 
in international law) regarding the domestic legislation on forming legal entities 
and the inactivity of the legislator after ratifying ILO Convention 87 (only after 8 
years of ratification of the ILO Convention 87 the government enacted a law for 
its implementation) prevented the state from fulfilling its obligation to secure for 
the applicants the enjoyment of their trade union rights. Therefore, the state’s 
behaviour could not be justified as “necessary in a democratic society” within the 
meaning of Article 11.2 of the Convention. Therefore, the Court established a 
violation of Article 11 on account of the failure to recognize the right of the 
applicants, as civil servants, to form a trade union (Para 125-127). 
Similar to the Chamber, the Grand Chamber also considered that the complaint 
regarding the annulment of the collective agreement must be considered 
separately, as it raised separate legal questions from those raised by the 
applicants’ right to form a trade union. The position of the government was that 
the right to enter into a collective agreement was not a right guaranteed by Article 
11, but is just one of the means that states may or may not choose to guarantee 
the right to form and join trade union under Article 11 (Para 133-137), as is 
obvious from the previous case law of the Court. 
The Court started from considering the general principles on this subject. It cites 
its previous case law in which it was stated that trade unions should be heard and 
that states have a free choice of the means (of which the right to conclude a 
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collective agreement is one) to be used towards this end. The Court mentioned 
two guiding principles that mark the evolution of the case law regarding the 
substance of the right of association: firstly, the Court takes into account the 
totality of the measures taken by the state in order to secure freedom of 
association, subject to its margin of appreciation; and secondly, the Court does 
not accept restrictions on the essential elements of the freedom of association, 
without which that freedom would become devoid of substance. The Court 
continued that the essential elements of the right of association thus far were the 
following: the right to form and join a trade union, the prohibition of closed-shop 
agreements (Sørensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, 2006) and the right of a trade 
union to seek to persuade the employer to hear what it has to say on behalf of its 
members. The Court makes clear that the list is not finite. It emphasizes the 
“living” nature of the Convention and the importance of the development of 
international law (Para 140-146).  
With regard to the right to collective bargaining the Court made reference to the 
International Labor Organizations Conventions (98 and 151) which recognize 
such a right, including for public servants, except for those directly involved in 
the administration of a state. Reference was also made to the European Social 
Charter Article 6.2 (an article that was not taken seriously by the Court in the 
previously mentioned cases) which affords all workers and trade unions the right 
to bargain collectively and thus imposes an obligation on states to promote 
collective bargaining in order to ensure broad coverage of the collective 
agreements. The Court also mentioned Article 28 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights according to which workers and employers and their 
organizations have a right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements. The 
159 
 
Court also takes note of the common practices of member states, the majority of 
which allows for public servants (those not holding state powers) to engage into 
collective bargaining for determining wages and working conditions (Para 147-
152). 
Based on these developments in international law and domestic legal systems of 
states the Court thought that its previous case law, where the right to bargain 
collectively and the right to enter into collective agreements were considered as 
mere means, should be reconsidered, and that these two rights should constitute 
essential elements of the freedom of association protected under Article 11. Even 
though it is in the interests of legal certainty and foreseeability not to depart from 
precedents, the Court was of the opinion that sometimes it is a necessary step in 
order to embrace reforms and improvements (Para 153). 
While applying these principles to the present case, the Court decided that the 
annulment of the collective agreement constituted an interference with the 
applicants’ trade union freedom (Para 157). According to the Court the refusal to 
accept the applicants’ right to enjoy the right to bargain collectively and to 
persuade the authority to enter into a collective agreement did not correspond to a 
“pressing social need” and was not “necessary in a democratic society”. This 
conclusion was based on several factors: collective bargaining and the right to 
enter into collective agreements are recognized by international instruments; 
Turkey ratified ILO Convention No. 98; there is no evidence that supports that 
the public servants in the present case belonged to the category of public servants 
in relation to which ILO allows restrictions (officials whose activities are specific 
for the administration of the state); the omission of a law, caused by the delay of 
the legislator, cannot be accepted as a justification for the annulment of a 
160 
 
collective agreement. Therefore, the Court established a violation of Article 11 on 
account of the annulment ex tunc the collective agreement entered into force by 
the trade union Tum Bel Sen following collective bargaining with the employing 
authority (Para 162-170).  
5.2.2.1.1 Discussing the Judgment  
Judge Zagrebelsky wrote a separate opinion on the right of trade unions to 
bargain collectively and on the issue of the Court’s departure from precedent. The 
judge referred to the fact that the Court from that point on will regard a right to 
collective bargaining as an essential element of the freedom of association. This 
move was explained by “the perceptible evolution in such matters, in both 
international law and domestic legal systems”. What captured my attention here 
is the statement of the judge that the new and recent fact that may be regarded as 
indicating an evolution internationally appears to be only the proclamation of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000. It’s difficult to disagree with the judge 
on this point, as the international documents on the basis of which the Court 
derived its conclusions in the judgment (ILO Conventions, ESC, ICESCR, and 
ICCPR) date back to 1950s and 1960s. As for the evolution of the domestic 
legislation the Judge was of the opinion that it is difficult to assess the time and 
period in which a significant change became perceptible. Therefore, the 
conclusion of the judge was that the “the Court’s departure from precedent 
represents a correction of its previous case-law rather than an adaptation of case-
law to a real change, at European or domestic level, in the legislative framework 
or in the relevant social and cultural ethos” (Para 2). 
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The judgment was fast recognized by commentators as a landmark, and different 
comments followed. In an article, Ewing and Hendy offered a detailed analysis of 
the Demir and Baykara judgment, explaining the way the Court reached its 
conclusion. In the view of the authors, while interpreting the rights under Article 
11, the Court abandoned the “original intentions of the drafters” and embraced 
the idea of a “living document”. However, this still left a question for the Court: 
how to get from a broad convention right to freedom of association (including the 
right to form and join trade unions) to the more specific right to engage into 
collective bargaining. According to the authors this was done by building on 
previous case law (Wilson, ASLEF298) and by referring to ILO Conventions No. 
98 and 151, ESC 1961 (Article 6(4)), the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(Article 28) and the practices of European states.299 
The same international and regional standards were used by the Court in 
determining the content of the right to bargain and also the permissible restriction 
upon that right. According to the Court the states are free to determine their own 
systems but at the same time should respect the requirements of the ILO and the 
ESC (Para 147-149). The decision not to accept the restrictions was based on the 
same considerations (Para 165).300  
                                                          
298 Here the ECHR stated that “As an employee or worker should be free to join, or not join a 
trade union without being sanctioned or subject to disincentives (e.g. Young, James and Webster 
v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44, mutatis mutandis, Wilson 
& the National Union of Journalists and Others, cited above), so should the trade union be equally 
free to choose its members”, Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers & Firemen (ASLEF) v. 
The United Kingdom, application no. 11002/05, §39, ECHR, 2007.  
299 K.D. Ewing and John Hendy QC, The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara, Industrial 
Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2010, p. 6.  
300 Ibid. p. 7. 
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Authors moreover note that in treating the ECHR as a living instrument, the 
Court also considered the other treaties (ILO Conventions, ESC) as living 
instruments. The Court relied not only on the texts of those treaties but also on 
the respective interpretations of its supervisory bodies.301  
For some scholars, by reconciling multiple conceptions of the right to collective 
bargaining, the Court in Demir and Baykara underlines the convergence of 
international and European sources. Because of the comparative method it applies 
the Court makes it compulsory for states to comply with the obligations 
emanating from the ILO standards and the ESC. In the opinion of the same 
author, the Strasbourg Court, by writing the Demir judgment, explicitly embraced 
the international context of the right to collective bargaining, which is intended to 
safeguard domestic labour laws and social guarantees against economic values 
and international competition.302 
In the opinion of Barnard, one of the striking features of the Demir judgment is 
the extensive reference made to international sources, particularly the ILO 
Conventions and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in justifying the reversal 
of its previous case law on the scope of Article 11. She makes a comparison with 
the ECJ rulings in Viking and Laval, which disregarded international instruments, 
and thinks that the ECHR is more open to international sources than the ECJ. 
                                                          
301 Ibid. p. 8.  
302 Antoine Jacobs, Article 11 ECHR: The Right to Bargain Collectively, under Article 11 ECHR 
in Filip Dorssemont, Klaus Lorcher and Isabelle Schomann (eds.) The European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Employment Relations, Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 312.  
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Therefore, she is of the opinion that the accession of the ECJ to the ECHR is a 
significant move in terms of the protection of social rights.303  
Some of the commentators are rather sceptical to this new interpretative approach 
of the ECHR. Jacobs writes on the harmonization issue regarding the right to 
bargain collectively. He is of the opinion that the ECHR should not go further in 
harmonizing national laws in regard to collective bargaining, because these laws 
have their roots in the historical development of collective bargaining (different 
from one country to another) and are expressions of power relations, touching 
upon which will disturb power balances in states. The author makes reference to 
the EU Treaties where emphasis is placed on the diversity of the national systems 
(Article 152 TFEU), and suggests that the ECHR in its future case law on the 
right to bargain collectively should instead restrict itself and leave certain aspects 
of trade union rights to the discretion of national authorities.304  
Jacobs is of the opinion that by the Demir judgment the Court interfered in the 
national laws on collective bargaining of member states. However, he thinks that 
such intervention is not a problem if it concerns flagrant violations of trade union 
freedoms, such as in the case of Demir.305  
5.2.2.2 Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey  
One more case that came soon after Demir and Baykara and caused much 
discussion among scholars and commentators was the case of Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen 
v. Turkey 2009. The case concerned the right to strike of civil servants who were 
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banned from taking part in a national one-day strike planned by trade unions in 
order to secure the right to a collective bargaining agreement. The circular 
prohibiting public sector employees from such action was published by the Prime 
Minister’s Public Service Staff Directorate. Some of the trade union members 
still took part in the strike action and received disciplinary sanctions as a result.306  
In this case, the Court established a violation of Article 11(1). The Court 
disapproved of the general character of the circular, which prohibited all public 
servants to take part in the strike action. According to the Court these sanctions 
were likely to discourage union members and anyone else wishing to participate 
legitimately in such a day of strike or action to defend the interests of their 
members.307  
The Court repeated that strike action, which enables a trade union to be heard, 
constitutes an important aspect of the protection of trade union members’ 
interests (Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden 1976, §36). However, in contrast to 
its previous case law the Court made reference to ILO and ESC instruments 
stating that ILO supervisory bodies recognize the right to strike as an 
indissociable corollary of the right of trade union association protected under 
ILO Convention 87 (here the Court refers to Demir and Baykara which mentions 
in detail the international law instruments in this regard). The Court also recalls 
the ESC recognizing a link between collective bargaining and the right to strike, 
and considers the right to strike a means for ensuring the effective exercise of the 
right to collective bargaining.308  
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5.2.2.2.1 Discussing the Judgment  
The last paragraph of the Court ruling gave labour rights supporters hope. 
According to Ewing and Hendy, the fact that the Court referred to the ILO and 
the ESC and recognized strike action as a corollary to the right to bargain 
collectively (which in turn was recognized as an essential element of the freedom 
of association protected under Article 11; Demir and Baykara, §153) strongly 
suggests that the Court recognized the right to strike, insofar as it was exercised 
in furtherance of collective bargaining, as equally essential. The commentators 
also paid attention to the fact that the Court in this case did not mention that the 
right to strike was one of the important means and that there are other means at 
the disposal of states. Instead, by using the rationale of Demir and Baykara, the 
Court stated that the government interfered with the applicants’ right to strike and 
this interference alone was enough to establish a violation of Article 11(1). The 
authors also placed emphasis on the fact that the linkage between collective 
bargaining and strike action had long been recognized in international law and 
therefore the conclusion of the Court in this case was logical.309  
Dorssemont shares the view that the Court in Enerji implicitly recognized the 
right to strike as an essential element of trade union freedom. He finds it 
unfortunate that the language of the Court in Enerji is not the same as in Demir 
and Baykara, and that the right to strike is still formulated as an important means 
only, instead of essential. However, he pays attention to the fact that the Court 
prefers to tackle the justified character of the prohibition under the angle of 
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proportionality. The prohibition of strike was not justified, because of its generic 
character.310  
The Enerji arguments, however, did not convince the Appeal Court of the UK. In 
the case of Metrobus Ltd v Unite the Union (2009) the Court dealt with 
restrictions of UK law on the right to strike (Part V, TULRCA 1992). The 
conclusion was that there was no undue restriction on the exercise of the right to 
strike in the UK; that the legislation has been carefully adapted throughout the 
years in order to balance the interests of all stakeholders; and that its provisions 
are therefore proportionate.311  
The British Court also considered ECHR jurisprudence in regard to the right to 
strike. In the view of the Court Demir and Baykara was not strictly on the right to 
strike and therefore could be disregarded. It did not take into account the 
conclusions in Enerji either. Justice Lloyd paid attention to the differences 
between the Demir and Baykara judgment, which according to the Justice was 
“full and explicit” and Enerji judgment, which the Justice articulated as a 
“summary discussion”. According to the Justice it is not prudent to proceed on 
the basis of the “less fully articulated” judgment (Enerji), which developed the 
Court’s case law through the recognition of the right to strike as an essential 
element of trade union freedoms under Article 11.312  
More positive is Barnard in her article published in 2013. She compares Demir 
and Enerji (ECHR) to the Viking (ECJ) judgment and emphasizes the fact that in 
Viking the Court adopted an essentially single-market approach and found strike 
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action unlawful unless justified and proportionate. While the ECHR cases 
adopted a human rights perspective according to which strike action is lawful and 
any restriction to it must be narrowly construed.313  
I totally agree here with the position of Barnard on this issue; but at the same time 
I have to say that the position of the UK judge in the Metrobus case also makes a 
lot of sense. The ECtHR is certainly a human rights oriented court but in the case 
of Enerji it could have been more explicit. It could easily recognize right to strike 
as an essential element of freedom of association, like it has done in Demir and 
Baykara with collective bargaining and right to conclude collective agreements.   
5.2.2.3 Cases after Demir and Enerji  
An interesting judgment delivered by the Grand Chamber in 2013 was case of 
Sindicatul “PĂSTORUL CEL BUN” v. Romania, 2013. The case concerns a 
refusal of the Romanian authorities to register a trade union formed by priests of 
the Romanian Orthodox Church. The Grand Chamber in this case quashed the 
Chamber judgment and decided that the refusal of the authorities to register the 
trade union was a direct consequence of the right of the religious communities to 
organize their activities in accordance with the provisions of their own statute.  
In its assessment the Court made reference to the ILO Conventions and Demir 
and Baykara only in that part of judgment where it had established that clergy 
men were involved in the employment relationship and therefore fall within the 
scope of Article 11.314 This way the Court established an interference in the right 
of applicants to form trade unions. There was no mention of Demir and Baykara 
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or any ILO Conventions in the Court decision whether such interference was 
necessary in a democratic society. 
One intriguing aspect that this judgment offers is found in the paragraphs where 
the Court speaks about general principles on the right to form and join a trade 
union. The Court lists the essential elements of the right to organize: the right to 
form and join trade unions; the prohibition of closed-shop agreements; the right 
for a trade union to seek to persuade the employer to hear what it has to say on 
behalf of its members; and the right to bargain collectively. The Court does not 
mention the right to strike among the essential elements. However, noticeable is 
the fact that the Court refers to this list as “non-exhaustive”.315  
A very recent case concerning the violation of the right to strike was the case of 
The National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. The United 
Kingdom 2014.316 The case concerned a right to secondary strike action where the 
applicant was a representative of a very small number of employees in the 
workplace, organizing striking action among whom would not have any 
disruptive effect on the work and would not lead to any results. According to the 
applicant, the union could better protect the interests of its members if it were to 
be allowed to organize a secondary strike action in support of the workers 
concerned (Para 16). Secondary action was expressly excluded from statutory 
protection by Section 224 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992.  
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For the first time in its jurisprudence the Court recognized that secondary strike 
action is a right protected under Article 11.1. Reference was made to Article 
31(3) (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and also to the Demir 
and Baykara passage acknowledging the importance of established international 
norms (ILO, ESC) in the interpretation process of the Convention rights (Para 76, 
77). 
The Court accepted the argument of the UK government and stated that unlike 
primary action, secondary action has the potential to impinge upon the rights of 
persons not party to the industrial dispute, to cause broad disruption of the 
economy and to affect the delivery of services to the public. Therefore, by 
enacting the law banning secondary strikes the UK Parliament pursued the 
legitimate aim of protecting “the rights and freedoms of others” mentioned in 
Article 11.2. Here the Court offered one more novelty: it distinguished between 
primary and secondary strikes and stated that in case of primary strikes the term 
“the rights and freedom of others” supposes only the employer’s interests, while 
in case of secondary strikes the same term is not limited to employers only, but 
entails the broader interests of public (Para 82). 
The position of the applicant was that the margin of appreciation of the UK 
government in deciding whether the interference with the applicant’s right was 
necessary in a democratic society must be limited, as it was in the case of Demir 
and Baykara. The Court stated that in order to decide on the margin of 
appreciation of a state the particular facts of the case should be taken into 
account. In case of Demir and Baykara the interference with the freedom of 
association (dissolution of a trade union) was far-reaching, intruding its inner 
core (Para 86). According to the Court, when interference affects the core of trade 
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union activity, the margin of appreciation of states is narrow. However, the other 
way round, if not core but secondary or accessory aspects of trade union activity 
are affected, the margin of appreciation is wider (Para 87). In the present case, the 
Court considered that the core elements of the freedom of association (which 
according to the Court can be primary strike action) were not at stake and 
therefore the state had a wide margin of appreciation (Para 88).  
The Court also considered common European practices in relation to secondary 
strike. According to the Court the UK, with its outright ban on secondary action, 
stands at one end of a comparative spectrum; however, this does not mean that 
domestic authorities stepped outside their margin of appreciation (Para 91).  
The Court took note of the applicant’s argument that the ECSR and ILO bodies 
regularly criticize the UK government for its current ban on secondary strike 
action. The Court made reference to the Demir and Baykara case, stating that 
international consensus that emerged from specialized international instruments 
may constitute a relevant consideration for the Court when it interprets the 
Convention. However, considering the circumstances of the present case the 
Court explained that “the negative assessments made by the relevant monitoring 
bodies of the ILO and European Social Charter are not of such persuasive weight 
for determining whether the operation of the statutory ban on secondary strikes in 
circumstances such as those complained of in the present case remained with the 
range of permissible options open to the national authorities under Article 11 of 
the Convention” (Para 99). 
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Based on these arguments the Court concluded that the restriction on the right to 
secondary strike served a pressing social need and was necessary in a democratic 
society. Therefore, there was no violation of Article 11.1 (Para 104-105). 
Several points should be emphasized in this judgment. Important is the fact that 
for the first time in its jurisprudence the ECHR recognized secondary industrial 
action within the scope of Article 11. This recognition of secondary strike seems 
logical as the Court continued the trend started in 2008 by Grand Chamber in 
Demir and Baykara, and shared the practice of the ILO and ESC, which 
recognize such right. 
However, when it came to restrictions upon this right, the Court gave the UK 
government a wide margin of appreciation. This time, the Court disregarded the 
position of the ILO and ESC and supported a total ban on secondary strikes by 
the UK government. The rhetorical question here is: what sense does it make to 
recognize a right and then allow states to put a blanket ban on it?  
Important here is also the fact that this selective approach of the Court to accept 
some aspects of the soft law instruments and to disregard the others creates a lack 
of certainty. It is not clear now what role the soft law instruments (ILO, ESC) 
play in the interpretation of the Convention.  
Notable in this judgment is also the fact that primary strike action was explicitly 
recognized by the Court as a core element of freedom of association. If the 
restriction upon the secondary strike action was justified by the fact that it was 
not a core, but a secondary or accessory aspect of trade union activity, it follows 
logically that in case of primary strike action states should enjoy a very narrow 
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margin of appreciation, because they deal with a core element of the freedom of 
association.  
One further important aspect in this judgment is the proportionality issue. I share 
the argument of the UK government and the Court that secondary strike action 
has a potential to seriously harm the economic situation in a country and cause 
disruption to the work of others not related to the industrial dispute. The 
argument that the economic and social aspects of a state are better known to the 
government than an international judge also makes sense. It is also a well-known 
fact that the Court is mainly concerned with civil and political rights. However, I 
still think that the Court should have used a case-by-case approach (which it 
mentions several times in the judgment) in relation to secondary strikes, instead 
of supporting a total ban upon it. It could have allowed the UK government to 
strictly regulate such actions, while at the same time giving trade unions a chance 
(at least theoretical) to claim such right. Such a decision would have been closer 
to the soft law instruments the Court embraced in previous case law.  
In conclusion, I have to say that the position of the Strasbourg Court in this case 
reminds me of the Viking judgment: in both cases right to strike was recognized 
(in Viking, primary strike; in RMT, secondary strike) and in both cases restrictions 
upon this right were justified and soft law instruments disregarded. This might be 
a pure coincidence that has nothing to do with the statistics, but it is still 
noteworthy that when it comes to the protection of secondary strikes the ECHR 
has now more to share with the ill-famous ECJ rulings than its own previous case 
law.  
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5.3 Trade Union Rights in the ESC 
As mentioned earlier, despite the classical distinction between the ECHR and the 
ESC, trade union rights are protected under both instruments. As we have seen 
from the jurisprudence of the ECHR when it comes to the definition of trade 
union rights and particularly freedom of association, the European Court widely 
refers to the ESC. Therefore, the following pages of this thesis are devoted to the 
notion of freedom of association as mentioned in the ESC.  
Article 5 of the ESC guarantees the right to organize:  
With a view to ensuring and promoting the freedom of workers and 
employers to form local, national or international organizations for the 
protection of their economic and social interests and to join those 
organizations, the contracting parties undertake that national law shall not 
be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, this freedom. 
The Article 5 separately mentions two categories: the police and the armed 
forces. The extent to which the guarantees provided by this article apply to these 
categories shall be determined by national laws and regulations.  
Another article of the ESC that speaks about labour rights is Article 6 of the ESC. 
It provides for the right to bargain collectively and for the effective exercise of 
this right, obliging contracting parties: 
1. To promote joint consultations between workers and employers; 
2. To promote where, necessary and appropriate machinery for voluntary 
negotiations between employer and employers’ organizations and 
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workers’ organizations, with a view to the regulation of terms and 
conditions of employment by means of collective agreements; 
3. To promote the establishment and use of appropriate machinery for 
conciliation and voluntary arbitration for the settlement of labor 
disputes; and recognize: 
4. The right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of 
conflict of interest, including the right to strike, subject to obligations 
that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into. 
5.3.1 Article 5  
The European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) provides detailed explanations 
of the terms and concepts mentioned in the two articles on collective labour 
rights. Regarding Article 5, the Committee makes it clear that because of the 
importance of the right to organize it is important that it is guaranteed by national 
law. Gaps in legislation or case law cannot be filled only by practice.  
Article 5 provides protection for organizations of workers and employers. So far 
the Committee has not engaged itself in with issues concerning employers’ rights 
to organize, but only workers’ rights.317 Civil servants are not separately 
mentioned in the article, which means that they are entitled to the full range of 
guarantees. Any restriction on the enjoyment of the rights under Article 5 should 
be justified under Article 31 of the Charter, which allows restrictions and 
limitations, but not the total suspension of the right.318 Workers who are not 
                                                          
317 Andrzej Marian Swiatkowski, Charter of Social Rights of the Council of Europe, Kluwer Law 
International, 2007, p. 189.  
318 According to Article 31 of the Charter, the rights mentioned in the Charter shall be subject to 
restrictions and limitations specified in the Charter, except for those restrictions and limitations 
which are “prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the 
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protected by Article 5 are those in the armed forces and to some extent the 
police.319  
As for organizations, according to the Article 5 workers and employers can form 
and join organizations for the protection of their economic and social interests. 
This usually means trade unions.320 The involvement of trade unions in political 
processes is not necessarily outside the frame of the Article 5. Here it is relevant 
to mention the 1952 resolution of the ILO on the Independence of the Trade 
Union Movement. According to this resolution, trade unions can undertake 
political activities for the advancement of their economic and social interests. 
Nevertheless, such political involvement “should not be of such a nature as to 
compromise the continuance of the trade union movement or its social and 
economic functions, irrespective of political changes in the country”.321  
Article 5 contains both negative and positive obligations for states. Negative 
obligations oblige states not to violate or restrict the freedom of association of 
trade unions. Member states may introduce formal demands to be fulfilled by 
workers forming a trade union. If there is a need for the registration of a trade 
union, any precondition, including fee requirements, must be reasonable. The 
obligation to register only does not violate the requirements of Article 5 if the 
national law provides sufficient protection for the organization during the 
                                                                                                                                                              
rights and freedoms of others or for the protection of public interest, national security, public 
health, or morals”.  
319 David Harris, John Darcy, The European Social Charter, 2nd edition, Transnational Publishers, 
Inc., 2001, p. 88-90.  
320 Supra note 317, p. 189. 
321 Article 5, ILO Resolution of 1952, concerning the independence of the trade union movement.  
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registration process. A minimum membership requirement may infringe Article 5 
if it is too high.322,323  
Workers should also be allowed to join organizations of their own choice. They 
should have the freedom to organize at whichever level they wish; local, national 
or international.324 The trade unions that they establish should enjoy broad 
autonomy. They should freely regulate their internal organizational affairs, 
including organizational structure and requirements for membership, disciplinary 
methods, or denial of membership. Trade unions must be able to freely elect their 
representatives and administer their property. However, as I have already 
mentioned, member states are allowed to introduce some restrictions on the trade 
union right to organize in the name of the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others and the public order.325 In relation to the UK, the Committee considered 
that very complex national legislation in the area may in itself impair the right to 
organize.326  
Article 5 guarantees not only the right to organize but also the right not to 
organize. Initially the Committee considered not touching upon closed-shop 
practices, but later it changed its mind. The Committee took notice of an ECHR 
case in which it was stated that closed-shop practices are in violation of Article 
11 of the European Convention. According to the Court “permitting every kind of 
compulsion in the field of trade union membership would strike at the very 
                                                          
322 Supra note 317, p. 190-193.  
323 Supra note 319, p. 93-94.  
324 Ibid. p. 94. 
325 Supra note 317, p. 194-196. 
326 Supra note 319, p. 96.  
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substance of the freedom it is designed to guarantee”.327 The Committee shared 
the reasoning of the European Court and applied it to Article 5 of the ESC. As a 
result, it is now settled case law that closed-shop practices are neither authorized 
nor tolerated. This applies equally to pre- and pro-entry closed shops.328  
Even though the right to collective bargaining is mainly protected under Article 6, 
Article 5 also pays particular attention to it. It is considered that compliance with 
Article 5 is a precondition of compliance with Article 6(2) on the right to 
collective bargaining.329 According to the Committee, trade unions should enjoy 
the right to negotiate the collective agreements on which the wages and social 
protection of the workers usually depend. A lack of negotiating rights in 
collective agreements undermines the existence of trade unions as a whole. 
Establishing excessive requirements for trade unions in order to receive 
negotiating rights (for instance, a minimum membership requirement of at least 
500 or 1000 members; an administration fee for the license to negotiate of 
20,000-60,000 Irish Pounds) is considered by the Committee as a violation of 
Article 5.330  
As for the positive obligations under Article 5, it protects workers’ organizations 
from interference by their employers. The focus of the Committee in this regard 
is on discrimination based on trade union membership (or non-membership) and a 
state’s obligation to protect trade unions and its members against such 
                                                          
327 Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 7601/76; 7806/77, §52, 
1980.  
328 Supra note 319, p. 95. 
329 Ibid. p. 97. 
330 Supra note 317, p. 200-202.  
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discrimination. In particular, states are required to have national laws in place that 
makes such activities illegal.331  
5.3.2 Article 6  
Article 6 promotes collective bargaining. For this purpose state parties are 
required to take certain steps. The first such step under Article 6.1 is to promote 
joint consultations between workers and employers. According to the Committee 
this applies to all kinds of consultations between employees and employers or 
their organizations, with or without involvement of the government (particular 
emphasis is put on occupational issues). The main idea is that such consultations 
should be on an equal footing, both parties should enjoy an equal say in the 
matter. Such consultations should take place in all sectors and at all levels; local, 
regional and national.332  
There is no need for a state to intervene if consultations between the sides of an 
industry are adequate. If this is not the case, state must take positive steps to 
encourage consultations. States might ask trade unions to meet representativeness 
criteria. However, such a requirement must be reasonable and must not 
excessively limit the possibility of trade unions to participate. In order not to be in 
violation of Article 6.1, states should prescribe these requirements in law. The 
requirements must be objective and subject to judicial review.333  
The second step that states are required to undertake in order to promote 
collective bargaining is to provide machinery for voluntary negotiations between 
parties with a view to regulate occupational issues by collective agreements 
                                                          
331 Supra note 319, p. 98.  
332 Matti Mikkola, Social Human Rights of Europe, Legisactio Ltd, 2010, p. 256-257.  
333 Ibid. p. 257.  
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(Article 6.2). The national law should recognize the right of employer and 
employee to regulate their relationship by collective agreements. According to the 
Committee both parties should be “at liberty to conclude collective agreements”. 
States must actively promote the conclusion of such agreements if spontaneous 
development of collective bargaining is not sufficient. States need to ensure that 
each side is prepared to bargain collectively. States may intervene in the 
bargaining process. This intervention is justified only according to Article G of 
the Charter and it should stop immediately after return to the normal situation in 
which the parties can exercise their right to collective bargaining freely again.334  
The third step to promote collective bargaining is to establish machinery for 
conciliation and voluntary arbitration in the case of labour disputes. In other 
words, states are required to establish and use appropriate techniques for the out-
of-court settlement of collective labour disputes. This should be supported by 
national law. The emphasis of the Committee is on the peaceful nature of the 
settlement of such collective disputes. If such a dispute is regulated independently 
by stakeholders then there is no need for a state to intervene. It is also important 
that the social arbitrage created for settling such disputes should be organized in a 
manner that ensures that states cannot affect the outcome of the arbitration 
decision. Therefore, it is a requirement of the Committee that domestic 
regulations must not provide any instructions or guidelines or suggest any criteria 
that should be followed by arbitrator when handling down the judgment. Also, 
crucial is that peaceful techniques of settling collective labour disputes should not 
be replaced by labour court proceedings.335  
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The Charter is the first international convention in force that explicitly 
recognized, in Article 6.4, the right of workers to go on strike in case of conflicts 
of interests. It also generally guarantees the right of employers and workers to 
collective action. In case of employers, such action could be a lockout. In the case 
of workers, other collective actions can be refusals to do overtime or working to 
rule and going slow. Both the right of an employer to lockout and the right of an 
employee to strike can be regulated by national law, but only to such an extent 
that the very existence of a right is not threatened. However, according to the 
Committee the right to strike and the right to lockout do not necessarily enjoy 
legal equality.336  
The right to strike is not absolute, and states may restrict its exercise under 
Article G of the Charter. States can also introduce common requirements for 
strike, such as an obligation to give notice; an obligation to allow settlements of 
labour disputes and to postpone strikes while in settlement (cooling-off period); 
limitations on a strike if its consequences of it are too dangerous for the state, for 
the development of society, to its citizens or to a third party.337 However, 
according to the Committee, intervention in the exercise of the right to strike on 
the part of state authorities is a very serious measure and should be justified under 
Article 31.1 of the Charter. Moreover, such intervention should be stopped as 
soon as the situation goes back to normal.338  
According to the wording of the Article 6.4 collective action is restricted by the 
collective agreements concluded previously. The Committee is of the opinion that 
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338 Supra note 319, p. 107-108.  
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such an obligation can only affect the right to take collective action of those 
workers who were part of the previous collective agreement and only in respect 
of those matters covered by that agreement.339  
One more important aspect is the fact that Article 6.4 permits workers to go on 
strike only in the case of a conflict of interests. It means that in case of a conflict 
of rights it cannot be invoked. In other words, disputes concerning valid 
collective agreements are not covered by this article and should be settled by 
negotiations or voluntary arbitration or a specialized Court with jurisdiction in 
such matters. Even if the collective agreement purports to permit strike action in 
disputes concerning rights, this does not mean that states are obliged under the 
Charter to render such action legal.340  
The Committee interprets the provision in a restricted way and allows neither 
sympathy strikes nor political ones. It should be noted that the ILO allows for 
both sympathy strikes and political strikes. However, ILO case law prohibits a 
party to advance its own interests, if those are bound by collective agreements, 
with the sympathy strike. Sympathy strikes should not be allowed for use as a 
roundabout way to take collective action that is against the peace obligation.341  
Article 6.4 does not mention any category of workers who might be denied the 
right to strike. Therefore, public officials are entitled to go on strike as well. The 
only exception in this regard that the Committee allows are those officials who 
are members of the police or the armed forces, judges and senior officials. The 
right to strike of these employees might be restricted. However, a denial of the 
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right to strike for public servants per se is not acceptable under the Charter. The 
right of workers to strike in essential or minimum services can also be restricted. 
However, similar to the case of public servants these restrictions cannot cover 
everybody working in those services as a group, especially if the services are 
defined broadly.342  
In the opinion of the Committee, strikes cannot be considered a violation of 
contractual obligations entailing a breach of a worker’s employment contract. The 
termination of an employment contract on the basis of engagement in strike 
action violates Article 6.4 of the Charter unless strikers are fully reinstated after 
the strike, meaning that their previously acquired entitlements (such as issues of 
pension, seniority and holidays) are not affected.343 According to the Committee, 
civil or criminal liability for participating in a strike has considerable bearing on 
the right to strike. Nevertheless, such liability is not precluded as long as it is in 
keeping with the Charter.344  
5.4 Conclusion  
In conclusion, the content of the right to organize and right to strike under the 
ESC can be summarized as follows: 
The right to organize 
1. Freedom to form (easy notification and registration procedure, 
moderate fees, low membership requirements, open for non-nationals); 2. 
Freedom to join or not to join (ban of pre- and post-entry closed shops); 3. 
Right to act freely (bye-laws, membership, hold meetings at work together 
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with trade union officials); 4. Any recognition as privileged partner 
(representativity criteria) should be reasonable and objective, based on 
pre-established criteria and be subject to suspension by an independent 
body and regularly reviewed, and other trade unions should not be 
deprived of all essential prerogatives; 5. Restrictions of the rights of 
police and armed forces, as well as highest civil servants; 6. Non-
discrimination of any worker, whether unionized or non-unionized, 
representative of other workers, migrant worker or on any other 
grounds.345 
The right to strike 
1. Entitlements: should be guaranteed by law in cases of conflicts of 
interests; should cover also public employees and civil servants; sectoral 
bans – not proportionate; prior approval – not in compliance; any group of 
employees should be entitled to call a strike; requirements for 
representativity – not in compliance; procedural requirements (ballot 
method, quorum, majority requirement) should not limit the exercise of 
the right; any employee should be entitled to join the strike. 2. 
Restrictions: illegitimate reason; as a clause of a collective agreement 
(expressed will of the parties needed); minimum service – (conditions of 
article G); notice and cooling-off periods or prolonging the conciliation 
may not limit the exercise of the right (days or weeks, not months); 
compulsory arbitration not accepted (except of article G). 3. Effects: 
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prohibition of dismissal or full reinstatement required; proportionate 
deductions of wages; equal rights for those joining the strike.346 
Chapter VI – Comparative Analysis of ECJ and ECHR 
Jurisprudence  
6.1 The Two Regional Organizations and Human Rights  
As I mentioned in the previous chapter on the ECJ, the main idea of the Schuman 
Plan was to create an organization that would mobilize control over the natural 
resources (steel and coal) of the member states of this organization, and in this 
way make sure that one state would not be able to wage a war without others 
knowing about it. This is how the idea of the European Union emerged. The idea 
was realized in a number of Treaties that united a certain number of European 
states and set internal rules. The rules were mainly concerned with deepening 
general economic cooperation by establishing a common market among member 
states, where goods, persons, services and capital could flow freely without any 
custom control. The human rights agenda appeared in the Treaties at a later stage.  
The first Treaty that explicitly mentioned human rights was the Maastricht Treaty 
1992, Article 6 of which declared that the Union is founded on the principles of 
human rights and has to respect them. The Treaty of Lisbon finalized this process. 
It declared the Charter legally binding (Article 6(1) TEU) and created legal basis 
for the accession of the EU to the ECHR (Article 6(2) TEU). The Treaty of 
Lisbon also provided that the focus of the Union is to build “a highly competitive 
social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress” (Article 
3(3) TEU).  
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The human rights discourse appears in the jurisprudence of the ECJ also at a later 
stage. As I mentioned in the previous chapter the very first cases on the issue 
where discussed in the late 1960s and early 1970s where the Court considered 
human rights to be general principles of Community law and recognized the 
international human rights treaties to which member states were party at that 
time.  
The situation with the European Convention on Human Rights and the European 
Court was different. From the very beginning the Council of Europe was seen as 
an organization the main purpose of which was to protect human rights. 
According to the Statute of the Organization “the maintenance and further 
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms” was considered one of the 
major means “to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of 
safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common 
heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress” (COE Statute, 
Article 1.b). Article 3 of the Statute obliges member states to “accept the 
principles of rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its 
jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. This led to the creation 
of dozens of human rights instruments under the umbrella of the COE, from 
which the ECHR was probably the most successful one.  
In short, the EU was created for economic purposes, and human rights became a 
concern at a later stage, while the COE was considered a human rights protecting 
mechanism from the very beginning. I believe that this difference between the EU 
and the COE has shaped the approach that the institutions under their structure 
have developed over time towards human rights. The ECJ has to take note of 
human rights as well as to guarantee proper functioning of EU law, whose main 
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focus is to provide economic stability in the union; while the ECHR is only 
concerned with human rights protection.  
6.2 Freedom of Association as a Trade Union Right from the 
Perspective of Two European Courts  
The issues related to freedom of association are scattered in the EU among 
different documents and judgments, including EU Treaties, the EU Charter and 
ECJ jurisprudence. In contrast, the COE is more systematic on the freedom of 
association. It is protected under three major articles in the two major human 
rights instruments (ECHR, ESC). Both instruments are backed by supervisory 
institutions (the European Court, the ECSR) that consistently interpret the 
provisions of this right. This makes it easier to identify the content of the freedom 
of association in the COE.  
The case law of the ECJ regarding the freedom of association takes a start in the 
case of Bosman.347 In this case the Court established that the freedom of 
association constitutes a general principle of EU law. Among other sources 
reference was made to the ECHR.  
The next phase of the Court was the case of Albany.348 The AG based his 
conclusion on the famous cases of Bosman and Maurissen and stated that “the 
Community legal order protects the right to form and join trade unions and 
employers’ associations which is at the heart of freedom of association”. The AG 
also recognized right to take collective action as “indispensable for the enjoyment 
of freedom of association”. The AG, however, was not sure whether the right to 
bargain collectively is a fundamental right. His position was supported by ECHR 
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case law (National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium, 1975; Swedish Engine 
Drivers’ Union v Sweden, 1976; Schmidt and Dahlström v Sweden, 1976; 
Gustafsson v Sweden, 1996) in which the Court was of the opinion that Article 11 
did not guarantee any particular treatment of trade unions and that states had a 
wide margin of appreciation in order to choose the means for the protection of the 
occupational interests of workers.  
In the case of Werhof349 the Court recognized a negative right of employees to 
organize. It was again confirmed that the right to associate is a general principle 
of EU law and once again reference was made to the ECHR.  
The right to strike was also recognized by the ECJ. In the Viking case the ECJ 
explicitly recognized the right to strike as a fundamental right; however, it stated 
that the exercise of this right nonetheless may be subject to certain restrictions. 
The Court noted that even though the protection of fundamental rights can justify 
restrictions on fundamental freedoms (the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom of provision of services), this does not mean that fundamental rights are 
outside the scope of EC law.  
Finally, the right to bargain collectively was also recognized by the ECJ in the 
case of Commission v. Germany.350 Here the Court stated that the right to 
collective bargaining is recognized by various international instruments that 
member states of the EU have ratified or signed, including Article 6 of the ESC, 
Article 12 of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers, and Article 28 of the EU Charter (in relation to the Charter it was 
emphasized that it has the same legal value as the Treaties). In the same case, the 
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Court implicitly recognized the right to conclude a collective agreement by 
mentioning it together with the right to bargain collectively and by recognizing 
that the collective agreement under dispute met the social objective of the EU 
Treaties. 
From this brief description we see that the ECJ became active on freedom of 
association issues only during the last two decades. Before that the Court was not 
concerned much with trade union freedoms. 
On the other hand, the situation with the ECHR was slightly different. As we saw 
from the previous chapter, it took slightly more than three decades for the ECHR 
to recognize all the mentioned elements of freedom of association as inherent in 
the right to form and join trade unions guaranteed under Article 11. National 
union of Belgian Police v. Belgium 1975 was the first case where the Court 
recognized a right of trade unions to consultations. The Swedish Engine Drivers’ 
Union v Sweden 1976 was a case where the Court recognized a right to enter into 
collective agreement. The right to strike was recognized in the case of Schmidt 
and Dahlström v. Sweden 1976. In the case of Wilson, National Union of 
Journalists and Others v. The United Kingdom 2002 the Court confirmed the 
importance of the right to bargaining. However, none of these cases recognized 
these rights as inherent elements of Article 11.  
Only in 2008 with the case of Demir and Baykara the ECtHR made clear that the 
right to collective bargaining and the right to enter into a collective agreement 
are inherent elements of the freedom of association protected under Article 11.  
About the right to strike the discussion was in the Enerji case. Here the Court was 
not very explicit in its recognition of the right to strike. The Court still repeated 
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its previous case law and states the strike action is an important (not inherent) 
aspect for the protection of trade union members. However, unlike its previous 
case law the Court makes reference to ILO and ESC practice, where the right to 
strike has very strong protection.  
The RMT judgement shed some more light on the right to strike. For the very first 
time, the Court made clear that secondary industrial action falls within the scope 
of Article 11. The Court, however, allowed a restriction of this right in the case, 
and justified it by saying that the ability to strike is not a core aspect of trade 
union activity, but secondary; implicitly recognizing that primary strike action 
has to be regarded by states as a core element of the freedom of association. 
Nevertheless, the Court was still not very explicit about the recognition of the 
right to strike, and it did not use the established term “inherent element” in 
relation to the right to strike. However, even though the Court was not as explicit 
here as in the case of Demir, it still needs to be mentioned that progress is 
evident. 
At first glance it seems that the case law of the ECJ and the ECHR equally 
recognize the freedom of workers and employers to associate and that there is not 
much divergence in their positions. The impression has a valid basis because 
freedom to associate was recognized step by step by the ECJ. The same also 
happened in the ECHR, which in the beginning did not recognize the inherent 
elements of the freedom of association. Even though the language of the two 
Courts has not been exactly the same (the ECHR has used the term “inherent 
right”, while the ECJ has spoken about general principles of the EU) the content 
is very similar.  
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However, as it is well established in the legal scholarship, the recognition of legal 
norms is one thing and their application in practice is another. In the case of 
Viking the Court had to make a balancing exercise between the right to strike and 
the right of establishment (freedom of movement in the EU). The proportionality 
test was introduced by the Court, according to which the national courts must first 
assess if the jobs of the workers were “jeopardized or under serious threat” and if 
the collective action by trade union was necessary to protect the jobs. After 
establishing this, national courts further have to ascertain whether the trade union 
action “was suitable for ensuring the objective pursued and does not go beyond 
what is necessary to attain that objective”. The Court in this case did not suggest 
any particular judgment to the national court, but the proportionality test itself 
was considered to be very strict by legal scholars, putting trade unions in a very 
difficult situation in which strike becomes a last resort.  
The ECJ in its previous cases (Albany, Viking) made reference to the ECHR in 
order to support the idea that some elements of the freedom of association are not 
inherent. However, after the ECHR recognized these elements as inherent, the 
ECJ still did not change its trend and still favoured fundamental freedoms of 
movement over freedom of association issues. In the case of Commission v 
Germany the Court makes reference to the Viking case and the proportionality 
test introduced by the Court therein. According to the Court the exercise of the 
fundamental right to bargain collectively must be reconciled with the EU 
freedoms of movement stemming from the EU Treaties. The Federal Republic of 
Germany was said to violate the EU Directives (92/50 and 2004/18) on freedom 
of establishment and the freedom to provide services in the field of public 
procurement.  
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It is very true that freedom of association is not an absolute right and its 
restriction is allowed by all international and regional instruments. However, the 
restrictions upon it should be strictly limited and justified on a case-by-case basis. 
The proportionality test enacted by the ECJ in the Viking does not offer sufficient 
protection for the freedom of association. The test is very strict and does not leave 
much room for manoeuvre.  
The ECHR on the other hand does not have to deal with economic issues or the 
fundamental freedoms of movement of the EU. The task of the ECHR is simpler 
compared to its counterpart; it is only concerned with human rights protection. 
Not surprisingly, the approach of the ECHR is more human rights-oriented and 
the standards the Court offers are much higher. 
The similarity between the case law of the two Courts is that both of them 
provide a detailed definition of the rights that constitute elements of the freedom 
of association. The ECHR explicitly refers to the ESC and the ILO and takes note 
of the definitions they provide. The ECJ also refers to international instruments, 
including the ECHR. The language of the ECJ is not as explicit as the language of 
the ECHR, but the very fact that they refer to international instruments suggests 
that they are willing to take the interpretations of the latter into consideration.  
6.3 How do the ECJ and ECtHR Standards Comply with the ILO 
and ESC?  
As was already mentioned in the second chapter, freedom of association as a 
trade union right is protected under the International Bill of Human Rights. 
However, the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does not shed much light on the definition 
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of freedom of association. Instead, reference is made to ILO standards. Both the 
ICESCR and ICCPR make explicit reference to ILO Convention 87 on Freedom 
of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize. Both supervisory organs 
(the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights) pay due regard to the ILO standards. 
The preparatory work of the ICESCR shows that, for instance, in relation to the 
right to strike, it was decided that the legitimacy of the restrictions for public 
officials have to be decided according to the ILO standards.  
In 2012 the Committee expressed concern about the fact that public servants in 
Germany are prohibited to strike. The Committee makes referral to Article 8.2 of 
the ICESCR and to ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and 
Protection of the Right to Organize and reminds the state that “public officials 
who do not provide essential services are entitled to their right to strike”.  
Several years before that, in 2009, the Human Rights Committee also expressed 
similar concerns in relation to Estonia. The Committee noted that the draft Public 
Service Act restricts the right of a number of public servants to strike. The 
Committee states that “state party should ensure in its legislation that only the 
most limited number of public servants is denied the right to strike”. 
This is very much in concert with the ILO concept of the right to strike, which 
considers strike as a fundamental right, necessary for the employers’ and 
employees’ organizations to protect the interests of their members. The ILO 
Committees do allow restrictions on this right, but are very strict in this sense. In 
the case of public servants, restriction on the right to strike can only be justified if 
193 
 
the relevant public servant is engaged in “exercising authority in the name of the 
state”.  
The ILO allows restrictions in relation to one more group: those working in 
essential services can also have their right to strike restricted. Essential services 
are strictly defined and can mean only those “the interruption of which would 
endanger the life, personal safety, or health of the whole or part of the 
population”.  
A general ban on sympathy strikes is also not allowed by the ILO organs. 
Workers should be allowed to take part in sympathy strikes. The only condition is 
that the initial strike should be legal.  
In general, according to the ILO, strikes can only be banned if they cease to be 
peaceful. Also, strikes of a purely political character are not supported by the ILO 
supervisory organs. Strikes are legitimate if they pursue economic and social 
objectives.  
In relation to Viking and Laval the Committee of Experts expressed a concern that 
the ECJ allows restrictions on the right to strike if the strike disproportionally 
impedes fundamental freedoms of the EU (e.g. the freedom of service and 
establishment). The Committee of Experts did not discuss the compatibility of the 
ECJ judgments with ILO Conventions 87 and 98, recalling its mandate, which is 
limited to reviewing the application of ILO Conventions in member states.  
The Committee’s conclusion is not a surprise. Viking recognized the right to 
strike and in this respect made reference to international standards, including 
those established by the ILO. The Court in Viking also noted that the right to 
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strike, again according to international standards, can be restricted. This was 
acceptable for the ILO. But then the ECJ came up with a new condition for 
restriction of a right to strike: fundamental freedoms of the EU. Of course, the 
ILO does not recognize such a restriction. It allows restrictions, but only if strikes 
are purely political, or violent, or concern certain groups, mentioned above. On 
this issue, the ways of the ECJ and the ILO divide.  
In Laval, sympathy strikes were condemned by the ECJ. However, the ILO 
explicitly allows such strikes if they are not used by a party to advance interests 
that go against the collective agreement conditions and therefore are a violation 
of peace obligation. It is interesting to mention that ESC does not allow sympathy 
strikes. So, even though the ECJ was in violation of ILO standards, it still 
complied with ESC standards.  
At the same time, the ECtHR looks at the right to strike from slightly different 
angle. In the Enerji case, the Court did not really recognize the right to strike as 
inherent in the freedom of association protected under Article 11. It only 
reiterated that the right is an important aspect of the protection of trade union 
freedoms. However, the Court here also cited ILO and ESC standards. This 
created a bit of uncertainty: on the one hand the Court did not consider strike 
action important enough to grant it the status of being inherent, on the other hand, 
the Court cited international standards which in fact consider strike action as an 
“intrinsic corollary of the right to organize”.  
The recent RMT judgment is also not very explicit. Even though, for the first 
time, the Court did recognize secondary industrial action as protected under 
Article 11, it did not openly state that the right to strike is inherent in the freedom 
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of association. The Court again in this case decided to stay on safer ground: it 
implicitly recognized the right to strike as a core element of the freedom of 
association, by justifying restrictions on secondary strike action by considering 
this type of strike an accessory aspect of trade union activity.  
The respective roles of the ILO and the ESC in the interpretation of Convention 
rights have also become confusing with the RMT judgment. Even though the 
ECtHR recently started to rely on these international standards, in RMT the Court 
did not apply them, but accepted a total ban on secondary strikes; a position that 
is not in concert with the ILO and the ESC.  
The right to strike is equally recognized by both courts. However, both courts 
admit that this is not an absolute right and both courts show certain precaution 
when judging on the right to strike. The reason for this precaution is economic 
well-being. In case of Luxembourg fundamental freedoms of movement are 
usually balanced against strike action; in case of ECtHR, even though 
fundamental freedoms are not mentioned, the economic argumentation of the UK 
in RMT was taken into consideration by the court. This means that neither of the 
court’s jurisprudence is in total compliance with the ILO standards. Nevertheless, 
I think Strasbourg is still in a better position to protect right to strike as it does not 
officially have to take into account an economic argument.   
Other than the right to strike we also have to look at the right to collective 
bargaining and the right to conclude collective agreement. The ILO sets 
standards on these issues. Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and 
Collective Bargaining encourages states to promote collective bargaining and 
collective agreements. Governments are not allowed to intervene in the 
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bargaining process even if the process runs against the economic policies of the 
government. Authorities are allowed to intervene only if bargaining takes place in 
the public sector, but even in this case they have to leave enough space for the 
parties to bargain.  
The ILO organs strictly condemn any changes to a collective agreement by a 
government once it is concluded. Governments can intervene, though, in future 
negotiations, but only if this is absolutely necessary to combat economic crisis. 
And even these interventions are very limited.  
If we look at the ECJ cases, the right to bargain collectively was not recognized at 
first. Only in 2010351 the ECJ explicitly recognized such a right, but it imposed 
restrictions upon it. While the right to bargaining is not an absolute right, the 
restrictions do not seem to be a big issue. However, the Luxembourg Court 
justified these restrictions by referring to the principle of proportionality, 
developed in the Viking and Laval cases. The Court said that the right to bargain 
must be reconciled with the fundamental freedoms of the EU.352 This position, 
again, cannot be in agreement with the ILO standards, which say nothing about 
such a restriction.  
On the other hand, the case law the ECtHR developed recently is very much in 
concert with the ILO standards and also the ESC. With the Demir and Baykara 
case, the Court significantly raised the standard of trade union rights protection 
and stated that the right to bargain collectively and the right to conclude 
collective agreement are, from now on, inherent elements of the freedom of 
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association protected under Article 11. Such a shift in the case law gave labour 
rights advocates hope for the future.  
The fact that in 2010 the ECJ recognized a right to bargain collectively (which, of 
course, can be considered a progressive development) could easily be the result of 
the Demir and Baykara judgment. However, neither ECtHR jurisprudence nor 
ILO standards are mentioned in the ECJ case.  
The standards set by the ESC are basically the same as the ILO. The ESC asks 
states not to create artificial barriers for trade unions that aim to protect the 
interests of their members by using legitimate means.  
In conclusion, even though neither the ECJ nor the ECtHR fully comply with the 
international standards of the ILO and the ESC, the ECtHR is still closer than its 
European counterpart. However, the situation can change with any upcoming 
case, and hopefully with the accession of the EU to the ECtHR.  
6.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it can be said that the EU went a long way to establish a human 
rights discourse in its institutions, including and probably most importantly in the 
ECJ. Human rights gradually became a concern of the EU. It took some time 
before the recognition of trade union freedoms actually happened. It can be said 
that human rights, including the freedom of association, are protected under EU 
law and ECJ jurisprudence. The problem arises when these human rights are in 
contradiction with the EU’s fundamental freedoms of movement. In these cases 
the ECJ, though trying to introduce a balance between these competing rights and 
freedoms, in fact abandons the human rights approach and focuses more on the 
interests of the internal market.  
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The fact that the EU Charter acquired legally binding force did not change the 
attitude of the ECJ. The last bastion is the EU’s accession to the ECHR. 
Accession (which I deal with in the next chapter) has the potential to shed light 
on many aspects of human rights, including trade union freedoms. Whether 
Europe becomes more human rights-focused, however, remains to be seen.  
Chapter VII – Accession of the EU to the ECHR and 
Trade Union Rights  
7.1 History of Accession of the EU to the ECHR 
In 1979 the European Commission issued a Memorandum on the then-
Community’s possible accession to the ECHR. The Commission noted that the 
European Community had increasing direct legal relations with individual 
citizens, which created a need to reinforce fundamental rights protection at the 
Community level. In the view of the Commission, in order to have immediate 
reinforcement the Community should formally adhere to the ECHR. At the same 
time, the Commission did not rule out the future possibility of an enactment of a 
human rights catalogue particular to the Community, which at that point was 
considered to be a long process, because the members could not agree on the 
definition of economic and social rights.353  
The proposal of the Commission was unheeded and lay dormant until 1993.354 In 
1993 an ad hoc group was created under the Belgian presidency. The task of the 
group was to examine the three key issues related to the accession: the 
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competence to accede; the preservation of the autonomy of EU law; and the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU. However, the Luxembourg Court dealt a 
detrimental blow to these efforts. In Opinion 2/94 the Court discussed the 
compatibility of accession with the EU Treaties. The Court simply concluded that 
as the law of the Community stood back then, the Community had no competence 
to accede to the ECHR. The Court confirmed the Community’s respect for human 
rights and the special significance of the ECHR. However, it stated that accession 
to the Convention would require substantial changes to the Community legal 
system, requiring Treaty amendment.355  
Coincidentally, the European states were in the process of negotiating the terms 
of the Amsterdam Treaty at the time, and it would have been possible to insert an 
express legal basis for accession in the Treaty. However, this did not happen.356  
In the late 1990s the idea emerged to adopt a bill of rights for European citizens. 
The initiator of this idea was then-German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. 
This led to the creation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this process 
the old idea of accession was also rediscovered. In the Draft Constitution of the 
EU the legal basis for the accession first appeared. The formulation of a provision 
speaking about the accession changed over time. It started with “the Union may 
accede”. Later the wording was changed to “the Union shall seek the accession”. 
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But because the drafters wanted to give a strong signal that the accession should 
happen the final wording was “the Union shall accede to the ECHR”.357  
In 2007 the Venice Commission issued comments about the accession of the EU 
to the ECHR. It is confirmed in the text that human rights standards were 
incorporated in the legal order of the EU. However, the Commission emphasizes 
that the interpretation and application of these standards by EU institutions might 
not always be the same as the ECtHR. After the accession, the ECtHR will have 
direct jurisdiction over the EU institutions. This will enhance uniformity of 
interpretation and application of the ECHR.358  
Therefore, immediately after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, negotiations 
about the accession of the EU to the ECHR started. Article 6(2) TEU states that 
the Union shall accede to the ECHR, however, on the condition that such 
accession shall not affect the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties. 
Six months after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, Protocol 14 to the ECHR 
also saw the daylight. It amended the ECHR and created a legal basis for the 
accession: Article 59(2) of the Convention came to read that the EU may accede 
to the Convention.  
The Explanatory Report to the Protocol 14 provides that for the actual accession 
to take place there is a need for further modifications of the Convention. This can 
be done either through one or more amending Protocols or by an accession 
agreement concluded between the EU and the COE. It is further explained that at 
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the time of negotiations for Protocol 14 the EU still lacked the competence to 
enter into negotiations and/or conclude an agreement.359  
More details on accession were provided in Protocol 8 to the Treaties, attached by 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 1 of that Protocol refers to the accession agreement 
which was supposed to include provisions for preserving the specific 
characteristic of the Union and its law, namely in regard to the Union’s possible 
participation in the control bodies of the ECHR and to the mechanisms for 
ensuring that the proceedings by states or by individual applications were 
correctly addressed to the member states and/or the Union as appropriate.  
At 17 March 2010, the European Commission issued a proposal for negotiation 
directives. The Commission proposed that it would represent the EU in the 
accession negotiations. On 4 June 2010 the EU Justice Ministers gave the 
Commission such a mandate. The legal service within the Commission was made 
responsible for the negotiations. The Committee of Ministers of the COE, in turn, 
gave an ad hoc mandate to the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) to 
elaborate the legal instrument necessary for the accession together with the EU. 
The CDDH entrusted the task to a group called CDDH-UE. The group consisted 
of 14 experts, seven of whom represented EU member states in the COE; the 
other seven represented non-EU member states.360  
From July 2010 until June 2013, when the final Draft Agreement on the 
Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights 
was agreed, a number of meetings were held. In the beginning it was the CDDH-
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UE working on the document. At a later stage the European Commission was 
also involved in the process. Importantly, civil society representatives, including 
human rights NGOs and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), also 
shared their views.361  
The European Courts were actively involved in the elaboration process of 
accession agreement. In January 2011 the presidents of the two Courts issued a 
Joint Communication. One of the major ideas expressed therein was an 
establishment of a “prior involvement” procedure, which gives the CJEU an 
opportunity to carry out internal review before the ECtHR carries external one. 
This way the principle of subsidiarity will be respected.362 This active 
involvement of the Courts in the legislative process made the negotiations easier. 
Probably, it was also due to the fact that the drafters were expecting the CJEU to 
deliver an opinion on the accession agreement.363  
 7.2. The Main Provisions of the Accession Agreement  
The draft accession agreement contains 12 articles. Article 1 determines the scope 
of the accession. The Union is acceding to the ECHR, Protocol and Protocol No. 
6. Similar to Article 6 TEU it is stated in this Article that the Convention and the 
Protocols cannot affect the competences of the EU as it is defined under EU law. 
Together with Article 4, Article 1 also clarifies that the terms such as “state”, 
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“state parties”, “national law” and so on, mentioned in the ECHR and its 
Protocols should also be understood as referring to the EU.  
Article 2 of the Accession Agreement allows the EU to make reservations to the 
Convention and its Protocols in the same vein as States are allowed to do it - in 
accordance with Article 57 of the Convention. However, it is not clear yet 
whether the EU will refer to such measures after the accession.  
Article 5 clarifies that proceedings before the CJEU cannot be understood as 
international investigations or dispute settlement under Articles 35, Paragraph 2.b 
and Article 55 of the Convention. In other words, proceedings before the CJEU 
do not bar applications before the ECtHR.  
Article 6 speaks about the election of judges. Similar to other contracting states 
the EU is entitled to have a judge appointed in accordance with Article 22 of the 
Convention. A special delegation of the European Parliament will represent the 
EU in the Parliamentary Assembly of the COE during the election process.  
Article 7 provides the possibility for the EU to take part in the meetings of the 
Committee of Ministers and to vote. The EU shall be consulted within the 
Committee. Furthermore, precautionary measures are taken in order to make sure 
that the right to vote of the EU does not prejudice the function of the Committee 
to effectively supervise the execution of the judgments or friendly settlements and 
that the EU rule according to which the EU member states are obliged to vote in a 
coordinated manner in cases concerning one or more EU members does not 
adversely affect the functioning of the Committee of Ministers.  
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Article 8 sets rules for the participation of the EU in the expenditure related to the 
Convention, while Articles 9-12 are of a technical character.  
The most important article for the purposes of this thesis, which contains 
provisions that have a potential to affect the protection of trade union rights in 
Europe, is Article 3 of the Accession Agreement. It mentions two important 
novelties: the co-respondent mechanism and the rule of prior involvement.  
Article 3(1) provides amendments to Article 36 ECHR. The title of Article 36 
was also to be changed to “Third party intervention and co-respondent” and a 
new Paragraph 4 was added:  
The European Union or Member State of the European Union may 
become a co-respondent to proceedings by decision of the Court in the 
circumstances set out in the Agreement on the Accession of the European 
Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. A co-respondent is a party to the case. The 
admissibility of an application shall be assessed without regard to the 
participation of a co-respondent in the proceedings. 
Article 3(2)(3)(4) describes three possible scenarios of EU involvement in the 
adjudication process of the ECtHR: firstly, when an application is directed 
against one or more members of the EU; secondly, when an application is 
directed against the EU itself; and finally when the applicant mentions both the 
EU and one or more member states in the application. In the first scenario the EU 
may become a co-respondent if an alleged violation calls into question the 
compatibility of EU law (primary and secondary; including decisions taken under 
the EU Treaties (TEU, TFEU), notably where the violation could have been 
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avoided only by disregarding an obligation under EU law) with the Convention 
rights (3(2)). 
In the second scenario the EU member state may become a co-respondent if an 
alleged violation calls into question the compatibility of EU primary law and the 
instruments having the same legal value (notably where the violation could have 
been avoided only by disregarding an obligation under the EU law) with the 
Convention rights (3(3)).  
In the third scenario, the status of the respondent may be changed to co-
respondent if the conditions described in Paragraphs 2 or 3 are met (3(4)).  
Article 3(5) further clarifies that in order for a High Contracting Party to become 
a co-respondent it needs to be invited by the ECtHR. If the contracting party 
wants to become a co-respondent at its own initiative, it still needs approval from 
the ECtHR. When deciding on the issue of co-respondent the Court shall seek the 
views of all the parties to the proceedings and assess if the conditions under 
Articles 3(2) and 3(3) are met. This will not affect the procedure of the Court 
according to which it makes a preliminary assessment of the applications with the 
result that manifestly ill-founded and inadmissible applications are not 
communicated to the state parties. Only in those cases which are communicated 
can a party become a co-respondent.364  
The Explanatory Report gives reasons for the introduction of the co-respondent 
mechanisms. One of the main reasons is to accommodate a specific situation that 
never happened before: a non-state actor with an autonomous legal system 
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becomes party to the Convention alongside its own members. Acts adopted by the 
EU institutions should be implemented by its member states, while the provisions 
of the EU Treaties, on the basis of which the EU institutions operate, are agreed 
by the member states among themselves. This creates a unique situation in the 
ECHR system when a legal act is enacted by one contracting party and 
implemented by another. The co-respondent mechanism cannot be regarded as a 
procedural privilege for the EU or its member states, because the co-respondent is 
a party to the case and therefore the judgments of the ECtHR are binding on it 
under Article 46 of the ECHR. It is a mechanism which helps to avoid gaps in 
participation. Protocol 8 to the Treaties is important in this regard. Article 1(b) of 
the Protocol requires the Accession Agreement to put a mechanism in place that 
ensures that individual applications are correctly addressed to member states 
and/or the Union.365  
According to the Explanatory Report the co-respondent mechanism shall not be 
an obstacle for the applicant. The admissibility of an application shall be assessed 
without regard to the participation of the co-respondent in the proceedings. In 
other words, an application will not be declared inadmissible as a result of the 
participation of a co-respondent in light of Article 35(1) ECHR on the exhaustion 
of domestic remedies.366  
Important is to note that no contracting party may be forced to become a co-
respondent. This reflects the fact that an application is not addressed to the 
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potential co-respondent and that no party can be compelled to become a party to a 
case when it was not named in the original application.367  
Respondent and co-respondent are normally held jointly responsible. However, in 
certain cases, on the basis of reasons given by the respondent and co-respondent 
and the applicant, the ECtHR may hold only the respondent or co-respondent 
responsible. Apportioning the responsibility on any other basis than this entails 
the risk that the Court would exceed its competence and assesses the distribution 
of competences between the EU and its member states. It is also important to 
mention that the Court only rules on whether there has been a violation of the 
Convention, and not on the validity of the legal act or provision underlying the 
act or omission subject of the complaint.368  
It is believed, however, that the co-respondent mechanism is expected to be 
applied in a limited number of cases. Instead, the party intervention rule under 
Article 36 ECHR is likely to be applied more in the cases where the EU is 
involved.369  
The prior involvement rule is triggered in proceedings when the EU is involved in 
the case as a co-respondent and when the CJEU has not yet ruled on the 
compatibility of EU law with the Convention rights at issue. In this situation 
sufficient time shall be afforded for the CJEU to make such an assessment. The 
condition is that an assessment must be made quickly in order to ensure that the 
proceedings before the ECtHR are not unduly delayed (Article 3(6)).  
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In the Explanatory Report it is stated that cases where the EU might be a co-
respondent arise from individual applications concerning acts or omissions of EU 
member states. Before going to the ECtHR the applicant is obliged to exhaust 
domestic remedies in the national courts of the respondent state. This national 
court may or in certain cases must refer the question to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling (Article 267 TFEU), but because parties to proceedings before 
national courts can only suggest (but not require) such a referral, this procedure is 
not considered a legal remedy obligatory for an individual to exhaust before 
sending an application to the ECtHR. The national court might not consider it 
necessary to refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, in which case 
the issue of conformity of an EU act with human rights will directly go to the 
ECtHR before the CJEU has the opportunity to express an opinion on it. Even 
though it is believed that such a situation will not occur that often, it was still 
decided to establish a remedy. For this reason, the Accession Agreement suggests 
the EU introduce internal rules in order to ensure that the CJEU has an 
opportunity to rule on the validity of a legal provision of EU law that has 
triggered the participation of an EU as a co-respondent. This assessment should 
take place before the ECtHR decides on the merits of the application. This 
procedure is inspired by the principle of subsidiarity and applies only in situations 
where the EU is a co-respondent. Interestingly, the explanatory report provides a 
suggestion for the EU that all parties to the case (including the applicant, who 
will be given a chance to obtain legal aid) will have an opportunity to make 
observations in the procedure before the CJEU. The CJEU will not assess the act 
or omission complained about, but only the EU legal basis for it, and its 
assessment will not bind the ECtHR. After the assessment is issued the parties to 
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the case should be given enough time to properly assess the consequences of the 
CJEU ruling. In order to avoid undue delays the explanatory report gives the 
CJEU a limited period for the assessment. It is emphasized that an accelerated 
procedure already exists before the CJEU and that the CJEU would have already 
had been able to rule under that procedure from six to eight months.370  
7.2.1 Commentaries on the Accession Agreement  
There are several important aspects that the Treaties and the Association 
Agreement do not shed enough light on and which might possibly have 
implications for the protection of fundamental rights. One of those important 
issues is the question when the prior involvement mechanism is triggered. As 
suggested by the Accession Agreement and the Explanatory Report, once the EU 
is recognized as a co-respondent to a case, a reference for a preliminary ruling 
will be made to the CJEU if it had not intervened earlier in this case. At first 
sight, everything is clear. Nevertheless, a situation may arise in which there was 
no preliminary reference in regard to the specific case, but the CJEU had already 
decided on the validity of the specific EU provision at stake in light of 
fundamental rights in another case. It is also possible that a preliminary reference 
was made to the CJEU by national courts, but for reasons other than compatibility 
with human rights.371  
The issue of deciding whether the Court of Justice already ruled on the matter is 
one of the problematic ones.372 For instance, in the case of Kaba II373 the first 
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question referred to the ECJ was rather straightforward: “how is it possible to 
make sure that Article 6 ECHR is respected; was it respected in the present 
proceedings and if not, how this might affect the judgment?”. 
Nevertheless, the Court avoided answering the first question. It noted that 
because the doubts of the national tribunal expressed in relation to the first 
question were addressed in the second question (here the Court did not mention 
the ECHR at all, but only Community law and national law) it was unnecessary to 
reply to the first question.374 It is now debatable whether in cases like this, the 
ECtHR has to delay the proceedings and allow the ECJ to make an assessment as 
it is envisaged by the prior involvement rule.375  
While prior involvement is triggered only in cases where the EU is a co-
respondent, the question is why it is not triggered where the EU is a respondent. 
For some commentators it seems more logical to have this procedure in all 
instances in which a question of compatibility of the EU law with the ECHR 
arises.376 The Agreement and its explanations do not provide clarifications 
regarding this issue.  
Another mystery that accompanies prior involvement is the consequence of this 
procedure. Two scenarios can be envisaged: 1. The EU law provision is declared 
by the CJEU as being consistent with fundamental rights and 2. The EU provision 
is declared by the CJEU null and void for violating fundamental rights. The 
                                                                                                                                                              
373 Case C-466/00, Kaba v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2003] ECRI-2219.  
374 Ibid. para. 37-58.  
375 Supra note 370, p. 251-252.  
376 Girgio Gaja, The ‘Co-Respondent Mechanisms’ According to the Draft Agreement for the 
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second scenario is less problematic, if the CJEU finds that the EU provision 
violates fundamental rights it might declare it null and void. In this case the 
Strasbourg Court can either grant just satisfaction or, if the standards are higher 
within the EU, it might rule no violation of the Convention.377  
A problem might arise in relation to the first situation. The Strasbourg Court 
might find the EU legal provision incompatible with the Convention even if the 
EU provision at stake was declared consistent with the fundamental rights by the 
CJEU in the prior involvement. This might be a consequence of the CJEU 
interpretation of the norm which falls below the minimum standards set by 
Strasbourg; or it could be that the two Courts have a different understanding of 
how to find a balance between the competing rights.378  
7.3 CJEU Opinion on the Accession Agreement  
On 4 July 2013 the European Commission requested an Opinion of the CJEU 
pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU on the accession of the EU to the ECHR. The 
question posted to the Court was the following: “Is the draft agreement providing 
for the accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms … compatible with the Treaties?”  
On 18 December 2014 the CJEU released an Opinion. The conclusion reached by 
the Court was a surprise for many academics and lawyers interested in the topic: 
the Association Agreement was ruled to be not compatible with Article 6(2) TEU 
or with Protocol 8 of the Treaties. 
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The Opinion of the Court is very comprehensive. It contains 258 paragraphs and 
provides information on the major principles governing the ECHR and EU and 
also the relationship between the two. The main provisions of the draft accession 
agreement and the explanatory report are summarized. The submissions of the 
EU institutions and the member states regarding the accession are also included. 
The position of the Court itself is contained in 115 paragraphs.  
The Court started with the admissibility issue. The fact that internal rules were 
not yet adopted did not bar the Court from declaring the question admissible. 
According to the Court internal rules constitute internal EU law and therefore 
they cannot be a subject matter of the Opinion procedure. This procedure only 
relates to international agreements which the EU is proposing to conclude (Para 
149, 151).  
The Court emphasized the importance of the specific character of the EU and EU 
law and stated that it should not be undermined by the accession. The Court 
reiterated that this specific characteristics arises from the very nature of EU law 
and unites several aspects. Most importantly, EU law stems from an independent 
source of law: the Treaties; these Treaties have primacy over national laws; the 
concept of direct effect allows a whole series of Treaty provisions to be 
applicable to the member states and its nationals. The Court further clarifies that 
fundamental rights recognized by the Charter are at the heart of the EU legal 
structure and that the autonomy the EU law enjoys in relation to national and 
international laws requires that the interpretation of the Charter rights are ensured 
within the framework of the structure and objectives of the EU (Para 164-170).  
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After deciding on the admissibility and recalling the importance of the 
preservation of the specific characteristics of EU law, the Court gave number of 
reasons to justify its position. The objection of the Court that is most relevant for 
this thesis was related to the Charter.  
In the view of the Court, Article 53 ECHR and Article 53 of the Charter should 
be coordinated with each other and a provision to this effect must be included in 
the Accession Agreement. The Court was not happy with the fact that while the 
interpretation of the ECHR by the ECtHR is binding on EU institutions 
(including the CJEU), this is not the case in relation to the Charter – the 
interpretation of the Charter by the CJEU is not binding on the ECtHR. 
According to the Court this must be changed. The Court reiterated that Article 53 
of the Charter, which defines the level of protection of Charter rights, is 
interpreted by the Court of Justice “as meaning that the application of national 
standards of protection of fundamental rights must not compromise the level of 
protection provided for by the Charter of the primacy, unity and effectiveness of 
EU law (judgment in Melloni, EU:C:2013:107, paragraph 60)”. Therefore, in the 
opinion of the Court, because Article 53 of the ECHR gives freedom to member 
states to introduce higher standards of protection of fundamental rights than those 
guaranteed by the ECHR, there is a need to coordinate Article 53 ECHR with 
Article 53 of the Charter, as interpreted by the CJEU, “so that the power granted 
to member states by article 53 of the ECHR is limited – with respect to the rights 
recognized by the Charter that correspond to those guaranteed by the ECHR – to 
that which is necessary to ensure that the level of protection provided for by the 
Charter and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not 
compromised” (Para 185-190).  
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In other words, this means that the ECtHR has to ensure that Article 53 of the 
Convention does not give authorization to member states to introduce higher 
human rights standards than is established by the EU charter, interpreted by the 
CJEU. According to the CJEU, this will be a guarantee of the primacy, unity and 
effectiveness of EU law. It goes without saying that this approach comes into 
conflict with the very essence of the ECHR, which offers only minimum 
standards of protection of the rights and welcomes any further improvement from 
member states.  
In my opinion, from a trade union rights point of view, this position of the CJEU 
is catastrophic. Since 2007 when the Court of Justice restricted the scope of trade 
union rights in favour of the free movement of companies and services (Viking 
and Laval), the situation has not changed in this regard. The reconsidered case 
law of the ECtHR (Demir and Enerji) in relation to Article 11 on the freedom of 
association also did not help to establish balance in this sphere. The CJEU 
continued in its own style. The only hope was the accession of the EU to the 
ECHR as a result of which, it was believed, the ECtHR would have been a final 
Court on human rights issues, while EU law matters were left with the CJEU. 
However, it seems that after the Charter acquired the same legal value as the 
Treaties, the CJEU now considers human rights (and most importantly the 
Charter) as part of EU law, the interpretation of which is within its prerogative 
only, and it does not wish to accept any external control, including from the 
ECHR.  
The Court also raised the issue of “mutual trust” between the EU member states, 
which means that while implementing EU law member states are required under 
EU law to presume that fundamental rights are observed by the other member 
215 
 
states. In the view of the Court, the fact that the ECHR gives member states the 
power to check on other member states’ observance of fundamental rights goes 
against the principle of mutual trust and undermines the autonomy of the EU. No 
provision preventing such a development is mentioned in the agreement (Para 
191-195). 
Protocol 16 ECHR was considered by the Court to be a danger for the 
effectiveness of the preliminary ruling procedure (Article 267 TFEU) and 
therefore incompatible with the autonomy of EU law. Namely, a request for an 
advisory opinion made pursuant to Protocol 16 by a national court of a member 
state that has acceded to that Protocol could trigger the procedure for prior 
involvement of the CJEU, thus creating a risk that the preliminary ruling 
procedure, which is a key stone of the EU judicial system, might be circumvented 
(Para 196-200).  
The Court also noted that the Agreement violates Article 344 TFEU, according to 
which only the CJEU has jurisdiction over inter-state disputes. In the opinion of 
the Court, the very fact that the EU or EU member states are able to submit 
applications to the ECHR under Article 33 entails a liability of objective of 
Article 344 TFEU being undermined, and goes against the very nature of the EU 
law (Para 201-214).  
The Court also criticized the co-respondent procedure laid down by the 
agreement and concluded that it does not ensure that the specific characteristics 
of the EU and EU law are preserved. Three reasons were named in this respect. 
Firstly, Article 3(5) of the Draft Agreement provides that if the EU or the EU 
member state requests leave to intervene as a co-respondent, they must present 
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arguments to prove that the conditions for their participation as a co-respondent 
are met, and the ECtHR has to assess this reasoning. In the opinion of the CJEU, 
in carrying out this assessment the ECtHR would be required to assess the rules 
of EU law governing the division of powers between the EU and its member 
states, as well as criteria for attribution for their act or omission. Secondly, 
Article 3(7) of the Draft Agreement speaks about a joint responsibility of the 
respondent and co-respondent parties if a violation is found in the case by the 
ECHR. However, according to the CJEU this does not preclude a member state 
from being held responsible, together with the EU, for a violation of a provision 
of the ECHR in respect of which that member state has made a reservation. This 
goes against the Article 2 of Protocol No 8 EU, according to which the 
reservations must not be affected. Thirdly, the ECtHR should not be allowed to 
decide on the apportionment of responsibility between the respondent and co-
respondent if a violation is found in the case (Article 3(7) Draft Agreement). In 
the opinion of the Court the apportionment of responsibility must be resolved 
according to the EU rules only, and if necessary it must be subject to review by 
the CJEU, which has the sole responsibility to ensure that any agreement between 
respondent and co-respondent respects those EU rules. The fact that the ECtHR 
makes this decision on the basis of the reasons submitted by the respondent and 
co-respondent does not change anything in this regard (Para 215-235).  
The prior involvement mechanism introduced by the Accession Agreement did 
not survive the CJEU criticism either. Similar to its opinion regarding the co-
respondent mechanism, the CJEU ruled that the prior involvement procedure does 
not enable the specific characteristics of the EU and EU law to be preserved. Two 
reasons were named in this respect. Firstly, it should be up to the EU institutions 
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to decide whether the CJEU has already given a ruling on the same question of 
law. According to the Court, permitting the ECtHR to rule on this issue would 
amount to conferring on it jurisdiction to interpret the case law of the CJEU, 
which is not acceptable. The draft agreement does not exclude such a possibility. 
Secondly, the Agreement does not provide a possibility for the CJEU to interpret 
the secondary law of the EU (Article 3(6), Draft Agreement). Paragraph 66 of the 
explanatory report only provides for the ability of the CJEU to rule on the validity 
of secondary law or on the interpretation of primary law. In the view of the Court, 
if the CJEU is not allowed to interpret secondary law, the ECtHR might be 
tempted to do so, which is again violation of the main principle that only the 
CJEU is allowed to interpret EU law (Para 236-248).  
Finally, the Court was not happy with the fact that the ECtHR might have 
jurisdiction over some Common Foreign Security and Policy (CFSP) matters, 
when the jurisdiction of the CJEU itself is very limited in this filed. The Court 
reiterated its position that the jurisdiction to carry out a judicial review of acts, 
actions or omissions on the part of the EU, including in the light of fundamental 
rights, cannot be conferred exclusively on an international court, outside the 
institutional and judicial framework of the EU (Para 249-257).  
The objections of the CJEU are very serious. Basically, it rejected the entire Draft 
Agreement by declaring co-respondent and prior involvement mechanisms, which 
constitute a major part of the Draft Agreement, incompatible with the EU 
Treaties. The parties now have to think about the renegotiation of a totally new 
agreement, based on specific requirements of the CJEU. However, the 
requirements of the CJEU seriously affect not only the EU and its member states 
but also the ECHR system and its contracting parties. Therefore, there is a need 
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for all 47 contracting member states to the ECHR to agree on a new agreement 
concluded according to the terms of the CJEU opinion.  
However, it is difficult to see how and why the ECtHR and/or the contracting 
states to the ECHR would have to agree on the CJEU terms. The most 
challenging requirement is the one concerning the coordination of Article 53 
ECHR with Article 53 of the Charter. According to the CJEU, member states 
cannot introduce standards higher than the Charter as interpreted by the CJEU 
(this would apply within the scope of EU law; and where EU law and the CJEU 
had set a ‘ceiling’ on rights). If the ECtHR accepts this objection it means that the 
CJEU will become the standard setting institution (at least in relation to certain 
issues) in Europe. This in fact leads to the primacy of the CJEU over the ECtHR. 
It also means that the ECtHR has to change its long-established practice that it 
provides only for a minimum protection on which the states may build. Changing 
this approach might have very difficult consequences for those states that might 
embrace higher standards of protection of a given right than the ECtHR. They 
might be asked to lower their standards. In that regard, the ECtHR would become 
dependent on the case law of the CJEU. This perspective is very damaging for 
trade union rights protection, as the CJEU standards in relation to these rights are 
considerably lower than those of the ECtHR.  
What also concerns me is the question why the CJEU did not mention these (or at 
least some of these) objections in the negotiation process, as it was also involved 
at that stage. One of the major reasons for the involvement of the judiciary in the 
legislative process was to avoid a negative opinion of the Court, which still was 
not avoided. After all, maybe it was not a wise decision to ask the CJEU if it 
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would accept the supremacy of the other Court. Nevertheless, the Opinion was 
released and the negotiating parties cannot disregard it now.  
Even though the Opinion was not expectable, I still agree with the CJEU on one 
thing: it is not clear how the ECtHR can judge the compatibility of an EU act 
with the ECHR, without actually interpreting that act. If the Strasbourg Court 
simply relies on the interpretation offered by the CJEU (as a result of the prior 
involvement procedure), there is a possibility that it (the ECtHR) can never 
conclude any incompatibility, because most probably, the CJEU will be reluctant 
to interpret the act as incompatible with the ECHR. This technical issue must be 
explored on a case-by-case basis, but it is definitely important to take note of it.  
A similar concern is expressed by the ICJ judge in his writing, though in a 
different context. He considers it impossible to exercise external control over 
compliance by the EU with its obligations under the Convention, if the ECtHR is 
not allowed to interpret the content of EU law provisions.379  
Whether the EU, ECtHR and the member states continue negotiations on the 
Draft Agreement, and what shape will it take, remains to be seen. Meanwhile, I 
hope that 18 December, 2014 will not go into history as a step backwards in 
human rights protection. After all, December is the month of the UDHR.  
7.4 Opinions on the Opinion  
Commenting on the Opinion of the Court on the accession, Catherine Barnard 
made a very interesting observation. She thinks that even though the Court 
recognized the obligation of the EU to accede to the Convention according to first 
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sentence of Article 6(2) TEU, it is apparent from paragraphs 160-162 of the 
Opinion that the emphasis of the Court is not on this obligation, but on the 
conditions to which the accession is subject under the Treaties. These are made 
explicit in the second sentence of Article 6(2) TEU (the condition not to affect 
Union’s competences) and Protocol 8 (the condition not to affect specific 
characteristics of the Union).  
Based on this, Barnard thinks that through the lens of the second sentence of 
Article 6(2) TEU and Protocol 8, the Treaty provides not an absolute obligation 
to accede but a conditional one. In support of her position she makes reference to 
the ECJ discussion document on the accession dated 5 May 2010 when the 
debates around the topic were very active.380  
This is an interesting and important document, because the ECJ officially defines 
what it means by the “specific characteristic of the EU” and what should be 
preserved in the case of accession. According to the Court one of the specificities 
of the Union lies in the fact that, as a general rule, “action by the Union takes 
effect as against individuals only through the intermediary of national measures 
of implementation or application”. The role of intermediary is taken by the states. 
If an individual thinks that his/her fundamental rights are not secured because of 
the implementation or application of EU law by national authorities, he/she, after 
exhausting the domestic remedies, may lodge an application against the member 
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state concerned to the ECtHR. This way, an individual can indirectly challenge 
the acts of the Union.381  
The opinion of the Court is that in the light of the accession this specific 
characteristic of the Union must be seen in the context of the principle of 
subsidiarity, meaning that the national courts or authorities are primarily 
responsible for the prevention or examination of breaches of the Convention. This 
principle should also apply to the Union acts. Therefore, it is important to make 
sure that any external review by the ECtHR is preceded by review by the EU 
and/or its member states.382  
Another specificity that the Court mentioned in the Discussion Document was its 
own role in the interpretation and application of the EU Treaties. It reiterated that 
the CJEU has an exclusive jurisdiction to declare the acts of EU institutions 
invalid. Even though national courts of member states have the jurisdiction to 
consider the validity of EU acts, they cannot declare them invalid. This way 
uniformity is achieved. According to the Court, this prerogative is an integral part 
of the “powers” of the Union institutions mentioned in the Protocol No. 8 and it 
must not be affected by the accession. For this not to happen, the Court is of the 
view that before the ECtHR deciding on the conformity of an EU act with the 
Convention, the CJEU must have had the opportunity to give a definite ruling on 
the point.383  
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The Court also comments on the preliminary ruling procedure as one of the main 
specificities and positively assesses its functioning over a half a century. 
However, it notes that not all cases on fundamental rights might reach the CJEU 
through the preliminary ruling procedure, and individuals cannot set this 
procedure in motion. Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that the preliminary 
ruling procedure cannot be regarded as a domestic remedy necessary to exhaust 
before bringing a case to the ECtHR. Nevertheless, the Court thinks it is 
important to make sure that when an EU act is challenged it is the Union Court 
that carries out an internal review before an external review takes place.384  
In the end the Court summarizes: 
in order to observe the principle of subsidiarity which is inherent in the 
Convention and at the same time to ensure the proper functioning of the 
judicial system of the Union, a mechanism must be available which is 
capable of ensuring that the question of the validity of a Union act can be 
brought effectively before the Court of Justice before the European Court 
of Human Rights rules on the compatibility of that act with the 
Convention.385 
To sum up, the main concerns of the Court in the discussion document were 
twofold: the possibility of an internal review of the EU act by the CJEU before 
any external review by the ECtHR, and the preservation of the situation where the 
CJEU is the only Court with the power to declare the EU acts invalid. Both these 
concerns were addressed by the relevant articles of the Accession Agreement; the 
prior involvement mechanism directly corresponds to the first concern of the 
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CJEU about the internal review. If the EU is co-respondent in the case, the CJEU 
is given the opportunity to assess the validity of the Union acts before the ECtHR 
decides on the merits of the application (Para 66, Draft Explanatory Report). As 
for the second concern on the validity of a Union act, the Draft Explanatory 
Report explicitly states that the ECtHR only rules on whether there has been a 
violation of the Convention or not. It does not have the power to declare an act of 
the EU or any of its member states invalid (Para 62).  
So the Court indeed names conditions for the accession. However, firstly, these 
conditions are not as detailed as in Opinion 2/13 (not to mention the fact that 
many of them are not mentioned here at all) and secondly, I believe that they are 
properly addressed by the Accession Agreement.  
Similar issues were raised after several months in the Joint Communication of the 
Presidents of the two Courts. Again, it was stated that in order for the principle of 
subsidiarity to be respected a procedure should be put in place to ensure that the 
CJEU carries out an internal review before the ECtHR carries out an external one. 
Three conditions were mentioned in this respect: firstly, the types of cases which 
may be brought before the CJEU are clearly defined; secondly, before the ECtHR 
starts its examination of the case the parties should have the opportunity to 
properly assess the CJEU position within a time limit prescribed in accordance 
with the ECHR procedural rules; and lastly, in order to avoid lengthy proceedings 
the CJEU might be required to give a ruling under an accelerated procedure.386  
I believe all these conditions are met in the Draft Accession Agreement. Article 
3(6) of the Draft explicitly states the type of cases (cases that raise issues not yet 
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addressed by the CJEU) for which prior involvement of the CJEU is considered 
necessary; it states that parties should have enough time to make observations 
after the CJEU states its position; and it states that the assessment of the CJEU 
must be quick.  
It is possible that in private discussions (that I believe are no less important than 
the official documents) the judges of the CJEU were more specific about their 
conditions and maybe also raised the issues mentioned in the Opinion before the 
ECtHR judges. It is difficult to speculate over this issue. One thing is certain: the 
CJEU was not very outspoken in public before Opinion 2/13.  
7.4.1 The ECtHR on the Opinion  
The ECHR annual report 2014 is so far the only document where European 
judicial officials, including the ECtHR, commented on Opinion 2/13 on the 
accession. As Lock correctly noted it is not very often that the Annual Report of 
the Court receives so much attention.387 But this time it did, because of the 
comment of the President of the ECtHR Dean Spielmann. This comment deserves 
to be quoted in full:  
The end of the year was also marked by the delivery on 18 December 
2014 of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) eagerly 
awaited opinion on the draft agreement on the accession of the European 
Union to the European Convention on Human Rights. Bearing in mind 
that negotiations on European Union accession have been under way for 
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more than thirty years, that accession is an obligation under the Lisbon 
Treaty and that all the member States along with the European institutions 
had already stated that they considered the draft agreement compatible 
with the Treaties on European Union and the Functioning of the European 
Union, the CJEU’s unfavourable opinion is a great disappointment. Let 
us not forget, however, that the principal victims will be those citizens 
whom this opinion (no. 2/13) deprives of the right to have acts of the 
European Union subjected to the same external scrutiny as regards respect 
for human rights as that which applies to each Member State. More than 
ever, therefore, the onus will be on the Strasbourg Court to do what it can 
in cases before it to protect citizens from the negative effects of this 
situation.388 
As Lock correctly observed, this comment contains very strong language, unusual 
for documents of this kind. The President could not hide “great disappointment” 
caused by Opinion 2/13 and explicitly stated that citizens, deprived of the right to 
challenge EU institution acts, are “victims” of this Opinion. Lock thought that 
even though this statement is made only by one judge it might still mean that the 
ECtHR might change its approach to the Bosphorus presumption. A revocation of 
this presumption was not deemed possible by Lock; after all, the EU enhanced 
the protection of human rights (EU Charter) since then. What Lock thought might 
happen is that the ECtHR tightens the conditions for application of the 
presumption so that more cases will be reviewable by Strasbourg.389  
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7.5 Future possible developments after Opinion 2/13  
The possible future developments after Opinion 2/13 are not clear yet. The 
officials are not hurrying to make official statements. The obligation of the 
accession still exists, though, and something needs to be done about it. One 
possible scenario is to sit around the negotiation table again and amend the 
accession agreement. This is what Lock recommends to do.390 However, 
considering the long process of negotiation over the draft AA it will most 
probably take several years before they reach a new agreement, if they reach one 
at all. As Steve Peers correctly noted, these amendments might go against the 
intrinsic nature of the ECHR, which means that the COE member states (those 
not part of the EU) might not agree at all on such amendments. But even if they 
agree, does the accession still matter after those amendments?391  
Another possible scenario is the amendment of the EU Treaties, so that the 
accession still takes place notwithstanding the Opinion of the CJEU. Leonard 
F.M. Besselink suggested adding to the EU Treaties an additional Protocol which 
might read the following way: “The Union shall accede to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
notwithstanding Article 6(2) Treaty on European Union, Protocol (No 8) relating 
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to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union and Opinion 2/13 of the Court of 
Justice of 18 December 2014”.392  
This way all the problems will be solved. The conditions mentioned in Article 
6(2) and Protocol 8 emphasized by the Court and also mentioned by Barnard will 
automatically lose their relevance. Considering that all the other EU institutions 
and the EU member states agree on the accession, this should not be a difficult 
thing to arrange.  
From the very beginning, there were different reasons for the idea of accession to 
become popular. One reason was that the CJEU started to refer to the rights and 
freedoms mentioned in the Convention on a regular basis. This turned out to be 
problematic, as the CJEU started to develop its own system of fundamental rights 
protection. In the absence of a common mechanism of interpretation agreed 
between the two European Courts, they started to interpret one and the same texts 
in different contexts and in different ways.393  
Everything got more complicated after the Lisbon Treaty. The Court started to 
refer more to the EU Charter. The risk of divergent interpretations of the human 
rights standards in Europe grew. The duplication of the human rights protection 
systems in Europe created legal uncertainty and runs the risk of weakening 
overall protection.394  
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Furthermore, after the increasing transfer of competences from the member states 
to the Union, the Union became responsible for the protection of certain rights. 
However, while the ECHR had (and still has) no ratione personae over the 
Union, it could not hold the EU responsible for these violations. Instead, the 
member state which implemented the relevant EU law was responsible for any 
violation of rights caused by the decisions taken by EU institutions. In other 
words, the actual perpetrator was free without any convictions and the individual 
whose rights were violated was deprived of these rights.395  
Besides, one of the requirements for candidate countries willing to become the 
EU members is to protect and promote the rights mentioned in the ECHR. 
According to commentators there is an element of hypocrisy when you ask others 
to commit themselves to the Convention while you’re not a party to it yourself.396  
All these reasons are still valid. And I strongly believe that accession of the EU to 
the ECHR is the only solution to these problems. The fact that the idea of 
accession did not disappear over the decades, and survived from one Treaty to 
another, makes me think that accession is unavoidable. Thus it seems justified to 
explore the effects that a future accession might have on human rights, and 
specifically, on trade union freedoms.  
7.5.1 The two Courts  
When it comes to the relationship between the two Courts, there are a few 
important aspects that deserve our attention. Neither the accession agreement nor 
the CJEU Opinion talked about these in depth. These issues are broadly discussed 
among academics and are worth looking at.  
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One of the most accepted opinions is that after accession takes place there will be 
no jurisdictional conflict between the two Courts as the ECtHR will execute 
external scrutiny of the EU in the field of human rights and the CJEU will remain 
as a Court of last instance for the interpretation of Union law. In other words the 
CJEU will continue to take final decisions on all the issues regarding EU law, 
while if the ECtHR finds incompatibilities between the Convention and EU law 
the relevant EU institutions and/or member states shall be responsible for 
bringing the relevant regulations or their application in particular cases into line 
with the Convention’s requirements.397 But this explanation does not provide an 
answer to one major issue: after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force the EU 
Charter acquired the same legal value as the Treaties, which means that human 
rights are now officially considered part of EU primary law. It is not clear which 
Court should have a final say on these matters.  
There is also another view in regard with the two Courts. In the opinion of a 
former CJEU judge, after accession the CJEU becomes subordinated to the 
ECtHR jurisdiction. In support of this opinion he refers to the CJEU opinion on 
the EEA where it is stated that the EU can become subject to the jurisdiction of 
an international court: “where … an international agreement provides for its own 
system of courts, including a court with jurisdiction to settle disputes between the 
Contracting Parties to the agreement, and, as a result, to interpret its provisions, 
the decisions of that court will be binding on the Community institutions, 
including the Court of Justice”.398 However, he emphasizes that in order to avoid 
                                                          
397 Supra note 392, p. 602.  
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conflict, the existing co-operation and dialogue between the Courts, including 
through the case law, should be continued and increased after accession.399  
In an article published in 1993 Lawson made an observation that most of the 
ECJ’s references to human rights are merely used to support a conclusion that is 
already reached on other grounds; and that no claims based purely on human 
rights have been upheld by the ECJ. He mentioned the Wachauf400 case as an 
exception, where the Court gave fundamental rights great meaning. However, he 
also regrettably noted that the Court in that case stated that restrictions can be 
imposed on fundamental rights in the interests of “common organization of 
market” and “general interests of the Community” (Para 18).401  
In support of his position that the interpretations of the two Courts might differ 
from each other Lawson cites the opinion of the Advocate General in the case of 
Orkem.402 Here the AG makes a statement that the ECJ “may … adopt with 
respect to provisions of the Convention, an interpretation which does not coincide 
exactly with that given by the Strasbourg authorities, in particular the European 
Court of Human Rights”. The AG further notes that, so far, the ECJ is not bound 
“to take into account, as regards fundamental rights under Community law, the 
interpretation of the Convention given by the Strasbourg authorities”.403  
                                                          
399 Christiaan Timmermans, Some Personal Comments on the Accession of the EU to the ECHR in 
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Lawson notes that the aforementioned opinion of the AG was not mentioned by 
the Court in the judgment and that the ECJ never specified its position vis-à-vis 
ECtHR case law.404 Nevertheless, he still thinks that this statement is important, 
and pays attention to the fact that the AG speaks about situations when the ECJ 
interpretation of fundamental rights does not “exactly” coincide with the 
interpretation of the Convention given by the ECtHR. Here, Lawson notes that 
the issue of radical difference in interpretation is not addressed by the AG.405  
So two important issues raised by Lawson are that, firstly, the ECJ is mostly 
concerned with internal market rules and applies fundamental rights only if they 
are in concert with those rules; in other words, “it has … a clear tendency to 
approach cases from a common market point of view”;406 and secondly, there is a 
possibility (at least theoretical) that in the future the ECJ might come up with 
interpretations of fundamental rights different from those established by the 
ECtHR in its case law and that as a result “manifest confusion” and/or “direct 
conflict” between the two Courts might occur.407  
Even though the views of Lawson are supported by the case law of the both 
European Courts, it must be kept in mind that the article was written in 1993. 
Since then the Luxembourg Court has significantly improved the protection of a 
number of fundamental rights. Trade union freedoms were among those rights 
protected by the ECJ (C-112/00 Schmidberger). However, the situation changed 
with Viking and Laval and has remained the same since then.  
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Notwithstanding the antiquity of Lawson’s article, the solution that he suggests is 
still as relevant as ever: accession of the EU to the ECtHR. He thinks that before 
there is a direct conflict between the Courts it is preferable to create a system of 
judicial cooperation on human rights issues.408 In this regard, accession seems to 
be the only solution.409 
Allan Rosas has a slightly different opinion on this matter. In an article published 
in October 2007 (just two months before Viking and Laval) he states that EU 
accession to the ECHR would not change things radically. He thinks that in actual 
practice the ECJ follows very closely the case law of the ECtHR. The reason for 
this is to avoid two different strides taken in relation to human rights and 
fundamental rights, which would potentially create problems for EU member 
states as they could face conflicting interpretations from Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg. Here he cites the Bosphorus presumption, stating that in case the 
member states follow the Luxembourg interpretation they may end up in the 
Strasbourg Court. He further notes that he is not aware of a single case where the 
ECJ “clearly” disregarded an ECtHR interpretation.410  
Tobias Lock offers a third, more balanced, view on the relationship of the two 
Courts, with which I totally agree. In his view both Courts in Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg regularly refer to each other’s case law and this helps to create 
uniform human rights standards in Europe. However, they have no legal duty to 
do this in the future; either Court can unilaterally end cooperation any moment. 
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Accession of the EU to the ECHR can prevent such a thing from happening; it 
will provide a clear legal basis for the relationship of the two Courts.411  
One important issue that needs to be addressed and that concerns the relationship 
of the two European Courts is related to the EU Charter. According to Article 
52(3) of the Charter the ECHR establishes the minimum standard that the EU has 
an obligation to respect. The question is whether the case law of the ECtHR, the 
only interpreter of the ECHR, also creates obligations for the EU and mainly the 
CJEU.412  
There is no such explicit mention of the ECtHR case law in Article 52(3). 
However, ECtHR case law is mentioned in the official Explanations regarding 
Article 52(3) which states that the meaning and the scope of the Charter rights are 
determined not only by the Convention and its Protocols “but also by the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights” and the CJEU.413 Nevertheless, the 
official Explanations do not create legal obligations for EU institutions; they only 
have a duty to “duly regard” them (Article 52(7)). This means that the interpreter 
of the Charter does not have to strictly follow the case law of the ECtHR, and 
therefore the Explanations do not create a sufficient basis to argue that the ECJ is 
bound by the case law of the ECtHR.414  
After concluding that the EU Charter text does not include any explicit reference 
to ECtHR case law, Lock checks on the drafting history of the Charter. The result 
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is the same: no reference to the case law of the ECtHR. The Convention working 
on the Charter could not agree on such a reference. Thus, Lock concludes that 
neither the wording, nor the drafting history of the Charter supports an opinion 
that there is a strict obligation for the ECJ to refer to ECtHR case law while 
interpreting the Charter.415  
Paul Gragl agrees that Article 52(7) of the Charter is a clear indication that the 
ECtHR case law does not create any legal obligations for the CJEU while 
interpreting the Charter. Nevertheless, Gragl argues that the ECtHR does not 
create any risks for the autonomy of the EU law, firstly, because Luxembourg 
accepts the leading role of Strasbourg in the field of human rights and secondly, 
because accession does not grant the ECtHR any jurisdiction to interpret and 
apply the Charter provisions as a quasi-court of the last instance. The CJEU must 
be permitted not only to interpret and apply the Charter but also to derogate from 
the specific interpretations of the ECtHR, provided that the limitations are 
according to Article 52(1) in that they “meet objectives of general interest 
recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others”.416  
This does not mean, however, that the CJEU may ignore every interpretation 
offered by the ECtHR. Gragl specifies that the CJEU is bound by ECtHR case 
law to the extent that it is not allowed to fall below the standards established by 
the ECtHR.417  
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In conclusion, the EU Charter does not make ECtHR case law obligatory for the 
ECJ. The situation might be different after accession though. Lock refers to ECJ 
Opinion 1/91 where it is stated that “where, however, an international agreement 
provides for its own system of courts, including a court with jurisdiction to settle 
disputes between the Contracting Parties to the agreement, and, as a result to 
interpret its provisions, the decisions of that court will be binding on the 
Community institutions, including the Court of Justice. Those decisions will also 
be binding in the vent that the Court of Justice is called upon to rule, by way of 
preliminary ruling or in a direct action, on the interpretation of the international 
agreement, in so far as that agreement is an integral part of the Community legal 
order”. 
According to Lock, because the ECHR constitutes an international agreement 
with its own court, this dictum of the ECJ seems to be applicable. Under 
international law only those decisions in which the EU is a party can be binding 
on it. The same is established by the ECHR (Art 46), according to which 
decisions of the ECtHR are only binding inter parties. It means that if the ECtHR 
finds a violation of ECHR rights by the EU, the ECJ will be bound by that 
decision if it has to interpret the same provisions of the ECHR in a subsequent 
case.418  
However, the CJEU already has experience in adapting its case law to that of the 
ECtHR. In the case of Hoechst, adjudicating on fundamental rights, the ECJ 
noted that the fundamental right to the inviolability of the home must be 
recognized in the Community legal order in regard to the private dwellings of 
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natural persons; and that business premises does not fall in this category.419 
According to the Court this inference is to be drawn from Article 8 of the 
ECHR.420  
The Hoechst case was decided in 1989. At that time, the ECtHR did not consider 
business premises to be protected under Article 8. However, in 1992 the ECtHR 
issued a judgment Niemitz v Germany where the Court stated that the search of a 
lawyer’s office constituted interference with the applicant’s right under Article 8, 
and since it was not considered necessary in a democratic society there had been 
a violation of Article 8. 421,422  
In 2002 the ECJ wrote a judgment on Roquette Freres423 on the same issues. The 
Court reiterated its statement made in Hoechst, that the protection of private 
activities from arbitrary interference by public authorities constitutes a general 
principle of Community law that member states are required to respect. The Court 
was explicit in stating that the scope of that principle in relation to the protection 
of business premises must be determined in accordance to the case law of the 
ECtHR subsequent to the judgment in Hoechst. The Court specified that 
according to that case law (Niemietz v Germany 1992; Colas Est and Others v. 
France, No 37971/97, 2002), the protection provided under Article 8 also extends 
to cover business premises.424  
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Examples like this give hope that maybe one day the CJEU will reconsider its 
case law on trade union freedoms and will put it in line with ECtHR case law.  
7.5.2 The Bosphorus Presumption  
Speaking about the future relationships of the two European Courts it is 
interesting to mention the Bosphorus case.425 This was an ECtHR case decided in 
2005, before the Lisbon Treaty. The major issue in this case was to decide 
whether compliance with the EU regulations could justify an impugned 
interference by the Irish authorities with the applicant company’s property rights 
protected under the Additional Protocol ECHR (Para 150-151).  
In this case the Court recognized a right of sovereign states to transfer powers and 
competences to international or supranational organizations, and acknowledged 
the obligations of member states flowing from their membership in those 
organizations. However, it stated that contracting states are not allowed to 
completely disregard their Convention responsibilities following a competence 
transfer, since this is incompatible with the Convention’s purpose (Para 154).  
So the Strasbourg Court had to find a balance between these two conflicting 
principles: the sovereignty of a state to transfer competences to international 
organizations and an obligation under the Convention for the same state to protect 
human rights. According to the Court: “state action in compliance with such legal 
obligations is justified as long as the relevant organization is considered to protect 
fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the 
mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered at 
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least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides”. At the same time, 
any such finding of equivalence could not be final and will be affected by any 
change in fundamental rights protection (Para 155). 
The Court continued by explaining that if such “equivalent protection” is 
provided by the international organization and the state implements the legal 
obligations flowing from such organization, the presumption is that the state has 
not departed from the Convention’s requirements. However, any such 
presumption can be rebutted if the circumstances of a particular case show that 
the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient (Para 156). 
The formula of “equivalent protection” is only applicable where the state had no 
discretion at all in implementing a legal act. In other words, the state would be 
fully responsible under the Convention for all acts that fall outside its strict legal 
obligations (Para 157). 
While applying these general principles to the facts of the Bosphorus case, the 
Court stated that the EU provides such equivalent protection of fundamental 
rights: the preliminary reference procedure under Article 267 TFEU was 
considered to fulfil a complementary role to national courts, offered by the EU 
legal system (Para 164); reference was also made to Article 52(3) of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (which was not yet legally binding at the time), 
which states that the meaning and scope of Charter rights shall be the same as 
their counterparts in the Convention (Para 80). 
Based on this, the Court concluded that Ireland did not infringe the Convention 
when it had implemented the legal obligations flowing from the EU, because the 
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EU offers protection of the fundamental rights equivalent to that of the 
Convention. Therefore, there was no violation of Article 1, Protocol 1 (Para 165). 
The judgment can be understood as a sign of respect from the ECtHR towards EU 
law. By refusing to review the EU legal acts on the basis on which the Irish 
government acted, the Court avoided a confrontation with the CJEU. Instead, the 
ECtHR showed that it trusts that Luxembourg can interpret and apply the 
Convention and ECtHR case law correctly. This approach of the ECtHR left a 
major question unanswered: which is the supreme human rights court in 
Europe?426  
It is without doubt that the “equivalent protection” formula puts the EU in a 
privileged situation compared to the member states’ supreme or constitutional 
courts, even though some of these Courts might have higher standards on human 
rights than the CJEU does. The following case law, however, shows that the 
ECtHR is not eager to apply this formula in a strict sense. Even though the Court 
did not repeal the presumption devised in Bosphorus, and did not show an interest 
in reviewing EU law, it still held member states liable for violations of the 
Convention in similar situations in its later case law. In the cases of MSS v 
Belgium and Greece and Michaud v France the states tried to justify their actions 
by relying on EU law. In both cases the Court made reference to Bosphorus; 
however, it stated that these two cases are different from Bosphorus, because 
unlike in Bosphorus, the requirements of EU law were not so strict in these cases, 
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and the states had a margin of discretion to choose the means to reach the goal set 
by EU law.427,428  
Seven judges in Bosphorus wrote two concurring opinions where they criticized 
the general “equivalent protection” formula introduced by the majority judges of 
the ECtHR. The judges did not question the finding of the majority that the 
human rights record of the Community had recently significantly improved. 
However, they were still of the opinion that before accession actually takes place 
the protection of human rights under the Community system is not equivalent to 
that of the ECHR. The judges cited the majority opinion that the effectiveness of 
the substantive guarantees of fundamental rights depends on the mechanisms of 
control in place to ensure such observance. According to the concurring judges 
these mechanisms are not very strong in the Community and are not comparable 
with the mechanisms offered by the ECHR. Criticism was voiced about two 
points. The first was the preliminary ruling procedure. The preliminary ruling 
procedure is not triggered by the applicant, but by the national courts. The 
interpretation provided by the EU Court is binding on the Court making the 
referral; the latter still enjoys full discretion in deciding how to apply the 
interpretations in the particular case. The second concern was related to 
individuals’ access to the Community Court, which according to the concurring 
judges was “limited”. As the majority also mentions in Paragraph 122, individual 
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applications are “one of the keystones in the machinery for the enforcement of the 
rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention”.429  
The latter concern was partially addressed by the Lisbon Treaty.430 According to 
Article 263 TFEU natural and legal persons may “institute proceedings against an 
act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, 
and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail 
implementing measures”. However, in comparison to this, the ECHR 
admissibility requirements in relation to individual applications are relatively 
broad and straightforward. According to Article 34 ECHR any persons, non-
governmental organizations or groups of individuals claiming a violation of the 
Convention rights by one of the contracting parties may send an application.  
Judge Ress wrote a separate concurring opinion. The judge expressed the opinion 
that the presumption does not exclude the possibility of a case-by-case review to 
check if there has been any violation of the Convention. The judge believed that 
case-by-case analyses are important, because the presumption of compliance with 
the Convention does not exist in relation to all Convention rights, because of the 
mere formal system of protection by the ECJ. He expressed the hope that the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights might enhance and clarify the level of control for 
the future.431  
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Judge Ress also commented on the opinion of the majority. He believed that the 
presumption of compliance can only be rebutted if it is established that the 
protection of Convention rights is manifestly deficient. One such situation might 
be when there has been an obvious misinterpretation and misapplication by the 
ECJ of the guarantees of the Convention rights. If the ECJ, when deciding the key 
question in a case, departs from the interpretation or the application of the 
Convention that had been already been the subject of well-established ECHR case 
law, it will be considered manifestly deficient protection. In case the ECtHR 
establishes different standards from those that were first established by the ECJ, 
the latter will have an obligation to take the new ECtHR standards into account 
and follow the well-established case law of the ECtHR. Even if the protection is 
“comparable” and not “equivalent”, the resulting protection of the Convention 
right must be the same.432  
If we apply this opinion to the situation of the protection of trade union freedoms, 
we see that the ECJ openly disregards the well-established case law of the ECtHR 
on that subject. In the case of Commission v Germany the Court did not even 
mention the ECtHR and its case law, leave alone the application of the standards 
established by the ECtHR in the cases of Demir and Enerji. It means that 
according to the formula offered by the concurring judge the protection of trade 
union rights by the ECJ was manifestly deficient. 
It is also notable that the so-called Bosphorus formula is not included in the 
Accession Agreement. The member states of the EU agreed not to request the 
codification of that formula in the agreement text, despite the fact that there were 
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some early calls to that effect. A decision was reached to leave this question for 
the ECtHR to decide.433 While for some commentators this approach is logical,434 
there are others who are not so convinced.  
When speaking about the accession the CJEU made reference to the Bosphorus 
judgment in 2010. The Court mentioned the existence of the equivalent protection 
of human rights in the EU, recognized by the ECtHR, and explained it by the fact 
that in recent years the CJEU regularly applies the Convention and refers to the 
case law of the ECtHR.435  
While this might be true for other Convention rights it is not that relevant with 
respect to trade union freedoms. In the cases of Viking and Laval the ECJ 
certainly referred to ECtHR cases. In the Viking case for instance, the Court made 
reference to the National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium, 1975 case, 
according to which collective negotiations and collective agreements might be 
one of the main ways in which trade unions protect their interests, but not 
necessarily the only way (Para 86). Less than a year after Viking, the ECtHR had 
changed its position with regard to this issue. In the case of Demir and Bykara the 
Court recognized the rights to collective bargaining and collective agreement as 
rights protected under Article 11 ECHR. This shift in the ECtHR case law did not 
affect the case law of the ECJ. As already mentioned, the case Commission v 
Germany 2010 did not even mention the European Convention at all (Paragraph 
37 only mentions ESC 1961/1996 and the Community Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights 1989), even though the discussion was about 
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collective bargaining and collective agreements, which the ECtHR in Demir 
recognized as rights protected under the Convention.  
There is a presumption that after the accession there will be no need to apply 
“equivalent formulas”; but not everybody shares this view. A former CJEU judge 
raises a challenging question: is it not paradoxical that credit for good behaviour 
in terms of human rights protection accepted before accession will be abandoned 
after accession, considering that after Bosphorus, the CJEU in fact improved its 
human rights protection record? In support of his argument he refers to Article 52 
(3) of the EU Charter and the increased practice of the CJEU to make reference to 
ECtHR case law. However, he also mentions the circumstances in which the 
ECtHR was making a decision in the Bosphorus case: the Court did not have 
jurisdiction to hold the EU, from which the relevant act emanated, liable. After 
accession that situation will be changed. Nevertheless, his position is that the 
Bosphorus presumption could still survive, possibly in a mitigated form, and that 
the final say in this regard belongs to the Strasbourg Court.436  
Whether the Bosphorus presumption still survives after the accession and to what 
extent, are the valid questions for Lock too. In 2009 he commented that both 
European Courts show comity towards each other, and that Bosphorus is clear 
proof of that. He argues that after accession there is no need to exercise such 
comity and therefore no need for the presumption to exist anymore. If it is 
retained it will deprive the ECtHR of a great deal of cases arising from the EU 
(the presumption only applies in cases where only the Community acted and 
where the EU obliges Member State to act). Furthermore, Lock thinks that if the 
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presumption survives it will put the EU in a privileged situation compared to 
other national courts of member states, and that such an unfair attitude would be 
hard to justify, especially considering the fact that some of the national courts 
offer better protection of human rights than the EU institutions.437  
After Opinion 2/13 on the accession was released Lock again expressed his 
opinion on Bosphorus. In the wake of a harsh criticism of Opinion 2/13 coming 
from the ECtHR President in the annual report of the Court,438 Lock thought that 
it was still unlikely that the Court would revoke the Bosphorus presumption, as it 
was based on an assessment of human rights protection in the EU which had even 
improved (EU Charter) after that. What Lock considered probable was a 
tightening of the conditions for the application of the presumption. In this way 
more cases will be reviewable by the ECtHR.439  
7.5.3 The Courts from another Angle  
In recent years the activities of the EU in the field of human rights have been 
growing. The CJEU started to invoke the (now legally binding) Charter more 
often. As a consequence, the EU rapidly became a standards-setting organization 
in the field of human rights. At the same time the ECtHR is expanding the scope 
of Convention rights by relying on the concept of “living instrument”.440 This 
approach was used in relation to various articles, including Article 11, which was 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
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This situation of overlap between the EU human rights activities and the ECHR 
might lead to two types of situations: first, that more and more areas of EU 
activity will be subject to human rights review by the ECHR; and second, that the 
EU institutions will be able to influence the interpretation of human rights by the 
ECHR as after accession they will create a new European Consensus (which is a 
comparative analysis of laws and legal practices of the ECHR contracting states, 
often relied on by the ECtHR).441  
In other words, the question is: which Court influences the other more? Will it be 
the ECtHR, which, by using a dynamic interpretation, puts more pressure on EU 
institutions and most importantly the CJEU, to interpret EU law in compatibility 
with ECtHR case law? Or will it be the EU, which, after becoming a party to the 
ECHR, promotes (makes common among member states) its standards to such an 
extent that the ECtHR will start to consider them common standards of member 
states and therefore start to use them as a basis for its judgments? It might also be 
a more constant back-and-forth of both of them influencing each other. 
I support the idea that when it comes to choosing between CJEU and ECtHR 
jurisprudence, one should have a look at the level of development of these 
standards by the Courts and take notice of those that offer better protection. For 
instance, in the case of non-discrimination, it might be argued that EU law is 
more developed and offers better protection than the case law of the ECHR.442 
Therefore, EU law has to prevail. However, in the situation of the trade union 
rights the case law of the ECHR is certainly more developed and offers better 
protection of collective labour rights than the case law of the CJEU. Therefore, it 
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would be plausible if this case law takes precedence over EU law and particularly 
CJEU jurisprudence.  
7.6 Hope for the freedom of association  
The main question which runs through this chapter as a red thread is whether 
accession can affect the protection of the freedom of association as a trade union 
right in the EU. The hope is there. It is believed that after accession the internal 
rules of the EU might be subtly subordinated to human rights. As a result, the EU 
might change its approach, according to which, when it comes to the competition 
between the internal market and human rights, the starting point for the CJEU is 
the protection of market freedoms, while human rights are seen as factors that 
could justify measures that prima facie constitute trade barriers. Although it is not 
expected that the CJEU will reposition on human rights after the accession, it is 
believed that “the function of the CJEU as a human rights court would not be 
simply a welcome surprise, but an expectation”.443  
The process of “moral subordination” of economic freedoms to human rights will 
complete the transformation of the CJEU into a human rights court, a process that 
started through the jurisprudence of the CJEU and later continued with the entry 
into force of the EU Charter.444 Even though the jurisprudence of the CJEU is not 
very supportive of trade union freedoms, it is a fact that its human rights 
jurisprudence has been significantly enriched in the last several decades. If the 
accession can have an influence on the proportionality test that the CJEU uses 
when it comes to competition between human rights and economic freedoms, it 
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will fill a gap in terms of human rights protection. This process will hopefully 
also affect the protection of trade union freedoms when they are in competition 
with economic freedoms.  
7.7 Conclusion  
After the accession the subsidiarity principle that applies to ECHR member states 
will also apply to the EU; the CJEU will not be subordinated to the ECHR, but 
will be in the same position as the national constitutional courts of the member 
states. Whether or not we call it subordination, the fact is that the ECtHR has the 
power to deliver a judgment not in concert with the constitutional courts, and 
member states are required to do their best to comply with that judgment 
(whether by amending their legislation; enacting new legislation or overturning 
the national court judgment).445 In short, the Strasbourg Court is not at the same 
hierarchical level as the national courts, but in fact it has the final say, at least 
regarding the matter of human rights protection mentioned in the Convention. 
After the accession this system will be equally applicable to the EU. If the ECtHR 
finds an incompatibility of the EU law with the ECHR, EU institutions will be 
obliged to rectify it.  
Considering the fact that the judgments of the CJEU are part of EU law, there is a 
case scenario that we can imagine: an individual lodges a case to the General 
Court on the issue of trade union rights, namely, the right to strike and the 
interpretation of the Posting Directive. The General Court will most probably 
reach the same conclusion as the ECJ reached in the cases of Laval and Viking. 
Even if the General Court were to write a different judgment, the case can still go 
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to the ECJ and with big probability the Court will not reconsider its own case 
law. After exhausting domestic remedies the individual takes the case to the 
ECtHR. Let us assume that the ECtHR does not accept the interpretation of the 
ECJ about the Posting Directive (as it interpreted the Directive as a ceiling) and 
states that it is incompatible with the ECHR. This is very likely to happen, 
considering the recent case law of the ECtHR in which the scope of the freedom 
of association as a trade union right was extended. What happens next? While the 
ECtHR is considered a specialized court in human rights the judgments of which 
are obligatory for the parties (Article 46(1) ECHR), the EU will be required to 
rectify the situation in terms of trade union rights protection. How can the EU do 
that? It probably has to reconsider the well-known proportionality test developed 
in Viking and Laval. Even if the CJEU agrees on that (the Explanatory Report 
states that while the EU is a contracting party to the Convention the decisions of 
the ECHR will be binding on EU institutions, including the CJEU (Para 26)), it is 
interesting to see how it could do it. The EU fundamental freedoms of movement 
are still the priority of the CJEU. The same would likely happen if the case were 
to reach the CJEU through a preliminary procedure, via national courts.  
Technical issues are also important: if the ECtHR establishes an incompatibility, 
does this mean that the case should go back to the CJEU? Or shall the CJEU wait 
for a future case (with the same content) in order to change its approach? 
Here we have another problem: by adjudicating on the rights protected under the 
Convention, the ECtHR (whether deliberately or not) also affects EU law. In 
other words, by interpreting the freedom of association as a trade union right the 
ECtHR also interprets the Posted Workers Directive, which is EU law. This takes 
us to a very sensitive issue: EU legal autonomy.  
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The autonomy of the EU was and still is one of the main concerns of the drafters 
of the accession agreement. It means that only the EU (mostly the CJEU) deals 
with the interpretation of EU law. According to Article 344 TFEU, in order to 
retain consistency and coherence the Union Courts are the only ones competent to 
decide on problems of EU law. This issue was also raised in the CJEU Opinion. 
The interpretation of the fundamental freedoms of the EU is a clear-cut case – 
only EU institutions have a jurisdiction to interpret them – but what about human 
rights? The rights found in the EU Charter are part of EU law, because after the 
Lisbon Treaty they acquired legal force similar to the EU Treaties. Some of these 
rights, however, are included in the ECHR. It is not clear how the two Courts will 
share the jurisdiction over these issues and how they would resolve a conflict that 
might arise when it comes to the interpretation of these rights.  
In his agenda the new President of the European Commission highlights the 
importance of the accession of the EU to the ECtHR. He entrusts the 
Commissioner with specific responsibilities to conclude the accession process, 
which is an obligation under the EU Treaties.446 Interesting is how the 
Commission will decide to act now, after the CJEU opinion. 
Chapter VIII – Conclusion  
We have seen that freedom of association as a trade union right was strongly 
opposed by different states over years, but because of its great importance it was 
mentioned in all three major documents of the International Bill of Human 
Rights. It is a right that opens the door for the realization of other rights and 
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therefore is fairly considered not only a civil and political right, but also an 
economic and social one. The fact that the First Additional Protocol to the 
ICESCR was adopted and entered into force in May 2013 gives hope that the 
freedom of association will be better protected in the future.  
The importance of freedom of association as a trade union right is fairly well 
noted on UN level. The fact that a special rapporteur was appointed recently by 
the UN to work on the issue of freedom of association is a clear example of this. 
Trade unions play an important role in the development of liberal democracies.447 
Therefore, it is of utmost importance to ensure effective enforcement of trade 
union rights at an international level.  
The ILO is the organization which has elaborated freedom of association 
standards from the very beginning of its existence. This is the most authoritative 
source on labour rights, and therefore both the ICCPR and the ICESCR make 
direct reference to the ILO Convention on Freedom of Association, suggesting 
that the scope of the trade union rights mentioned in these documents shall be 
defined with ILO standards on mind.  
Freedom of association is one of the major principles the work of the ILO is 
based on. The importance of this principle is recognized at every level of ILO 
activity. The Declaration of Philadelphia 1946, incorporated into the ILO 
Constitution, first emphasized the importance of freedom of association for 
sustained progress. Since then all the important documents at the ILO level paid 
due regard to this principle. ILO Conventions 87 and 98 are the main texts the 
ILO supervisory organs use to promote freedom of association.  
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As the result of more than a half century of work, the ILO supervisory organs 
established that the following are the components of the principle of freedom of 
association: the right to strike; the right to organize freely and conclude collective 
agreements; the right not to be prejudiced and discriminated for trade union 
activity.  
For the ILO organs freedom of association is a tool that enables workers and 
employers to be equally represented in the negotiation process and to enjoy equal 
rights. Mutual respect and the protection of rights is the only guarantee for social 
justice.  
The ILO offers the highest standards of protection of trade union freedoms. At 
the same time, the ILO takes into consideration the necessary measures that states 
sometimes have to refer to in order to save the economy in times of crisis. 
Therefore, it allows states to introduce restrictions on the freedom of association, 
providing that these restrictions are reasonable, last no more than necessary and 
are agreed with the workers’ and employers’ organizations. The ILO also allows 
certain restrictions in relation to public servants and those working in essential 
services, but on the condition that public servants are the ones exercising 
authority in the name of the state and that essential services are interpreted 
narrowly.  
On the regional level trade union rights protection developed much later. Within 
the framework of the EU, the ECJ was the institution that first started to 
recognize the freedom of association. Bosman was the first case where the Court 
established freedom of association as a general EU principle. This was in 1995. In 
1996, the Court in Albany recognized the right to form and join trade unions as 
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part of the freedom of association. Since then the Court developed the freedom of 
association. In Viking the right to strike was recognized and in finally in 2010 the 
Court recognized the right to bargain and the right to conclude collective 
agreements in the case against Germany (Commission v Germany).  
One might say that the EU Court came very close to the respected standards of 
the ILO on the freedom of association. It has recognized all the necessary 
elements of the freedom of association that the ILO organs consider important for 
trade unions to protect their members.  
The problem, however, is not so much with the recognition of the elements of 
freedom of association, but with the extent to which a given institution allows 
restrictions on those rights. The ECJ, most importantly, has allowed restrictions 
on trade union freedoms in order to safeguard fundamental freedoms of 
movement of the EU. This type of restriction is not known to the ILO organs. The 
proportionality test that the Court introduced in the Viking and Laval cases is hard 
to reconcile with the ILO standards. In Viking the ECJ instructed the national 
court to assess first if the jobs of the workers were “jeopardized or under serious 
threat” and if the collective action by the trade union was necessary to protect 
these jobs. After establishing this, the national court has further to ascertain 
whether the trade union action is “suitable for ensuring the objective pursued and 
does not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective”. This makes strike 
action a last resort for trade unions, which can only be relied on if workers are 
losing their jobs. This position, is, of course, against the understanding of the 
right to strike offered by the ILO, which allows strikes as long as they don’t go 
violent and as long as they pursue economic and social objectives.  
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The interpretation of the Posted Workers Directive in Laval is also problematic. 
The ECJ offered a very strict reading of the Directive. Basically, it made the 
Directive a ceiling for the protection of workers’ rights. Only if the provider of a 
foreign service voluntarily signs a collective agreement in the host state (offering 
better protection to the workers than the Directive), this agreement can be 
applicable to posted workers. But this is a scenario that is very unlikely to happen 
if the collective agreement indeed offers better protection for workers than the 
Directive. No employer will be willing to burden himself with additional 
responsibilities, especially if they are costly.  
The Rüffert and Luxembourg cases further show that the Court does not give 
much freedom to the member states when the issue concerns economic freedoms. 
The Court blocks any initiative of member states that try to enhance protection of 
posted workers and therefore impose more obligations on the employer, clearly 
taking the side of the employer. This situation is not really compatible with the 
ILO, which offers the highest standards of worker protection. The ILO 
Conventions are equally concerned with the protection of employers and 
employees. This means that during the negotiations on terms and conditions of 
work, their rights should be equally protected and respected. Both parties to the 
negotiation should have an equal say. In the ECJ case, I think the balance is 
distorted. The ECJ is clearly on the side of employers and this is explained by one 
main reason: economic integration is needed.  
On the other hand, another European Court makes its standards on freedoms of 
association higher. The Court decided to strengthen the protection of trade union 
freedoms by giving member states less choice in choosing the means of 
protection. Since Demir, collective bargaining and collective agreement are no 
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longer mere means for the protection of trade union freedoms that states might 
choose to guarantee or not. Now they are inherent elements of the freedom of 
association. This decision was made by relying on the ILO and the ESC. 
Presumably, ILO organs would approve this shift in ECtHR jurisprudence. The 
right to organize and the right to conclude collective agreements are cornerstones 
in the ILO for the protection of workers’ rights. The same goes for the ESC, 
which in this sense has the same set of standards as the ILO. The fact that the 
ECtHR directly refers to the ILO and ESC standards without discussing them 
makes me think that the European Court accepts the standards established by 
these international institutions on the right to bargain and collective agreement, 
including the scope of the restrictions that these institutions allow in relation to 
these rights.  
The case of CJEU is different. In Commission v Germany (a case decided after 
Demir and Baykara, in 2010) the Court restricts the right of parties to collective 
bargaining, without even mentioning the ECtHR or ILO standards. However, the 
Court does mention Article 28 of the EU Charter and makes the statement that 
even though the right to bargain collectively is a recognized right, it is not an 
absolute right and it needs to be reconciled with the fundamental freedoms of the 
EU, most importantly, with the principle of proportionality developed by the ECJ 
in Viking and Laval. The mention of the EU Charter together with Viking and 
Laval is a clear example for me of how the Court tries to adjust the interpretation 
of the human rights to the unique system of EU law. In this process, ECtHR and 
ILO standards are only partially respected.  
The right to strike creates a different situation. Here, the ECtHR does not fully 
comply with ILO standards. The Court was reluctant to explicitly recognize the 
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right to strike as an inherent element of the freedom of association, as it was done 
with the right to collective bargaining and collective agreement. The RMT 
judgment later slightly changed the situation; the Court recognized secondary 
strikes, but supported the UK’s total ban on it. This, of course, is not in concert 
with the ILO, which does not lose a chance to criticize the UK for this. The Court 
seems to share the UK government’s economic argument that secondary strikes 
might harm the economic situation in a country. I think it would have been wiser 
of the Court to use a case-by-case approach to secondary strikes instead of 
supporting total ban. The UK could still regulate secondary strikes on its territory 
and the Court would have made a judgment closer to ILO and ESC standards. 
With the RMT judgment the Court actually got closer to CJEU jurisprudence, 
most significantly to Viking. In both cases, the Courts recognized the right to 
strike (in Viking primary strike, in RMT secondary strike) and in both of them the 
restrictions were justified and ILO standards disregarded. 
Getting closer to the CJEU judgment on the right to strike does not really makes 
the ECtHR jurisprudence attractive for the ILO. The ILO Committee of Experts 
in the British case of BALPA stated that the doctrine the ECJ elaborated in the 
Laval and Viking cases was very likely to have a significant restrictive effect on 
the exercise of the right to strike, in a manner that is contrary to ILO Convention 
87.448  
One challenge of this research lies in the fact that the institutions setting trade 
union standards in Europe have different goals and agendas and operate in very 
different contexts, with very different backgrounds. The ILO is the oldest 
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international organization in the world, established in 1919 and having witnessed 
the aftermath of WWI and scourges of WWII. It has been concerned with the 
protection of labour rights in the world since then. Even though the scope of ILO 
activities is very broad, the organisation still works mainly on social and 
economic rights. The belief is that only by achieving social justice, one can 
achieve world peace. The situation is different with the EU. The creation of this 
Union was also stimulated by the desire to promote peace and prevent countries 
on the continent to get involved in future conflicts, by establishing supervision of 
their production of coal and steel. With time, this purpose became less important 
and the EU became an economic union, the main focus of which always was to 
create wealth and to guarantee economic prosperity. Only at a later stage, with the 
jurisprudence of the EU Court, the EU started to be concerned with human rights 
protection. Nevertheless, economic freedoms are still in a preferable situation 
when it comes to a conflict between these two. On the other hand, the Council of 
Europe from the very beginning was created for human rights protection. The 
ECtHR was always concerned with human rights and only, but unlike the ILO, it 
was mostly concerned with civil and political rights.  
We can see how different these institutions are. It is not a surprise that the 
standards established by them are also different. The fact that they are not 
subordinated to each other and run their agendas separately complicates the 
establishment of acceptable standards of trade union freedoms in the Union. The 
accession of the EU to the ECtHR is seen as a solution in this situation.  
Before going ahead with accession, it has to be noted with respect that it took the 
EU a long time to establish human rights discourse in its institutions, including 
and probably most importantly in the ECJ. Human rights gradually became a 
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concern of the EU. It took some time before the recognition of trade union 
freedoms actually happened. It can be said that human rights, including the 
freedom of association, are protected under EU law and ECJ jurisprudence. The 
problem arises when these human rights are in contradiction with the EU’s 
fundamental freedoms of movement. In these cases the ECJ, though trying to 
introduce balance between these competing values, in fact abandons the human 
rights approach and focuses more on the interests of the internal market.  
The EU Charter acquiring legally binding force did not change the attitude of the 
ECJ. In fact, the tendency has revealed that the Court might interpret the Charter 
not necessarily in conjunction with the international standards of the ILO or those 
of the ECtHR. The last bastion is the EU’s accession to the ECHR. Accession has 
the potential to shed light on many aspects of human rights by introducing 
common standards acceptable for everybody in Europe.  
However, the process of accession has been seriously hindered by the CJEU 
Opinion. The Court considered that the autonomy and specific characteristic of 
the EU and EU law are endangered by accession. Specificity was defined as 
follows: EU law stems from an independent source of law: the Treaties; these 
Treaties have primacy over national laws; the concept of direct effect allows a 
whole series of Treaty provisions to be applicable to member states and their 
nationals. The Court further clarified that fundamental rights recognized by the 
Charter are at the heart of the EU legal structure and that the autonomy that EU 
law enjoys in relation to national and international laws requires that the 
interpretation of the Charter rights are ensured within the framework of the 
structure and the objectives of the EU (Para 164-170).  
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The commentaries of the commentators cited above, that after the accession one 
Court will not be subordinated to the other, but they will share their field of 
influence, did not seem to convince the judges in Luxembourg. They also did not 
take into account the main message of the accession agreement that the ECtHR is 
not going to interpret any provisions of EU law, but only their conformity with 
the ECHR standards.  
To some extent, I also share the fear of the CJEU that the ECtHR, when judging 
the compatibility of the EU act with the ECHR, will still need to interpret that act 
and in this way will intrude in the jurisdiction of the CJEU. Although what 
surprises me is that this fear was not mentioned during the negotiation process on 
the Association Agreement, where Luxembourg was actively involved.  
One thing is certain, judges in Luxembourg cannot go against the will of the 
states that put the accession provision in the Treaties and that are seriously 
determined to implement it in practice. In his agenda the new President of the 
European Commission highlights the importance of the accession of the EU to 
the ECtHR. He entrusts the Commissioner with specific responsibilities to 
conclude the accession process, which is an obligation under the EU Treaty.449 
Therefore, I still believe that accession is unavoidable.  
About the effect of accession on trade union rights not many academics comment. 
Most probably this is because predicting the developments of the case law of the 
European Courts is not an easy thing to do; especially now, after Opinion 2/13, 
when it is not clear yet how the accession process will unfold, and whether there 
will be a new accession agreement taking into account Opinion 2/13 or whether 
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there will be an amendment to the Lisbon Treaty, in which case it will not be 
necessary to consider the comments of the CJEU.  
If the accession happens on the conditions of the CJEU, it will have 
approximately the same influence on trade union freedoms as the EU Charter did. 
The Luxembourg Court will most probably continue with its proportionality test 
and will not change its attitude towards trade union freedoms in contradiction 
with EU fundamental freedoms.  
But there is another solution to this. Member states might add to the EU Treaties 
an additional Protocol that will explicitly state that the accession is still going to 
happen notwithstanding Article 6(2) Treaty on European Union, Protocol (No 8) 
relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union and Opinion 2/13 of the 
Court of Justice of 18 December 2014.450  
If this will be the case, we can still hope that accession will take place and that 
the EU institutions will actually be obliged to respect the ECHR standards, as 
defined by the Court, if they are party to a particular case. This is very much 
possible. After all, this was the wish of all the parties participating in the 
negotiating process over the Accession Agreement.  
After the accession, the CJEU Court will have to take notice of the ECHR 
standards on trade union freedoms. While imposing restrictions on trade union 
freedoms the CJEU Court will have to think twice. If the case reaches the ECtHR 
and Strasbourg finds that the grounds for the restriction are not acceptable for the 
ECHR and the international standards of the ILO and ESC, which it often refers 
to, the Court might find a violation of the Convention and the CJEU will have to 
                                                          
450 Supra note 390.  
261 
 
reconsider its judgment. This will be a detrimental blow to the EU’s reputation in 
general, which claims to have a very high standard of human rights protection. I 
believe that the CJEU Court will be inclined to prove that the Bosphorus 
presumption was not just a noble act of the ECtHR, but a well-deserved prize.  
In conclusion, I will briefly answer the two main questions of this thesis:  
1. What is the lower acceptable level of freedom of association in 
Europe?  
2. How can it be changed after the EU accession to the ECtHR? 
Freedom of association as a trade union right is guaranteed in all the major 
international and European documents. The right to bargain collectively, the right 
to conclude collective agreements and the right to strike are now recognized by 
ECtHR and CJEU case law as elements of the freedom of association, which can 
be used by the trade unions to protect the interests of their members.  
The right to bargain collectively, the right to conclude collective agreements and 
the right to strike are all recognized in Europe, in the relevant legal texts as well 
as in the case law of the Courts. Differences emerge when it comes to the 
restrictions on these rights. I believe that, after the accession, the scope of the 
acceptable restrictions in Strasbourg and in Luxembourg might be synchronized.  
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